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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Institutional investors
Financial institutions enable people to shift resources across time and reach different finan-
cial goals. Traditionally, people do business mainly with banks, but over time people have
started increasingly dealing directly with institutions like pension funds, insurance companies
and mutual funds, and indirectly with sovereign wealth funds, endowment funds and other
investment companies. Today, these institutional investors manage the vast majority of the sav-
ings of individuals. Individuals rely on financial institutions either because they lack the high
level of expertise, confidence and time to manage their savings directly (Allen, 2001; Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2013), or because they are required to participate by law. The challenge
is to ensure that the financial institutions to whom individuals entrust their money act in their
interest.
In my dissertation, I focus mainly on one type of financial institution: defined benefit (DB)
pension funds. In a DB pension fund, the sponsor promises a monthly retirement benefit that
is predetermined by a formula based on the employee’s earnings history, tenure of service and
age, rather than depending directly on individual investment returns. On the other end of the
retirement systems spectrum are defined contribution (DC) pension plans. In a DC pension
plan, fixed contributions are paid by employers and employees, while future retirement bene-
fits depend on the investment returns and interest rates. In DB plans, the pension fund board
and executives are responsible for the benefit design, asset allocation policy and performance.
The fiduciary duty of a pension fund’s Board of Trustees as well as its executives is to act in the
best interest of their beneficiaries. In the context of DC pension funds, plan sponsors select the
menu of available investment options, while each plan member is individually responsible for
the asset allocation decision as well as the retirement consumption decision.
The strength of DB pension funds is to provide insurance to the plan members against the
risk of outliving their assets, in a way that allows for intergenerational as well as intragenera-
tional risk-sharing (Merton, 1983; Shiller, 1999). Such risk-sharing makes the impact of shocks
both smaller and more persistent (Ball and Mankiw, 2007), and is welfare-enhancing in stan-
dard economic models (Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005). For instance, generations of
workers and retirees share the risk through changes in the contributions paid by workers and
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through changes in the inflation protection of pensions and pension rights. However, the in-
volvement of multiple generations in a DB pension system creates potential agency conflicts.
Agency conflicts have been extensively studied in the corporate finance literature since
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), focusing on the firm as an institution. One
side of corporate finance focuses on shareholders putting their money in the hands of man-
agers who decide how it should be spent. Another side of this literature considers the conflict
of interest between different stakeholders in a corporation, like bondholders and shareholders.
Similar conflicts of interest exist in DB pension plans, where people rely on this pension system
to manage savings and offer retirement packages.
First, different generations of plan beneficiaries have opposing interests depending on the
funding status of the pension fund. During underfunding periods, the young generation
would be tempted to leave the DB pension fund instead of guaranteeing the pension bene-
fits of the retired generation through higher contributions. In periods when assets exceed the
liabilities value, the old generation would consider closing the pension fund and distributing
the surplus among the current members. However, the wealth transfers can affect not only the
plan members, but also more broadly the taxpayers. If DB pension systems shift the funding
burden in a hidden way, then there can be wealth transfers from the taxpayers towards the plan
members because the pension promises are usually backed with implicit or explicit guarantees.
Second, all plan beneficiaries also need to ensure that pension fund executives act in their
interest. There are multiple levels of intermediaries, such as board members, pension fund
management team, asset managers, consultants and actuaries, between the plan members and
their retirement assets. When delegating the management of retirement savings to these in-
termediaries, plan members are uncertain about their true incentives and skills. For example,
pension funds decide whether to manage the investments directly or to delegate this respon-
sibility to external managers and fund-of-funds. Pension fund boards and executives should
make this decision based on their expertise and capacity to manage investments internally,
but they could also consider their risk aversion, compensation structure, job preservation and
other career concerns (Goyal and Wahal, 2008; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992). If these
additional concerns alter the delegation decision, than the intermediaries can benefit to the
detriment of plan members.
Over time, these two agency conflicts have become more evident as pension fund asset
value declined substantially relative to their liabilities, which represent the future promised
pension benefits (Brown, 2008; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011). The financial status of pension
plans is one of the most important questions confronting state and local governments as well
as private sector companies.1 In periods of underfunding, DB systems require increased con-
tributions increase and threaten the ability of governments to adequately fund other public
services and the ability of firms to invest in profitable investment projects. The rising costs and
1Novy-Marx and Rauh (2012) show that financial losses of U.S. state pension funds in 2008 accounted for 12 to
68 percent of the revenue generated by the state governments. When examining corporate decisions to freeze DB
plans, Rauh, Stefanescu, and Zeldes (2013) document that firms save around 3 percent of payroll per year, and over
a 10-year horizon they save more than 3 percent of total firm assets.
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soaring amount of unfunded liabilities also result in increasing demands for transparency and
accountability.
The increased public scrutiny focuses especially on the asset allocation of pension funds
and their relations with financial intermediaries as pension funds delegate more than 86 per-
cent of the asset management in 2010 (source: CEM Benchmarking Inc. 2010 data) to external
managers and fund-of-funds. Concerns have been raised about the way in which interme-
diaries are compensated (Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner, 2011). Recently, agency conflicts in
pension plan investing through placement agents and consultants were uncovered in the cases
of CalPERS and the New York State pension plan. For example, in the CalPERS case, one of
these placement agents received more than $50 million in kickback payments from one asset
management firm as a compensation for the assistance in obtaining the CalPERS business.2
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide greater understanding of these two agency con-
flicts that arise when individuals entrust their money to financial institutions. My dissertation
focuses mainly on the agency problems in DB retirement plans, but the implications can be
extended to collective DC pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and endowment funds. I
analyze the asset allocation and performance of DB pension funds over the last two decades,
and in this period pension funds faced maturing client population as well as declining interest
rates. In the analysis of changes in strategic asset allocation of pension funds, I also incorporate
the difference in regulation of pension funds across countries.
The finance literature generally presumes that the fundamental theoretical problem is to op-
timize the individual portfolio of investment assets. However, when designing retirement sys-
tems, the fundamental problem is the regulator’s problem of monitoring the pension plans on
behalf of individuals, some of whom are currently capable to manage their risks independently
and some of whom are not. The regulator should promote the management of retirement risks
not only among people who are currently actively managing their own risks, but also among
people who are still minors or not born yet, and also among many adults who are not capable
to fully manage their own risks, because of their limited financial knowledge, or limits of cur-
rent retirement products (Shiller, 1999). In a DB pension context, the main responsibility of the
regulator is to ensure that these funds can provide stable and adequate pension to their bene-
ficiaries. The regulator should mitigate the potential agency conflicts in DB pension plans, by
ensuring that the current generation does not benefit at the expense of future generation and
by ensuring that pension fund boards and executives fulfil their fiduciary duty.
1.2 Pension fund asset allocation and performance
The first question this thesis explores is the design of a strategic asset allocation policy. I ex-
amine how pension funds modify the asset allocation policy and liability valuation in response
to the maturing participant base and declining interest rates. Human capital life-cycle theory
suggests that asset allocation and liability discount rate choices should be more conservative as
2see “Calpers Rocked by Pay to Play,” The Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2009.
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a fund matures. I analyze whether differences in regulation influence the response of pension
funds to these two trends that are exogenous to individual pension fund boards’ decisions.
Next, I investigate how pension funds implement the asset allocation policy. Pension funds
engage in three asset management decisions: changing the strategic asset allocation policy,
market timing and security selection. I explore the role of size and liquidity for pension fund
performance in all three asset management components. DB pension funds are particulary
interesting vehicles to study the relation between size and performance, because pension fund
inflows do not depend on performance, but on actuarial and demographic factors. This long-
term liability structure potentially enables DB pension funds to make substantial investments
in illiquid assets.
Gradually over time, institutional investors have modified their strategic asset allocation
towards increased exposure to alternative assets, such as real estate, private equity and hedge
funds. In alternative assets, institutional investors usually do not act as the ultimate portfolio
manager, but rather delegate the asset management decisions to financial intermediaries, like
external managers and fund-of-funds. I also consider the specialization decision, which cap-
tures whether institutions invest only in one alternative asset class, or invest simultaneously
in two or three alternative asset classes. My main contribution is to consider how levels of
intermediation and specialization relate to costs and performance of institutional investors in
alternative assets.
In the remainder of this introduction, I briefly discuss the content of the different chapters
and provide a summary of the key findings.
1.2.1 Strategic asset allocation policy
The challenge for DB pension funds is how to periodically update critical aspects of the pension
deal, such as the contribution levels, strategic asset allocations, and the kind of inflation pro-
tection offered. These modifications are based on the financial situation of the pension fund,
which compares the asset value with the projected value of liabilities. When estimating the
financial situation, boards need to decide on a few key input parameters such as the level of
expected returns, interest and inflation rates, and the discount rate used to value the liability
stream, as well as a number of actuarial indicators such as life expectancies.
Depending on the regulatory framework, these decisions either can be left at the full discre-
tion of the pension funds, or they can be heavily restricted by regulation or public policy. The
regulations pertaining to Canadian and European public and private funds, as well as to cor-
porate pension funds in the United States, require use of liability discount rates that are based
on high quality interest rates. In contrast, U.S. public funds may link the liability discount
rates to the expected rate of return on their assets. Financial theory (Brown and Wilcox, 2009;
Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011) suggests that future streams of pension benefit payments should
be discounted at a rate that reflects the riskiness of their promised pension benefits. Beneficia-
ries of pension promises, for both public and corporate entities, seem well protected by law,
implying that these pension payments are relatively certain and bear relatively little systemic
risk (Brown, 2008; Brown and Wilcox, 2009).
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In Chapter 2, I empirically study the consequences of the distinct regulatory environment
for U.S. public pension funds by examining their asset allocations, liability discount rates, and
performance. I argue that the regulatory framework for U.S. public funds gives them incentives
to invest more in risky assets in order to maintain a higher liability discount rate and present
an improved funding position. Economic theory suggests that the asset allocation and liability
discount rate choices should be more conservative as a pension fund matures. This is indeed
how U.S. corporate pension funds and Canadian and European public and private funds have
responded. These funds lower their liability discount rates if interest rates decline, and invest
less in risky assets and use lower liability discount rates as their participant base matures.
However, U.S. public pension funds are unique in choosing more risky asset allocations and
not lowering the discount rates as their plan member base matures. Further, for U.S. public
funds, I find no relation between their liability discount rates and interest rates.
These results suggest that part of the asset allocation decisions of U.S. public funds may
be driven by a desire to camouflage or make up for underfunding. I find that the increased
risk-taking of U.S. public pension funds has resulted in a relative underperformance of more
than 60 basis points annually on a net benchmark-adjusted basis, which is consistent with asset
allocation decisions being made sub-optimally.
These results point to a basic conflict of interest between current and future stakeholders
of U.S. public pension funds. Current generation (including executives, members, and their
board representatives; politicians; and taxpayers) has a direct incentive to underestimate the
current value of existing promised pension benefits and transfer this risk to future generations.
The underestimation of the existing liabilities value may allow the current stakeholders to pay
lower required contributions to the pension funds and postpone tough changes in the pension
benefits. For instance, in 2011 and 2012, CalPERS Board members decided not to lower the
liability discount rate from 7.75% to 7.25%, because this could have resulted in an even lower
self-reported funding ratio (the funding ratio in 2010 was 83 percent) and increase in state’s
employee pension costs of approximately 4.2 percent of payroll per year. The increase in the
required contributions would have been even higher for the local governments and public
safety agencies.3
My findings indicate that the current regulatory framework allows U.S. public pension
funds to make strategic decisions that camouflage the real value of their promised pension
benefits. These decisions could result in substantial redistributions between generations and
could have negative implications for future stakeholders and taxpayers.
1.2.2 Pension fund asset management decisions
Chapter 3 extends the analysis of pension fund asset allocation by examining how pension
funds implement strategic asset allocation decisions over time. This chapter examines the per-
formance of the three asset management decisions made by a large institutional investor: asset
allocation, market timing, and security selection.
3see “CalPERS Should Cut Assumed Return to 7.25% From 7.75%, Actuary Recommends,” Bloomberg News,
March 7, 2012.
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I also explore the role of size and liquidity for pension fund performance in all three as-
set management components. On the positive side, less liquid investments have potentially
higher expected returns. Large scale may provide significant bargaining power vis-a-vis ex-
ternal money managers or allow funds to attract investment talent internally. On the negative
side, larger size may make trading in less liquid securities much more difficult, may limit the
investment strategies available and create organizational complexities. Pension funds seem
particularly interesting vehicles to study questions related to size and liquidity in investment
management performance, because they tend to be larger than other institutional investors,
like mutual funds or endowment funds. Pension fund incentives also differ substantially, as
DB pension fund inflows do not depend on performance, but on actuarial and demographic
factors. This long-term liability structure further enables pension funds to make substantial
investments in illiquid assets.
The first component of asset management, asset allocation, compares the impact of the
change in strategic asset allocation policy weights over last year, relative to not changing the
previous year policy weights. The second component is market timing, defined as the dif-
ference between strategic policy and actual (realized) allocation weights. Market timing thus
captures the performance related to overweighting or underweighting particular asset classes,
relative to the policy weights in that year. The third component is security selection, corre-
sponding to net benchmark-adjusted returns or the difference between realized net returns and
benchmark returns for a given asset class. This captures the returns due to picking securities
and timing industries and styles within an asset class.
After risk-adjusting, I find that pension funds obtain positive returns from changes in strate-
gic asset allocation and market timing, but not from security selection. The positive abnormal
market timing returns can be fully attributed to passive exposure to ‘time series’ momentum,
and not to any active rebalancing. Pension funds benefit from simultaneously investing in
multiple asset classes, but would have performed even better if they had invested more in pas-
sive mandates without frequent rebalancing across asset classes. For comparison, the average
annual investment cost of passive mandates is 6 basis points compared to 45 basis points for
active mandates.
Larger pension funds do not manage to transfer their lower investment costs into higher
net returns. Rather, I document diseconomies of scale in pension fund performance. The dis-
economies of scale are primarily apparent for funds investing in less liquid assets, as proxied
by fund total return loadings on the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded systematic liquidity
factor. Smaller pension funds obtain higher total returns and especially higher market timing
returns. The better market timing returns of smaller funds can be explained by two effects.
First, smaller funds can be managed in a more flexible way that enables them to deviate further
from their strategic asset allocation weights. Second, even if smaller pension funds have to
rebalance to restore their strategic weights, such rebalancing has lower market impact.
Overall, pension funds seem to have most expertise in designing strategic asset allocation
and market timing policies, rather than in actively selecting securities or in finding external
managers with superior security selection skills. When I compare the total performance of
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funds depending on the percentage actively managed assets, I document that especially larger
pension funds would have done better if they had invested in passive mandates without fre-
quent rebalancing across asset classes. The most actively managed group of pension funds has
significantly greater liquidity-related diseconomies of scale, as pension funds that are in the
largest quartile group underperform similarly sized funds with much less active management
by about 62 basis points per year.
1.2.3 Financial intermediation in alternative assets
During the 1990-2011 period, institutional investors have increased the amount of investments
in alternative asset classes, attracted by the promise of superior absolute returns and low cor-
relation with traditional assets such as equities and bonds. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine the
allocations of institutional investors to real assets, private equity and hedge funds. My main
contribution is to consider how levels of intermediation and specialization relate to costs and
performance of institutional investors in alternative assets.
I distinguish three levels of intermediaries serving as an interface between investors and
assets. Institutional investors can manage the alternative investments internally (in-house),
delegate the asset management to external managers or delegate even the selection of exter-
nal managers to fund-of-funds. Establishing a competitive internal asset management division
requires investors to pay high fixed costs for employee compensation, information gathering
and structuring of investments. When delegating the asset management to financial interme-
diaries, institutional investors trade off higher anticipated returns from these intermediaries
against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty
about their true incentives and skills. The private markets for alternative assets offer an appro-
priate setting to compare the performance across the three levels of intermediation, since the
identification of good managers or projects is impeded by limited disclosure, a rapidly growing
number of funds and proliferation of investment strategies in all three alternative asset classes.
In terms of net benchmark-adjusted returns, institutions that invest through internal man-
agers tend to perform better than their counterparts, that rely on financial intermediaries. More
layers of financial intermediation result in lower performance in all three alternative asset
classes: real assets, private equity and hedge funds. The outperformance of internal man-
agers compared to financial intermediaries stems from two sources. First, for sufficiently large
institutional investors, establishing internal management divisions costs significantly less than
investing through external managers and fund-of-funds. Second, internal managers can suc-
cessfully compete with financial intermediaries in the private markets and manage to obtain
similar or higher gross returns in all three alternative asset classes.
I consider also the specialization decision, which captures whether institutions invest only
in one alternative asset class, or invest simultaneously in two or three alternative asset classes.
From a mean-variance perspective, adding asset classes to the overall portfolio brings diversi-
fication benefits. However, each alternative asset class is different and requires its own exper-
tise. The effect of specialization on performance is non-uniform and depends on mandate size.
In general, institutions realize significant economies of scale in their alternative investments.
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However, smaller institutional investors that specialize in one alternative asset class perform
significantly better than smaller investors that invest simultaneously in multiple alternative as-
set classes. The opposite is true for larger institutions. Large specializing investors may face
liquidity related diseconomies of scale and are better off when investing simultaneously in
multiple alternative assets.
The results regarding the effect of investment approach and size on performance in alter-
native assets are consistent with the model of financial intermediation by Stoughton, Wu, and
Zechner (2011). Fund-of-funds’ underperformance on a gross and net basis relative to internal
and external managers confirms the Stoughton et al. (2011) prediction that, in private markets
with kickback compensations, underperforming assets are more likely to be sold indirectly,
through multiple layers of financial intermediaries.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis on pension fund investments in alternative assets, by ex-
amining in more detail institutional allocations to real estate. Based on the assets under man-
agement, real estate is the most significant alternative asset class for institutional investors.
Moreover, real estate represents an intersection between public and private markets. Only in
real estate, investors have the option to substitute an illiquid product (direct real estate) with a
liquid product, like real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Although listed REITs provide liquid and scalable property exposure, which should make
these vehicles attractive to smaller investors, I document that larger funds are in fact more
likely to invest in REITs. Allocations to REITs are mostly implemented as complementary in-
vestments to the direct real estate holdings of larger pension funds, while smaller funds allocate
more capital to financial intermediaries in direct real estate. Smaller pension funds do not seem
to recognize that REITs represent an investment approach in real estate that is comparable to
selecting financial intermediaries investing in direct real estate, but with substantially lower
investment costs.
I also analyze the contribution of alternative assets to the overall investor performance. I
find that especially smaller institutional investors would have been better off by not investing
in alternative assets. I document that smaller investors would have obtained at least two per-
centage points higher annual returns, if they had invested passively in public equity rather than
alternative assets. Smaller institutional investors consistently underperform their self-reported
public equity benchmarks with their investments in real assets, private equity and hedge funds.
1.3 Implications for pension fund governance
Pension funds serve as agents that enable the principle, plan members, to save for retirement.
People rely on pension funds to manage their wealth because they are required by law to save
through this institutions or because they lack knowledge and monitoring capacity to manage
investments directly. However, the fact that the principle does not possess sufficient expertise
and requires an agent creates additional agency conflicts (Allen, 2001).
In this dissertation, I show that among pension funds two agency conflicts exist. Both of
these agency conflicts could be reduced substantially by greater transparency in the pension
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fund valuation as well as in the relations between pension funds and asset management indus-
try.
First, different generations of plan members and taxpayers have opposing interests when
a DB pension fund is underfunded. Current stakeholders have an incentive to postpone re-
structuring the pension benefit promises and to transfer the underfunding risk to the future
generation. Chapter 2 shows that pension fund asset allocation decisions implemented by the
current generation can be influenced by the regulatory incentives to mask funding problems
and shift the risk to future generations as well as to tax payers. In the past two decades, U.S.
public pension funds uniquely increased allocations to riskier investments, which allows them
to maintain high discount rates even as interest rates decline, thereby camouflaging their de-
gree of underfunding. The purpose of public and private DB pension plans is the same – to
provide secure and affordable retirement benefits to their members. There is no good eco-
nomic reason why public and private pension funds in the United States should be regulated
in different ways. The current regulation of U.S. public pension funds reduces the transparency
of pension funds’ financial situation and could lead to substantial redistribution between gen-
erations and could have negative implications for future stakeholders and taxpayers.
In my policy implications, I do not argue that there is an optimal funding level of pen-
sion plans. Based on the Ricardian equivalence it is irrelevant for the public welfare whether
the current retirement benefits are financed with debt or taxes (Ricardo, 1820). There are no
intergenerational consequences of the public pension debt, because current generation could
leave extra assets to their children as a compensation for the additional taxes or lower pensions
due to intergenerational pension transfers. However, the Ricardian equivalence only holds if
the current and future generations are informed about the level of pension plan underfunding
and state indebtedness. The current regulation of U.S. public pension funds camouflages their
funding situation and indirectly the public debt level, making it difficult for people to correctly
assert the intergenerational transfers (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009). Providing accurate esti-
mates of the pension fund financial situation and their projected cash-flows will enable the plan
members and taxpayers to make informed financial decisions. Moreover, increasing the trans-
parency in U.S. public pension fund reporting is a necessary precondition before discussing
the potential reforms in the pension deal, required to overcome the significant underfunding
problems.
Second, when plan members delegate the management of their retirement saving to pen-
sion funds, they anticipate higher returns from the expertise and economies of scale of these
institutions. Pension fund asset management decisions are made in two stages. In the first
stage, pension fund executives allocate capital to different asset classes, each managed by a
different asset manager, and in the second stage, each manager decides in which assets within
his class to invest the funds allocated to him (Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen, 2008). This two-
stage process involves many intermediaries, such as pension fund boards and executives, asset
managers, placement agents and consultants. The multiple layers of delegation can generate
several misalignments of incentives and may lead to substantial losses for the pension plan
members.
9
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapters 4 and 5 show that multiple layers of intermediation result in higher investment
costs and lower performance, especially in alternative assets. Even though delegated asset
managers on average underperform the internal investments net of fees, this is an equilibrium
for some institutional investors that delegate portfolio management to intermediaries because
delegation reduces their anxiety about taking risk. When investing internally, institutions do
not share the responsibility for future performance with financial intermediaries, which re-
sults in significantly higher risk aversion (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2013; Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992). Investors will retain the external managers, since an institutional
investor who delegates the asset management to intermediaries in order to shift responsibility
perceives the returns on risky investments delivered by this manager as less uncertain than
those delivered by an internal investment division. However, institutional investors who rely
on financial intermediaries in order to shift responsibility and reduce anxiety, seem to violate
their fiduciary duty and do not seem to act in the best interest of their beneficiaries.
My findings have some general normative implications for the asset management industry.
The large amount of asset under management enables DB pension fund to establish efficient
internal investment divisions and to negotiate lower fees with external asset managers. How-
ever, the large size also exposes DB funds to potential liquidity-related diseconomies of scale.
Based on Chapter 3, in traditional assets, such as equities and bonds, especially larger pension
funds would have done better if they had invested in passive mandates without frequent re-
balancing across asset classes. When investing actively in equities and bonds, large pension
funds experience significant diseconomies of scale. The results suggest that larger institutional
investors, like DB pension funds, can benefit more from designing strategic asset allocation
and market timing policies, rather than selection of multiple active managers within the asset
classes.
In alternative assets, where passive investing is not possible, larger investors should eval-
uate the possibility of investing internally because fewer levels of intermediation enable insti-
tutional investors to access better investment opportunities in alternative asset classes. Smaller
institutions should consider substituting fund-of-funds with other investment approaches, and
specializing in one alternative asset class, instead of simultaneously investing in multiple alter-
native assets. If smaller investors do not have sufficient skills and resources, they should invest
passively in public equity instead of going into alternative assets.
This thesis shows that financial institutions are prone to significant agency conflicts because
different groups of stakeholders have opposing interests and because they cover multiple lay-
ers of intermediation. In the pension fund context, the agency conflicts could result in a re-
distribution of assets between the different generations as well as a redistribution form the
retirement plan members to the multiple layers of financial intermediaries.
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Chapter 2
Pension Fund Asset Allocation and
Liability Discount Rates: Camouflage
and Reckless Risk Taking by U.S.
Public Plans?*
2.1 Introduction
Pension funds around the world are in a state of flux. In the past two decades, funds have faced
financial crises, a maturing participant base, decreasing Treasury yields, tightening regulation
and, as a result, increasing demands for transparency and accountability. Most defined benefit
(DB) pension funds are underfunded or have asset values that are lower than the value of their
liabilities (the pension benefit promises made), despite the fact that the valuation of the size of
these liabilities in many cases is severely underestimated (see Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011).
The challenge for DB pension funds is how to decide and periodically update, in conjunc-
tion with other stakeholders, critical aspects of their policies, such as the contribution levels of
plan members, strategic allocations across various asset classes, and the kind of inflation pro-
tection offered. They do so by using projections of their liabilities (i.e., pension promises) and
their expected future income from investments. When considering asset-liability management,
boards need to decide on a few key input parameters such as the level of expected returns,
interest and inflation rates, and the discount rate used to value the liability stream, as well as a
number of actuarial indicators such as life expectancies.
The amount of latitude pension fund boards have in this process depends on the regula-
tory framework in which they operate. In general, these decisions either can be left at the
full discretion of the pension funds, or, at the other end of the spectrum, they can be heavily re-
stricted by regulation or public policy. Previous literature (see, for example, Brown and Wilcox,
2009; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011, 2009) has shown that regulation of U.S. public pension DB
plans is relatively opaque and leaves wide discretion to their boards, setting them apart from
*This chapter is co-authored with Rob Bauer (Maastricht University) and Martijn Cremers (University of Notre
Dame).
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e.g. Canadian and European public pension funds as well as from private pension funds in
all three of these regions. In this paper, we empirically study the consequences of the distinct
regulatory environment for U.S. public pension funds by examining their asset allocations, lia-
bility discount rates, inflation protection, asset valuation smoothing, and performance. Using
the international CEM pension fund database that provides detailed annual information for an
extensive sample of large pension funds over 1990 - 2010, our empirical approach is to com-
pare U.S. public funds to U.S. private funds and both private and public funds in Canada and
Europe.2
U.S. public funds are distinct in that they can decide their strategic asset allocations and
liability discount rates largely without regulatory interference under current Government Ac-
counting Standards Board (GASB) guidelines. In particular, these guidelines link the liability
discount rates of U.S. public funds to the (assumed and relatively subjective) expected rate
of return on their assets. In contrast, U.S. private pension funds and (both public and pri-
vate) Canadian and European pension funds are arguably subject to significantly stricter reg-
ulatory guidelines. Their regulations generally require that liability discount rates be chosen
as a function of current interest rates (see, for example, the Canadian Institute of Actuaries,
2011 and Crossley and Jametti, 2013), as advocated by the economic theory literature (Brown
and Wilcox, 2009; Lucas and Zeldes, 2009; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011, 2009). We argue that
the distinct regulatory framework for U.S. public funds gives them strong incentives to shift
a larger allocation to risky investments, as this increases the assumed expected rate of return
on their asset portfolio and thus (through their regulation) results in higher liability discount
rates. This in turn helps these pension funds camouflage their degree of underfunding and
potentially delay making difficult decisions on contribution levels and pension benefits. Over
the last two decades, increased allocations to assets with higher (assumed) expected returns
has allowed U.S. public pension funds to maintain high liability discount rates, even as interest
rates significantly declined.
We empirically document that the asset allocation and liability valuation of U.S. public DB
pension funds have changed very differently in response to two critical developments in the
last 20 years, both of which are exogenous to individual pension fund boards and have pro-
found economic implications. The first development is the maturing of member populations,
i.e. that the percentage of retired members (current or past workers who are beneficiaries) as a
fraction of all members has significantly increased and thus the percentage of members paying
into the defined benefit plan has decreased. On average, the percentage of retired members
among private plans increased from 31 percent in 1993 to 52 percent in 2010, and from 28 per-
cent in 1993 to 39 percent in 2010 among public pension funds. The second development is the
2The relatively long time series and broad cross-sectional coverage provide strong statistical power, such that our
main results are derived in pooled panel regressions with pension fund fixed effects as well as year fixed effects,
using robust standard errors that are independently double-clustered in both the time and fund dimensions. The
CEM database offers an exclusive and very detailed look at the asset-liability management of pension funds around
the globe. CEM data has been used previously by researchers such as French (2008) to study the cost of active
investing, and by Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2012) to examine the asset allocation, market timing, and security
selection skills of pension funds.
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steady decline in interest rates over this period. For example, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield
fell from about 7 percent in 1994 to about 3 percent in 2010.
In regard to the first major issue, the increased proportion of retired members, economic
theory suggests that asset allocation and liability discount rate choices should be more con-
servative as the fund matures (see Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2007; Lucas and
Zeldes, 2006, 2009; Sundaresan and Zapatero, 1997). We find that this is indeed how pension
funds have generally responded. However, U.S. public pension funds are unique in not choos-
ing more conservative asset allocations and not choosing lower discount rates as their plan
member base matures. Instead, for U.S. public funds, the proportion of retirees relative to
non-retirees is positively related to the allocation to risky assets: a 10 percent increase in the
percentage of retired members of U.S. public pension funds is associated with a 2.05 percent
increase in the allocation to risky assets, while a 10 percent increase in the percentage of re-
tired members is associated with a 1.16 percent lower allocation to risky assets among all other
pension funds.3 Further, and again in contrast to the other pension funds in our sample, for
U.S. public funds, we find a positive association between their liability discount rates and the
proportion of retired members: a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members is
associated with a 21-31 basis point increase in the discount rate for U.S. public funds.
The second major development is that the three regions we consider all saw significant
declines in interest rates over our time period, which should theoretically affect the choice of
the liability discount rate. Financial theory suggests that future streams of pension benefit
payments should be discounted at a rate that reflects their inherent riskiness, particularly their
covariance with priced risks. Beneficiaries of pension promises, for both public and corporate
entities, seem well protected by law, such that these pension payments are relatively certain or
bear relatively little systemic risk (see, for example, Brown, 2008; Brown and Wilcox, 2009).4
As a result, Brown and Wilcox (2009) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) propose using liability
discount rates based on yields on government and municipal bonds and swap rates.
In our empirical analysis, we find that pension funds generally lower liability discount rates
as interest rates decline, which is consistent with both their regulations and economic theory.
However, U.S. public pension funds are again different, as we find no association between
liability discount rates and interest rates. This is consistent with their incentives and their
distinct regulation that explicitly links liability discount rates to their expected rate of return
on assets rather than to the level of interest rates. This result holds even while controlling for
the proportion of assets invested in risky asset classes, which means that U.S. public pension
funds have made the economically surprising choice of not lowering their nominal expected
return estimates on risky assets as interest rates decline.
3We define the percentage allocated to risky assets as investments in public equity, alternative assets (e.g., private
equity, hedge funds, and real estate) and risky fixed income (e.g., high yield bonds).
4For public funds, pension promises in the United States are usually backed by constitutional non-impairment
clauses as well as through statutory and common law (Brown and Wilcox, 2009). The Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation backs pension promises of corporate defined benefit plans in the United States. Even if a firm enters
bankruptcy with insufficient pension assets to cover its liabilities to workers, plan participants will still receive their
annual pensions up to a statutory maximum amount.
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Moreover, we find that an increasing majority of U.S. public pension funds manages the
asset side of the balance sheet by smoothing the valuation of the assets over time, for which
applicable valuation standards allow wide discretion (see, for example, Actuarial Standards
Board, 2007, 2009). We document that U.S. public pension funds with higher allocations to
risky assets are more likely to smooth asset valuations, possibly because smoothing masks the
volatility of the performance of risky investments.
We also study the decision to provide contractual inflation protection. Public pension funds
(especially in the U.S.) are more likely to promise inflation-indexed pension benefits to their
participants. Brown and Wilcox (2009) argue that pension funds promising inflation protection
should use risk-free real interest rates (e.g., yields on TIPS) to discount their pension promises.
However, we find no association between liability discount rates and whether or not the DB
fund offers inflation protection. This suggests that funds may be underestimating the cost of
their inflation protection promises.
In summary, over the past 20 years, U.S. public pension funds have uniquely increased their
allocation to riskier investment strategies, which has allowed them to maintain high discount
rates and present lower liability valuations, in line with the predictions of Brown and Wilcox
(2009).5 During our time period, U.S. public pension funds increased allocations to risky assets,
especially if their proportion of retired members increased. At the beginning of our sample,
U.S. public pension funds had liability discount rates and allocations to risky assets that were
similar to or below the other funds in our sample (for example 57 percent compared to 67
percent for U.S. private funds in 1993). By the end of our sample period in 2010, U.S. public
funds as a group had the highest discount rates (190 basis points above U.S. private funds
and even more above typical discount rates of Canadian and European pension funds) as well
as the largest allocations to risky assets (on average 73 percent compared to an average of 64
percent for U.S. private pension funds, while Canadian and European funds have even lower
allocations to risky assets).
This risk-taking behavior can be explained by the GASB rules linking liability discount rates
to the riskiness of the assets, which creates the incentive to invest more in risky assets in order
to keep liability discount rates high and present lower liability valuations, and thus (at least
on paper) a better funding position. Our results point to a basic conflict of interest between
current and future stakeholders of U.S. public pension funds. Current stakeholders (including
boards, members, and their representatives; politicians; and taxpayers) have a direct incentive
to underestimate the current value of existing promised pension benefits and transfer this risk
to future generations. In this era of general underfunding, when the average self-reported
funding ratio of U.S. public funds in 2010 was 75 percent, such underestimation of the value of
the existing liabilities may allow the current stakeholders to postpone tough choices.6
5Our findings on U.S. private pension funds are also in line with Rauh (2009), who documents a positive corre-
lation between risk taking and the share of active employees in corporate pension plans.
6A recent example illustrates the economic magnitude. The actuary of CalPERS recommended lowering the
liability discount rate from 7.75% to 7.25%, according to a news article (Bloomberg News, March 7, 2012, “CalPERS
Should Cut Assumed Return to 7.25% From 7.75%, Actuary Recommends”). The article states: “Lowering the
return would boost the state’s employee pension costs, as a percent of payroll, as much as 4.2 percent in the year
beginning July 1, according to a CalPERS staff report. Local governments could see an increase of as much as 4.5
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Our results further suggest that part of the asset allocation decisions of U.S. public funds
may be driven by considerations other than asset-liability management and their views on
where the best investment opportunities are. In effect, the increased risk-taking is arguably
reckless to the extent that it is driven not by such economic considerations but rather by a
desire to camouflage or make up for underfunding. We find evidence suggesting that the in-
creased risk-taking of U.S. public pension fund has resulted in an underperformance of more
than 60 basis points annually (on a net benchmark-adjusted basis, and compared to all other
pension funds), which is consistent with asset allocation decisions being made sub-optimally.
Moreover, U.S. public pension funds that are more mature had worse underperformance. A
10 percent increase in the maturity of U.S. public pension funds is associated with 25-48 basis
point lower net benchmark-adjusted returns.
We discuss policy implications by comparing U.S. public pension funds to public funds in
Europe (mainly funds from the U.K. and the Netherlands) and Canada, as well as to private
pension funds in all three regions. The results for Canadian and European funds suggest that
public and private pension funds behave similarly when they face a similar regulatory envi-
ronment. As a result, we recommend bringing U.S. public fund regulation in line with the
regulation applying to U.S. private pension funds and to (either public or private) Canadian/
European pension funds.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we discuss the regula-
tory environment of pension funds for the three regions we investigate. Section 5.3 introduces
the pension fund databases we use and provides summary statistics on our key variables of
interest. In section 2.4, we investigate how the allocation to risky assets is related to charac-
teristics in our pension fund database, including smoothing of the asset valuation. In section
2.5, we explore how reported liability discount rates are related to pension fund characteris-
tics and which funds are more likely to provide inflation protection to their members. Section
5.6 examines whether the increased risk-taking of certain pension funds results in better per-
formance. Section 5.7 concludes with a discussion of policy implications, including the recent
GASB (2011, 2012) proposals pertaining only to U.S. public pension funds.
2.2 Optimal asset allocation and the regulation of pension funds
In this section, we explain the predictions about pension funds’ risk-taking behavior and their
choice of liability discount rates (and how these relate to fund maturity and interest rates) from
two different perspectives. We first consider economic theory and then discuss possible short-
term incentives in the context of underfunded DB pension plans and regulation. “Risk-taking
behavior” refers to the proportion of assets invested in risky assets, such as public equity, pri-
vate equity, real estate, and alternative assets. The “liability discount rate” is the rate that is
percent the following year. The costs for some public-safety agencies could jump as much as 6.5 percent. ... The
board rejected a similar proposal ... last year. Board members at the time expressed concern that lowering the rate
to 7.5 percent would burden local governments when they were already facing financial strains.” One week later,
the CalPERS board decided to indeed lower the discount rate, but by only half as much as recommended by its
actuary (see “CalPERS Lowers Investment Target to 7.5%,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2012).
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used by the pension fund to discount its projections of future pension payments. In our empir-
ical section, we test these predictions about how the level of interest rates, plan maturity, and
contractual inflation protection relate to the allocation to risky assets and the liability discount
rate.
2.2.1 The relation between risk taking, maturity, and inflation protection
Theoretical models imply that optimal asset allocation should be a function of fund maturity,
salary growth, and promised inflation protection. In principle, these variables should have
similar effects across all funds, regardless of geographical region, regulatory requirements, or
plan type (public or private).
Economic theory and empirical work argue that returns on risky assets and the growth
in average aggregate labor earnings are positively correlated in the long-run, although short-
run correlation is typically low. Lucas and Zeldes (2006) show theoretically that when labor
earnings growth and stock returns are positively correlated over longer horizons, obligations
to older workers and retirees behave more like bonds and can be valued and hedged as such.
However, because of future salary risk, obligations to younger workers are risky or behave
more like stocks. As a result, Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) and Lucas and Zeldes (2009)
argue that the proportion of pension fund assets invested in risky assets should be positively
related to the percentage of active participants, because pension benefits are tied to salaries,
which are positively correlated with stock returns in the long run.
Rauh (2009) finds a positive correlation between risk taking and the share of active em-
ployees in U.S. private pension plans, whereas Lucas and Zeldes (2009) find an insignificant
relation between the share of active participants and the percentage allocated to public equity
among U.S. public pension funds. We expand this prior research by examining not only the
cross-sectional dimension, but also how allocations to risky assets have changed over a rela-
tively long and dynamic time period. Moreover, we incorporate international evidence on both
public and private pension plans. Lucas and Zeldes (2009) sample consists of 109 state and 87
local plans in a single year (2006), and Rauh (2009) focuses only on U.S. corporate funds. In
comparison, our sample includes 804 public and private defined benefit pension funds in three
regions over a 20-year period.
Further, Campbell and Viceira (2005) argue that optimal pension fund asset allocation also
depends on the contractual indexation policy, whether the liabilities are fixed in real or nom-
inal terms, and show that holding bonds to maturity is akin to accumulating inflation risk.
Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) and Schotman and Schweitzer (2000) document that stocks
can serve as an inflation hedge in the long run.
Regarding the appropriate rates to discount the pension liabilities, financial theory sug-
gests that the streams of future pension payments should be discounted at a rate that reflects
the inherent risk of these cash flows, particularly their covariance with priced risks. In the
case of pension funds, the “risk” associated with the liabilities relates primarily to whether the
promised benefits will be paid in full in the future. For public funds in the United States, pen-
sion promises are usually backed by constitutional non-impairment clauses as well as through
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statutory and common law (Brown and Wilcox, 2009). Pension promises of corporate DB plans
in the United States are backed by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). If a firm
enters bankruptcy with insufficient pension assets to cover its liabilities to workers, the PBGC
(and potentially the U.S. government) provides plan recipients with their annual pensions up
to a statutory maximum amount. In addition, underfunded private plans have to contribute
a deficit reduction (“catch-up”) contribution (Brown, 2008). Hence, pension promises of both
public and private funds are well protected, with little uncertainty about whether the promised
benefits will have to be paid. As a result, Brown and Wilcox (2009) and Novy-Marx and Rauh
(2011) propose using Treasury rates, municipal rates, and swap rates to discount pension lia-
bilities, because these rates reflect the low uncertainty surrounding the promised pension pay-
ments.
The implication that follows is that liability discount rates should decrease in line with
decreasing government bond yields. Further, as the yield curve is generally upward sloping,
we would expect that more mature pension funds, those plans whose liabilities have shorter
durations, should typically use lower discount rates than younger funds. Furthermore, public
pension funds should use lower discount rates than private pension funds, because public
plan benefits are virtually free of risk as they are usually backed by constitutional guarantees;
in contrast, members of private plans still risk losing part of their pensions if the firm enters
bankruptcy.
2.2.2 How pension fund regulation affects asset allocation decisions and liability
discount rates
We examine the effect of differences in pension fund regulation by contrasting the regulatory
framework for U.S. public pension funds with those of U.S. private funds and both public
and private pension funds in Canada and Europe. Specifically, we argue that these regulatory
differences give rise to different incentives regarding the choice of the proportion of assets
invested in risky asset classes and the liability discount rate used. The main difference across
pension funds is the regulations concerning the liability discount rates. U.S., Canadian, and
European pension funds generally face few limits on the proportion of investments they can
make in risky assets.7
In the United States, significant differences in regulation exist between private and public
pension plans. U.S. public pension funds are subject to the Government Accounting Standards
Board (GASB) guidelines for discounting liabilities. These guidelines allow U.S. public pen-
sion funds to base their liability discount rates on the expected rates of return on their assets.
U.S. public fund boards are largely unconstrained in the proportion of their assets that can be
invested in risky assets and in their assumptions on the expected rate of return in the various
asset classes, giving these boards substantial latitude in choosing their liability discount rate.
We argue that U.S. public pension funds have considerably more leeway in their choices than
U.S. private funds or (public and private) pension funds in Canada and Europe.
7See the OECD Secretariat (2011) Survey of Investment Regulation of Pension Funds.
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Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011, 2009) and Brown and Wilcox (2009) argue that this latitude
gives rise to strong incentives to invest more in risky assets, with higher expected rates of
return. The resulting higher liability discount rates allow the U.S. public pension funds to
present lower liability estimates and better funding status, even though the nature of their
liabilities remains the same. In times when public funds are typically severely underfunded
(even using their relatively high liability discount rates), this relieves pressure on the public
entities involved as well as on politicians and taxpayers, at least in the short term.
Despite the critiques from academic economists, GASB still maintains the view that “as long
as plan assets related to current employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries are projected to be
sufficient to make the projected benefit payments for those individuals, governments would
discount projected benefit payments using the long-term expected rate of return” (GASB, 2011,
2012). Ambachtsheer (2010) argues that under this GASB rule, pension obligations will con-
tinue to be underfunded and underreported by U.S. public sector pension plans. Novy-Marx
(2011) shows that under this rule it is possible for a plan to improve its official measure of
funding status by literally burning money.8
Using time series data on the trends in strategic asset allocations over the last 20 years, we
are able to test directly whether U.S. public pension funds use their freedom strategically. When
facing decreasing bond yields, their typical discount rates of around 7 to 8 percent can only be
maintained by allocating even more assets to equity and alternatives. This riskier allocation
thereby camouflages the level of underfunding. This camouflaged underfunding amplifies the
risk that DB plans will run out of assets before they run out of liabilities, which would involve
a significant wealth transfer from future to current generations of workers and taxpayers.
Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) document that U.S. state pension plans gamble by choosing
riskier portfolios following periods of relatively poor investment performance. We extend this
analysis by associating changes in asset allocation to changes in fund maturity and govern-
ment yields over a long time horizon (1990-2010), contrasting U.S. public funds to U.S. private
funds and international public and corporate pension funds. We also examine pension fund
performance following increased risk-taking.
Using yields on taxable municipality and Treasury bonds, discount rates that reflect the
very limited uncertainty of future public pension fund payments, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011)
show that all state pension plans in the United States were severely underfunded in 2009. The
collective underfunding is in the range of $1.26-2.49 trillion. Hence, all public funds in the
United States are tempted to continue to use high discount rates, even when interest rates
decline, to present a more favorable situation to beneficiaries, taxpayers, and creditors. Within
public U.S. funds, we expect that funds with a greater percentage of retired members have
especially strong incentives to use higher discount rates, as the shorter maturity increases the
8Novy-Marx (2011) shows that the GASB penalizes a plan for holding cash and bonds by forcing it to recognize a
larger liability if it does so: “By destroying a dollar’s worth of T-bills, or other cash-equivalents, a manager decreases
a plan’s assets, but increases the remaining assets’ expected returns. These higher expected returns are used as a
discounting rate and decrease the present value of plan’s liability, as recognized by GASB, and this decrease can
more than offset the loss of assets.”
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present value of their liabilities and limits their ability to camouflage their underfunding. Thus,
we expect that more mature public funds in the United States are using higher discount rates.
U.S. private pension funds face different regulatory standards and do not have clear incen-
tives to invest more in riskier assets over time. Most importantly for our empirical identifica-
tion, individual firms in the United States have less discretion over their reported pension lia-
bilities and discounting rates than public pension funds. Until 2004, U.S. firms were required to
discount their liabilities using the 30-year Treasury rate, both for funding purposes and when
estimating their deficit reduction (“catch-up”) contributions. Since 2006, firms have been al-
lowed to discount their liabilities using a discount rate that is a blend of long-term corporate
bonds, including both upper-medium and high-grade securities (Rauh, 2006).
At the same time, let us emphasize that we are making a comparison and that we are not
arguing that U.S. corporate plans had no regulatory latitude at all. First, Love, Smith, and
Wilcox (2011) argue that various forms of government intervention, such as benefit guarantees
through the PBGC, can provide the firm with an incentive to shift risk to other parties. To the
extent that the PBGC insurance is underpriced and not risk-adjusted, firms could increase the
value of their “pension put option” by taking on more risk in their pension portfolio. Second,
FASB rules allow firms to take credit for the expected rate of return on their income statement,
as a reduction in the net period pension expense. Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) show
that firms use higher assumed rates of return on pension assets when they prepare to acquire
other firms, when they are near critical earnings thresholds, and when their managers exercise
stock options.
However, Rauh (2009) shows that the risk management incentives to avoid costly financial
distress dominate risk-shifting incentives in private DB pension funds, especially amid tight-
ening regulation. Brown (2008) presents examples of ways in which accounting standards that
existed prior to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 allowed firms to hide the true economic costs
of pension promises.9 Since 2006, their asset-liability management has been subject to more reg-
ulatory scrutiny. Moreover, firms also have incentives to use appropriate discount rates and to
shore up underfunded pension plans, because firms that are sufficiently overfunded are ex-
empt from the PBGC insurance premiums and pension overfunding reduces the probability of
a ratings downgrade in such a way that the value of the firm is increased (Bergstresser, Desai,
and Rauh, 2006; Rauh, 2006).
In Canada, pension fund accounting standards generally require that the discount rate be
selected based on market yields of high-quality corporate debt instruments with cash flows that
match the timing and amount of the expected benefit payments. These standards seem to leave
only limited room for discretion (primarily by allowing latitude in defining “high quality”),
9For instance, prior to the adoption of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, firms were only required to fund 90
percent of their liabilities. They were permitted to “smooth” interest rates over four years (which allowed firms
to report smaller liabilities in periods of declining interest rates), were allowed to use the smoothed “actuarial”
value rather than the market value of plan assets (with up to a 20 percent deviation from actual market values
permitted), and were allowed to avoid making cash contributions to their pension plans by making use of various
accounting credits even if the plan was underfunded. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 addressed these issues
by, for example, mandating minimum contribution rules that, after a phase-in period, are based on 100 percent of
a plan’s liabilities, rather than 90 percent funding. In addition, the time period for smoothing assets and liabilities
was reduced to two years (Brown, 2008).
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which specific debt instruments are to be included, and how to address the lack of suitable
debt instruments at very long-term maturities (Canadian Institute of Actuaries, 2011).
Furthermore, and in sharp contrast to the United States, Canadian public and private pen-
sion plans are regulated in the same way, generally under the domain of the financial market
supervisors of the province where they are registered. In Canada, only the province of Ontario
(where around 50 percent of the plans are registered) has established pension benefit insurance.
Crossley and Jametti (2013) find that insured plans in Canada invest about 5 percent more in
equities than do similar plans without benefit guarantees. Our dataset does not include the
province in which Canadian pension funds are registered, but we control for fund fixed effects,
which should absorb the differences in asset allocation due to such cross-jurisdiction variation.
Our small sample of European pension funds consists almost entirely of Dutch funds (plus
a few from the U.K.). In the Netherlands, pension funds have almost no discretion in choosing
their liability discount rate. Until 2004, Dutch pension funds were obliged to use 4 percent
as their discount rate. Thereafter, the Financial Assessment Framework (FTK), which is part of
the Pensions Act, set the requirements for discounting the liabilities by using the term structure
(swap-curve) of nominal risk-free interest rates (or real in case of inflation indexation guaran-
tees). In this tight regulatory regime, poorly funded pension funds are less inclined to invest in
riskier assets. If there is a funding shortfall, which is defined as a coverage ratio of less than 105
percent, the fund must submit a recovery plan. The coverage ratio must regain the 105 percent
level within three years. In the U.K., private plans discount their liabilities using AA yields,
whereas public pension funds use a 3.0 percent discount rate, set based on the expected GDP
growth in the long run.
2.3 Data
We study the link between pension fund asset allocation and liabilities, looking at both cross-
sectional relations and relations within plans over time. We use the unique international CEM
dataset, which comprises more than 800 defined benefit pension funds for the 1990-2010 pe-
riod. The CEM database provides a detailed perspective on the pension fund strategic (target)
asset allocations on a lower aggregation level. This detailed information enables us to precisely
estimate the riskiness of the strategic asset allocation policy. Because our data cover three re-
gions (the United States, Canada, and Europe), we are able to provide international evidence
and examine the effect of different regulatory standards on pension fund asset allocation.
On the liabilities side, CEM provides information on the maturity of the fund, the index-
ation policy, and the liability discount rates. The dataset contains information on the number
of active and retired plan members, which enables us to infer the percentage of retired mem-
bers. We use the percentage of retired members as a proxy for fund maturity. The database
also provides information on the characteristics of the indexation policy, such as whether a
fund provides full, ad hoc, or no inflation protection. CEM also collects the discount rates that
pension funds use to calculate the present value of their liabilities.
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On the assets side, we focus on the percentage allocated to risky assets based on the reported
strategic asset allocation policy. Every year, pension funds submit their strategic (target) asset
allocation policy and their actual (realized) asset allocation policy to CEM. In practice, the ac-
tual asset allocation policy can be affected by market movements due to expected transaction
costs of rebalancing or inertia. For example, large positive returns on the equity market will
increase the share of this asset class in a pension fund’s actual asset allocation. Hence, to avoid
the effects of market movements and to capture more precisely pension fund boards’ asset
allocation decisions, we focus on the strategic asset allocation policy.10
We define the percentage allocated to risky assets as allocations to equity, alternative asset
classes, and risky fixed income investments. Alternative asset classes incorporate allocations
to real estate, private equity, hedge funds, commodities, natural resources, infrastructure, and
tactical asset allocation mandates. We classify mortgages and high yield mandates as risky
fixed income investments.11 The non-risky assets include investments in cash and investment-
grade fixed income assets.
In our empirical analysis, we also split the sample into public and private pension funds.
Our sample of U.S. public pension funds includes both state and local plans. The private sub-
sample captures the funds classified as “corporate” and “other” in the CEM database. In the
United States and Canada, the “other” category is mainly composed of multi-employer or Taft-
Hartley funds, often referred to as “union” funds. In Europe, the “other” category covers
mainly industry-wide funds, which are common in the Netherlands. We combine the category
“other” with “corporate” and label this group “private” funds, because these pension funds
are established by private-sector employers and they are subject to the same regulation. For
example, in the United States, all private DB pension plans are regulated by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and have an insurance program within the PBGC.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the pension funds in our sample. Panel A shows
that the CEM database includes more than 800 funds and about 4,800 observations. The ma-
jority of the observations are U.S. pension funds, followed by Canadian pension funds and a
smaller number of (mostly large) European pension funds. Pension funds included in the CEM
database had more than $3.66 trillion in assets under management in 2010 and covered around
25 percent of global DB pension fund assets (which is also more than 14 percent of total global
pension fund assets).12 Over the 1990-2010 period, U.S. pension funds included in the dataset
controlled more than 40 percent of total assets under management by the U.S. DB pension fund
sector. Canadian pension funds included in the CEM database held approximately 80-90 per-
cent of the total assets under management by Canadian pension funds. To our knowledge, this
is the broadest global database on pension fund asset allocation and performance available for
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for pension fund asset allocation, maturity, liability discount
rates, fund size, and inflation protection. In Panel A, rows #Funds and #Obs. present the number of
funds and observations. In Panels B and C, we show the means and standard deviations (in parenthe-
ses) of variables separately in 1993 and 2010. %Risky shows the average percentage allocation to risky
assets based on the strategic asset allocation policy. The risky assets include allocations to equity, alter-
native asset classes (i.e., hedge funds, private equity, and real estate), high yield bonds, and mortgages.
%Retired presents the average percentage of retired members from total plan members. LDR presents
the average liability discount rates used by the pension funds. The Fund size row reports the average
total assets under management (in billions US$) of the pension funds. In f lation protection refers to the
percentage of funds providing contractual inflation protection. We show the statistics for all funds and
separately by region. We also report the statistics separately for public and private (corporate) funds.
All funds U.S. Canada Europe
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
Panel A: Total number of pension funds and observations
#Funds 226 593 160 348 57 177 9 68
#Obs. 1653 3168 1171 1761 448 1173 34 234
Panel B: Summary statistics in 1993
#Obs. 37 148 32 84 5 64
%Risky 0.562 0.630 0.567 0.665 0.531 0.585
(0.177) (0.126) (0.187) (0.135) (0.101) (0.097)
%Retired 0.276 0.311 0.287 0.322 0.205 0.296
(0.107) (0.160) (0.104) (0.167) (0.112) (0.151)
LDR 7.742 7.986 7.621 8.211 8.400 7.695
(1.238) (0.881) (1.298) (0.782) (0.548) (0.921)
Fund size 8.772 2.278 8.998 3.401 7.323 0.804
(14.686) (5.826) (15.422) (7.488) (9.727) (1.203)
Inflation protection 0.676 0.152 0.656 0.012 0.800 0.328
Panel C: Summary statistics in 2010
#Obs. 93 214 64 130 24 51 5 33
%Risky 0.701 0.621 0.728 0.643 0.636 0.611 0.659 0.551
(0.097) (0.133) (0.081) (0.138) (0.079) (0.082) (0.193) (0.151)
%Retired 0.389 0.522 0.385 0.554 0.406 0.485 0.360 0.450
(0.138) (0.240) (0.090) (0.242) (0.230) (0.224) (0.086) (0.239)
LDR 7.035 5.480 7.617 5.723 6.115 5.914 3.990 3.602
(1.326) (1.030) (0.967) (0.629) (0.569) (0.684) (1.326) (1.030)
Fund size 23.125 7.065 22.715 7.162 11.020 2.156 86.479 14.269
(44.347) (13.537) (36.021) (11.793) (21.532) (2.892) (127.407) (23.537)
Inflation protection 0.602 0.224 0.563 0.100 0.708 0.471 0.600 0.333
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academic research.
In Panels B and C of Table 2.1, we show pension fund size, allocation to risky assets, matu-
rity, liability discount rates, and the percentage of pension funds providing contractual infla-
tion protection over time. When analyzing the allocation to risky assets, we document different
trends between public and private pension plans. The strategic allocation to risky assets of pub-
lic pension funds has increased from 56.2 percent in 1993 to 70.1 percent in 2010, mainly due to
increased risk-taking among U.S. public pension funds. Private pension plans have decreased
their allocation to risky assets marginally, from 63.0 percent in 1993 to 62.1 percent in 2010.
Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows that the allocation to risky assets among U.S. public pension funds
has increased steadily over time, while among private funds it was rather stable until 2004 and
decreasing thereafter. Additionally, we observe significant regional effects: compared to Cana-
dian and European pension funds, U.S. pension funds on average allocate a greater percentage
of their assets to riskier investments.
Pension fund maturity summary statistics in Table 2.1 are estimated based on retired mem-
bers as a percentage of total plan members. We document that the vast majority of the pension
funds are maturing over time and that private pension funds are generally more mature than
public pension funds. The percentage of retired members among private plans has increased
from 31.1 percent in 1993 to 52.2 percent in 2010, while among public pension funds the per-
centage of retired members has increased from 27.6 percent in 1993 to 38.9 percent in 2010. This
difference in maturity between public and private funds is the result of a growing number of
U.S. corporations having chosen to freeze DB pension plans and replace them with defined
contribution (DC) plans for new employees (see Rauh, Stefanescu, and Zeldes, 2013). Hence,
private DB pension plans in the United States mature faster than public funds, as confirmed
by Panel A of Figure 2.1 (%Retired). Panel B indicates that in Canada there is no difference
in the percentage of retired members between public and private pension funds. In Europe,
the sample is much smaller, but again we find no clear difference between public and private
funds.
In Table 2.1, we also observe the percentage of pension funds providing contractual inflation
protection to their members. We create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a pension
fund provides contractual inflation protection, and 0 if the fund provides ad hoc inflation pro-
tection or no protection at all. In all three regions, public pension funds are significantly more
likely to provide contractual inflation protection as compared to private pension funds during
the entire sample period. Interestingly, the percentage of U.S. public pension funds providing
such protection has decreased slightly from 65.6 percent in 1993 to 56.3 percent in 2010.
10All our results are robust to using the risky assets estimated based on the actual asset allocation policy instead
of the strategic asset allocation.
11Our findings are robust to removing the high yield and mortgage assets from the definition of percentage
allocated to risky assets.
12The comparison is based on the Global Pension Assets Study 2011 conducted by Towers Watson. For more
information, see: http://www.towerswatson.com/en-AE/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2011/
02/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2011
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of retired members and percentage allocated to risky assets
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2.3 Data
In Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2, we also present summary statistics of liability discount rates.
U.S. pension funds, on average, always use higher discount rates than Canadian pension funds
and, especially, European pension funds. Figure 2.2 displays the trend in government bond
yields and liability discount rates of public and private pension funds, for each region.13 Among
U.S. funds, public pension funds maintain steady discount rates around 7.5-8.0 percent during
the entire 1993-2010 period.14 In sharp contrast, the liability discount rates used by U.S. pri-
vate pension funds decrease over time from 8.2 percent in 1993 to 5.7 percent in 2010, closely
following the pattern in ten-year Treasury yields. The discount rates used by Canadian pen-
sion funds are also decreasing over time, but not to the same extent as Canadian government
bond yields. Most European funds use fixed discount rates of 4 percent before 2000, following
strict regulatory guidelines. Afterwards, their liability discount rates move together with the
government bond yields, consistent with the revised guidelines (see the previous section for
details). In both Europe and Canada, there is no significant difference between the discount
rates used by public and private pension funds.
To extend the analysis on U.S. public pension funds, we merge the CEM database with
the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) submitted by public (state and local)
pension funds in the United States as a source of information about the self-reported funding
ratios and asset valuation methods of these pension funds. The majority of the additional data
is obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, but some data points
are manually collected from the CAFRs. The data from the Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College covers the 2001-2010 period. We are able to extend it back by a few years by
hand-collecting data in the CAFRs. This results in a sufficient number of cross-sectional ob-
servations for the self-reported funding ratios of U.S. public pension funds for the 1998-2010
period. Figure 2.3 presents the trend in self-reported funding ratios of U.S. public pension
funds during the 1998-2010 period. Even though U.S. public pension funds, on average, em-
ploy higher liability discount rates than all other pension funds in our sample, most of the U.S.
public funds are underfunded during the entire period. The average self-reported funding ra-
tio decreases from 92 percent in 1998 to 75 percent in 2010. Overall, Figure 2.3 shows that the
funding problems of U.S. public pension funds are increasing over time and the vast majority
of them are significantly underfunded in 2010, despite the use of a (too high) discount rate that
is not in line with the riskiness of liabilities.
In addition to their large discretion in setting liability discount rates, U.S. public pension
funds are also allowed to smooth asset valuations when reporting their funding ratios. Unlike
the choice of higher liability discount rates, which by construction always leads to higher fund-
ing ratios, smoothing asset valuations may not always result in better reported funding levels.
However, smoothing asset valuations lowers the volatility of reported asset values across time,
13For Europe, we use the Eurozone countries’ 10-year government bond yields (changing composition over time
and weighted average) provided by Eurostat.
14The summary statistics in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2 start in 1993, because in the 1990-1992 period we have an
insufficient number of cross-sectional observations for the liability discount rates of U.S. and Canadian public and
private pension funds.
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Figure 2.2: Liability discount rates (LDR) and Treasury yields
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Figure 2.3: U.S. public funds: Self-reported funding ratios (SRFR) and asset valuation smoothing
thereby enabling public pension funds to tolerate investments in volatile and risky assets more
easily. Figure 2.3 shows that the majority of U.S. public pension funds smooth asset valuation
across the last five years. Some pension funds use an even longer period, smoothing assets
over ten years. The figure further shows that the percentage of U.S. public pension funds that
smooth is increasing over time, especially after 2008, perhaps because pension funds camou-
flaged their increased underfunding after the downturn in financial markets. Specifically, the
percentage of U.S. public pension funds smoothing asset valuation increases from 63 percent
in 2001 to 68 percent in 2008, and to 82 percent in 2010.
2.4 Pension fund investments in risky assets and asset valuation
We first explore how the strategic allocation to risky assets is related to pension fund maturity
and other characteristics. Subsection 2.4.2 focuses on U.S. public pension funds and analyze
the association between changes in the percentage allocated to risky assets and changes in self-
reported funding ratios. Subsection 2.4.3 analyzes how the allocation to risky assets influences
the probability that U.S. public pension funds smooth asset valuation
2.4.1 Pension fund maturity and risk taking
The standard deviations of our key variables of interest in Table 2.1 show that there is consid-
erable variation in the allocation to risky assets and fund maturity among the pension funds.
We relate the percentage allocated to risky assets based on the strategic asset allocation policy
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(%Riskyi,t) to the percentage of retired members and other relevant pension fund characteristics
using pooled panel regressions with year and regional, or fund fixed effects:
%Riskyi,t = β0 + β1%Retiredi,t + β2Xi,t + β3YDt + β4FEi + ui,t (2.1)
where %Retired refers to the percentage of retired members, and Xi,t captures other control
variables, such as fund size, inflation protection dummy variable, and plan type dummy vari-
able (public or private pension fund). YD are the year dummies, FE captures regional or fund
fixed effects, and ui,t is the idiosyncratic error. We independently double cluster the robust
standard errors in all regressions by pension fund and by year. In the regressions, we include
interaction terms to capture the effect of U.S. public funds.
Table 2.2 presents the results of the panel regressions for the allocation to risky assets jointly
for U.S., Canadian, and European pension funds. Column (1) indicates that funds with a higher
proportion of retired members, in line with theoretical predictions, invest less in risky assets,
controlling for fund size, the level of inflation protection, and regional and year fixed effects. In
column (6), we include fund fixed effects and find that a 10 percent increase in the percentage
of retired members is associated with a 1.31 percent reduction in the allocation to risky assets.
Pension funds with more assets under management (i.e., with a larger Fund size) allocate
proportionally more assets to risky investments. In particular, a one-unit increase in the log
of assets under management (i.e., doubling the pension fund size) increases the allocation to
risky assets by 0.5 to 0.9 percent. The effect of fund size on the allocation to risky assets is not
significant when controlling for fund fixed effects in columns (6)-(8).15 The decision to provide
contractual inflation protection does not seem related to the asset allocation policy.
In column (2), we add a Public dummy that indicates whether the pension fund is public
or not, which allows us to estimate the effect of plan type (public or private) on the strategic
asset allocation policy. Public pension funds allocate 3.2 percent less to risky assets, on average.
Column (5) and (8) show that U.S. public funds behave differently. In contrast to other funds,
more mature U.S. public funds (i.e., with a higher %Retired) allocate more to risky assets. The
positive relation between %Retired and risk taking for U.S. public funds is not consistent with
the negative relation that is predicted by economic theory, and in sharp contrast to the negative
unconditional coefficient on %Retired in columns (1)-(8). Based on column (5), for all funds
except U.S. public pension funds, a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members
is associated with a 1.16 percent lower allocation to risky assets. However, for U.S. public
pension funds, a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members is associated with
a 2.05 percent increase in the allocation to risky assets (0.1*(-0.116) + 0.1*0.321 = 0.0205). The
magnitude is slightly smaller, but still positive and significant, when we control for fund fixed
effects in column (8).
The large negative coefficients on the dummies for Canadian and European pension funds
indicate significant regional differences in the allocation to risky assets. Controlling for matu-
15This may be no surprise, as fund fixed effects remove considerable variation and assets under management do
not vary strongly over time, especially relative to the large cross-sectional variation in size and to removing year
fixed effects.
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rity, fund size, and plan type, U.S. pension funds allocate around 8 percent more to risky assets
than Canadian funds, and 14 percent more than European funds.
Table 2.2: Panel regressions: Percentage allocated to risky assets
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the percentage allocated to risky
assets based on the strategic asset allocation of pension funds. The risky assets include allocations to
equity, alternative asset classes (i.e., hedge funds, private equity, and real estate), high yield bonds, and
mortgages. As independent variables, we include %Retired, the percentage of retired members from
total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total pension fund assets; In f lation protection,
a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides a contractual inflation protection; Public,
a dummy variable taking a value of one if a pension fund is public; Public ∗U.S., an interaction term
capturing U.S. public funds; %Retired ∗ Public, an interaction term capturing the percentage of retired
members among public funds; %Retired ∗ Public ∗ U.S., an interaction term capturing the percentage
of retired members among U.S. public funds; and Canada and Europe, regional dummy variables (the
base result refers to U.S. funds). Where indicated, we include year dummies and fund fixed effects.
We independently double cluster the robust standard errors by pension fund and by year. We report
standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Percentage allocated to risky assets based on strategic asset allocation
%Retired -0.079*** -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.131*** -0.137*** -0.144***
[0.023] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.036] [0.035] [0.036]
Fund size 0.005** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.021 0.020 0.019
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Inflation protection -0.002 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Public -0.032** -0.020 -0.066** -0.030
[0.014] [0.014] [0.029] [0.029]
Public*U.S. -0.019 -0.016 -0.127***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.045]
%Retired*Public 0.117* 0.024 0.089 0.015
[0.065] [0.056] [0.065] [0.068]
%Retired*Public*U.S. 0.321*** 0.253**
[0.111] [0.125]
Canada -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Europe -0.128*** -0.138*** -0.142*** -0.145*** -0.144***
[0.020] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,806 4,806 4,806 4,806 4,806 4,821 4,821 4,821
R2 0.195 0.208 0.209 0.215 0.226 0.750 0.751 0.753
The main conclusion from Table 2.2 is that more mature pension funds generally allocate
fewer assets to risky investments, the only exception being U.S. public pension funds. Con-
trary to the predications from economic theory that maturing pension funds should reduce
their exposure to risky assets, we find that mature U.S. public pension funds allocate a larger
percentage of their assets to risky investments.
In Table 2.3, we analyze the relation between fund maturity and risk-taking for every re-
gion separately as a robustness check.16 We find a significant negative relation, on average,
16In particular, the separate U.S. and Canadian samples provide a robustness check of the main result in Table 2.2
that came from the positive coefficient on the triple interaction of %Retired ∗ Public ∗U.S. We do not show results
for European pension funds separately due to our limited sample size.
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between fund maturity and risk taking in the U.S. and the Canadian samples. For U.S. pension
funds (see Panel A, columns (3) and (5)), we find that a 10 percent increase in fund maturity is
associated with a reduction in the allocation to risky assets of 1.43-1.76 percent among private
pension funds. However, for U.S. public funds this relation is positive. Based on column (3),
a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members is associated with a 2.31 percent
increase in the allocation to risky assets of a U.S. public pension fund (0.1*(-0.143) + 0.1*0.374).
When controlling for fund fixed effects in column (5), a 10 percent increase in the percentage of
retired members is associated with a 1.10 percent increase in the allocation to risky assets of a
U.S. public fund.
Results for Canada show that an increase in fund maturity reduces the allocation to risky
assets (Panel B of Table 2.3). Whether a plan is private or public seems unrelated to the strategic
asset allocation policy of Canadian pension funds. Public and private pension funds in Canada
reduce their exposure to risky assets in a similar way as they mature.
Throughout 1990-2010, yields on government bonds continuously declined in all regions.
For example, the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes decreased from 7.08 percent in 1994 to
3.22 percent in 2010 (see Figure 2.2). To investigate whether these decreasing Treasury yields
have an effect on the allocation to risky assets, we also add the ten-year Treasury yield in the
previous year to the model presented in equation (1). Table 2.4 examines whether declining
yields, as a proxy for the expected return on non-risky assets like cash and government bonds,
influence the allocation to risky assets by pension funds. Our results indicate that only pub-
lic pension funds, and especially U.S. public funds, increase their allocation to risky assets in
response to declining government bond yields.
Controlling for fund fixed effects in columns (5)-(8), we find that the association between
the government bond yield and the allocation to risky assets remains statistically significant
only for U.S. public pension funds. According to column (7), for U.S. public funds, the approx-
imately 4 percentage point decline in the yield on ten-year Treasury securities over this period
is associated with a 11 percentage point increase in the allocation to risky assets (4 * [-1*(-0.010)
+ (-1)*(-0.018)]). This finding is robust to controlling for the percentage of retired members in
columns (4) and (8).
Summarizing, we show that more mature pension funds invest less in risky assets, the only
exception being U.S. public pension funds. Moreover, U.S. public pension funds take substan-
tially more risk in response to declining government bond yields. The increased risk-taking by
U.S. public funds when faced with low interest rates is particularly noteworthy as these pen-
sion funds have even less ability (relative to, for example, U.S. private pension funds) to scale
back spending if risky assets underperform expectations, because their promised benefits often
have special protections in state constitutions as well as through statutory and common law
(see Brown and Wilcox, 2009).
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Table 2.3: Panel regressions: Percentage allocated to risky assets by region
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the percentage allocation to risky
assets based on the strategic asset allocation of pension funds. We present the results for U.S. funds in
Panel A and Canadian funds in Panel B. As independent variables, we include %Retired, the percentage
of retired members from total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total pension fund
assets; In f lation protection, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides a contractual
inflation protection; Public, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a pension fund is public; and
%Retired ∗ Public, an interaction term capturing the percentage of retired members among public funds.
Where indicated, we include year dummies and fund fixed effects. We independently double cluster the
robust standard errors by pension fund and by year. We report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and ***
indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: U.S. pension funds
%Retired -0.076** -0.100*** -0.143*** -0.157*** -0.176***
[0.032] [0.028] [0.027] [0.046] [0.047]
Fund size 0.002 0.005* 0.008*** 0.027 0.019
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.020] [0.019]
Inflation protection -0.000 0.023** 0.024**
[0.010] [0.012] [0.012]
Public -0.044** -0.176***
[0.019] [0.049]
%Retired*Public 0.374*** 0.286**
[0.110] [0.114]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,919 2,919 2,919 2,932 2,932
R2 0.065 0.088 0.120 0.704 0.710
Panel B: Canadian pension funds
%Retired -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.083*** -0.078* -0.078*
[0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.042] [0.041]
Fund size 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.015
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.026] [0.025]
Inflation protection -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010]
Public -0.015 -0.007
[0.015] [0.033]
%Retired*Public -0.019 0.004
[0.064] [0.062]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,621 1,621
R2 0.149 0.154 0.154 0.701 0.701
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Table 2.4: Panel regressions: Percentage allocated to risky assets and Treasury yield
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the percentage allocated to risky
assets based on the strategic asset allocation of pension funds. The risky assets include allocations to
equity, alternative asset classes (i.e., hedge funds, private equity, and real estate), high yield bonds, and
mortgages. Compared to previous results, we control for Yieldt−1, the Treasury yield in the previous
year; Public ∗ Yieldt−1, an interaction term capturing the effect of the previous year’s Treasury yield on
public funds; and Public ∗Yieldt−1 ∗U.S., an interaction term capturing the effect of the previous year’s
Treasury yield on U.S. public funds. As independent variables, we include Fund size, the logarithm of
total pension fund assets; In f lation protection, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides
contractual inflation protection; %Retired, the percentage of retired members from total pension fund
members; Public, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a pension fund is public; Public ∗U.S., an
interaction term capturing U.S. public funds; and Canada and Europe, regional dummy variables (the
base result refers to U.S. funds). Where indicated, we include year dummies and fund fixed effects. We
double cluster the standard errors by pension fund and by year. We report standard errors in brackets.
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Percentage allocated to risky assets based on strategic asset allocation
Yieldt−1 -0.012*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.004
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Public ∗Yieldt−1 -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.010* -0.009
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
Public ∗Yieldt−1 ∗U.S. -0.013* -0.013* -0.018** -0.018**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Fund size 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
Inflation protection 0.013* 0.015** 0.015** 0.013*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007]
%Retired -0.087*** -0.107***
[0.021] [0.036]
Public -0.024* 0.164*** 0.123*** 0.113***
[0.015] [0.027] [0.030] [0.028]
Public*U.S. -0.017 0.053 0.047
[0.018] [0.041] [0.041]
Canada -0.069*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
Europe -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.139***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019]
Year dummies No No No No No No No No
Fund fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,806 4,806 4,806 4,806 4,821 4,821 4,821 4,821
R2 0.166 0.196 0.198 0.216 0.728 0.737 0.741 0.745
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2.4.2 Self-reported funding ratios and allocation to risky assets
So far, we have seen that U.S. public pension funds are different from all other public and pri-
vate pension funds in our sample, and that more mature U.S. public funds allocate a larger
share of their assets to risky investments. We turn now to the effect of underfunding on the
allocation to risky assets of U.S. public pension funds. Incorporating the levels of self-reported
funding ratios directly into the analysis is problematic because these ratios can be influenced
significantly by pension funds through two valuation decisions: choosing higher liability dis-
count rates or using smoothed asset valuations. These two valuation decisions are stable over
time, which implies that the self-reported funding ratios may not show accurately the pension
fund underfunding problems; in contrast, changes in funding ratios more realistically present
the dynamics and heterogeneity in funding problems across U.S. public funds. Hence, we fo-
cus on the effect of lagged changes in self-reported funding ratios on changes in allocation to
risky assets.
Table 2.5: Panel regressions: Allocation to risky assets and self-reported funding ratios
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the change in the percentage al-
located to risky assets based on the strategic asset allocation of pension funds. We focus on the effect
of Cumulative ∆SRFR, the cumulative change in the self-reported funding ratio of U.S. public pension
funds over the last years. The cumulative change includes the change in self-reported funding ratio from
year t− 1 to year t (∆SRFRt) and the change from year t− 2 to year t− 1 (∆SRFRt−1). We also control
for the change in the percentage of retired members (∆%Retired) and the change in fund size (∆Fund
size) between year t and year t− 1. In models (1)-(3) we use all observations, whereas in models (4)-(6)
we focus on the subperiod 2006-2010. In all models, we include year dummies and fund fixed effects.
We independently double cluster the robust standard errors by pension fund and by year. We report
standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables: changes in percentage allocated to risky assets
All observations 2006-2010 subperiod
Cumulative ∆SRFR -0.040*** -0.042** -0.059** -0.084***
[0.015] [0.020] [0.026] [0.025]
∆SRFRt -0.060** -0.082**
[0.030] [0.034]
∆SRFRt−1 -0.024 -0.086***
[0.031] [0.028]
∆%Retired -0.013 -0.009 0.143 0.143
[0.125] [0.124] [0.132] [0.131]
∆Fund size 0.029 0.029 0.113*** 0.113***
[0.046] [0.045] [0.040] [0.041]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 527 508 508 260 252 252
R2 0.206 0.207 0.208 0.150 0.199 0.199
Table 2.5 shows that lagged changes in self-reported funding ratios have a negative effect on
changes in the allocation to risky assets. The cumulative change in self-reported funding ratios
(Cumulative ∆SRFR in the table) captures changes over the previous two years: from year
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t− 2 to year t. The mean cumulative change in self-reported funding ratios is a decline of 3.45
percent (see Figure 2.3), which leads to a 15 basis point (-0.042*0.0345, using the coefficient on
Cumulative ∆SRFR in column 2) increase in the strategic allocation to risky assets. The average
annual change in allocation to risky assets among U.S. public funds is 109 basis points, so
changes in self-reported funding ratios predict a significant part of the changes in the allocation
to risky assets. The results in models (4)-(6) show that the economic magnitude of this relation
doubled in the last five years of our sample period, when underfunding among U.S. public
pension funds increased substantially. During this subperiod, an average cumulative decrease
in self-reported funding ratios results in an increase of about 30 basis points in the allocation to
risky assets. Our results indicate that U.S. public pension funds responded to the deteriorating
funding situation by investing more in risky assets.
2.4.3 Asset valuation smoothing
Figure 2.3 shows that the majority of U.S. public pension funds use a smoothing period when
valuing assets. Actuarial guidelines allow wide discretion in valuation methods (see Actuarial
Standards Board, 2007, 2009) and also vary by state. For example, the State of New Jersey’s
Public Employees’ Retirement System values assets by their average market value over the last
five years.17 While New Jersey public pension fund is typical in its use of a five-year smooth-
ing period, some pension funds use up to ten years to smooth asset valuation. Such smoothing
reduces the reported volatility in investment performance, which in turn may enable the pen-
sion fund to better tolerate the volatility of risky investments, present more stable self-reported
funding ratios, and keep the contribution level constant even in periods of large market volatil-
ity. In Table 2.6, we estimate the probability that U.S. public pension funds use a smoothing
period in their asset valuation using the following logit model:
Pr(Smoothingi,t = 1|X) = F(δ1%Riskyi,t + δ2Returni,t−1 + δ3Zi,t + ei,t) (2.2)
where F is a logit function that takes on values strictly between zero and one, and Smoothingi,t
is a binary dependent variable. The dependent binary variable is 0 if a U.S. public pension
fund i does not smooth asset valuations in year t, and equals 1 otherwise. We model the prob-
abilities as a function of pension fund characteristics, focusing on the strategic allocation to
risky asset classes (%Riskyi,t) of fund i in year t. We control for the lagged pension funds re-
turns (Returni,t−1). When examining the role of performance, we investigate the effect of the
fund’s prior year net returns, lagged U.S. equity market returns, and the fund’s prior year net
benchmark-adjusted returns. Zi,t captures other control variables, such as lagged changes in
the allocation to risky assets, the percentage of retired members, fund size, and inflation protec-
tion. In all regressions, we include year dummies and independently double cluster the robust
standard errors by pension fund and by year.
17See http://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/annrpt2011/pers11.pdf, page 24.
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Table 2.6: Logit regressions: Smoothing period in the asset valuation
We present the results of logit regressions determining whether U.S. public pension funds smooth the
valuation of their assets. As independent variables on risk-taking we include %Risky, the percentage
strategically allocated to risky assets, or we decompose it to %Equity, the percentage allocated to eq-
uity; %Alternatives, alternative assets; and %RiskyFI, risky fixed income assets. We also control for
∆%Riskyt−1, the lagged change in the percentage allocated to risky assets; %Retired, the percentage of
retired members from total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total pension fund assets;
and In f lation protection, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides a contractual infla-
tion protection. As independent variables that capture the previous year returns, we include NTRt−1,
the net return of pension funds in the previous year; MKTt−1, the equity market return in t − 1; and
NTR− BMt−1, the net benchmark-adjusted return of pension funds in the previous year. We present
the marginal effects (elasticities) at the means of the independent variables. The marginal effects for the
dummy variables are estimated for discrete changes from 0 to 1. We also include year dummies and in-
dependently double cluster the standard errors by pension fund and by year. We report standard errors
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Logit - probability to use smoothing in asset valuation
%Risky 1.349* 1.351* 1.392* 1.323* 1.371*
[0.714] [0.799] [0.812] [0.802] [0.820]
%Equity 1.609*
[0.893]
%Alternatives 1.009
[0.936]
%RiskyFI 2.374
[2.119]
∆%Riskyt−1 -0.488 -0.472 -0.217 -0.484 -0.175 -0.240
[0.565] [0.571] [0.578] [0.577] [0.611] [0.633]
%Retired -0.245 -0.081 -0.263 -0.207 -0.149
[1.096] [1.055] [1.091] [1.064] [1.157]
Fund size -0.084 -0.086 -0.099 -0.086 -0.098 -0.094
[0.065] [0.067] [0.062] [0.067] [0.061] [0.062]
Inflation protection 0.099 0.091 0.099 0.09 0.111
[0.114] [0.115] [0.114] [0.115] [0.117]
NTRt−1 0.612
[0.980]
MKTt−1 0.767
[0.671]
NTR− BMt−1 -1.972* -2.121*
[1.156] [1.167]
Year dummies Yes Yes No No No No
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 374 372 370 372 370 370
Pseudo R2 0.066 0.077 0.090 0.078 0.096 0.104
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For pension funds with an average allocation to risky investments (72 percent), the proba-
bility that a fund is smoothing asset valuations equals 73.71 percent. The logit regression results
indicate that U.S. public pension funds with a higher allocation to risky assets are more likely
to smooth asset valuations.18 For example, the probability of smoothing asset valuations for
pension funds with a 64 percent (one standard deviation decrease relative to the mean) allo-
cation to risky assets is 62.09 percent. The probability of smoothing increases to 82.75 percent
for U.S. public pension funds that allocate 79 percent (one standard deviation increase) to risky
assets.
Lagged net returns and lagged equity market returns are not significantly related to the
smoothing probability. However, the previous year’s net benchmark-adjusted returns are sig-
nificantly negatively related to the probability that the fund uses asset valuation smoothing.
This negative relation suggests that some U.S. public pension funds recently started smoothing
their asset valuations in response to relative underperformance, compared to their benchmarks
and peers, rather than as a response to declining asset market values per se. According to col-
umn (5), the probability of using smoothing for a pension fund that outperforms its benchmark
on a net basis by 219 basis points (one standard deviation change) is 70 percent. This proba-
bility increases to 74 percent if pension funds have zero net benchmark-adjusted returns, and
increases further to 78 percent if U.S. public pension funds underperform their benchmarks net
of costs by 219 basis points (a one standard deviation change).
2.5 Pension fund liabilities valuation
In this section, we analyze the valuation and composition of pension fund liabilities. First, we
discuss the relation between liability discount rates and pension fund maturity and risk-taking.
Subsection 2.5.2 analyzes the probability that U.S. public pension funds provide contractual
inflation protection to their members.
2.5.1 Liability discount rates
This subsection explores whether the liability discount rates reported to CEM are related to
certain pension fund characteristics. We focus on the relation of fund maturity and risky asset
allocation with the discount rate used by pension funds to value their liabilities. We estimate
the following pooled panel regression model with year and regional, or fund fixed effects:
LDRi,t = γ0 + γ1%Riskyi,t + γ2%Retiredi,t + γ3Xi,t + γ4YDt + γ5FEi + ε i,t (2.3)
where LDRi,t represents the liability discount rate of fund i in year t, and ε i,t is the idiosyn-
cratic error. Xi,t captures other control variables, such as fund size, inflation protection dummy
variable, and plan type dummy variable (public or private pension fund).
18Smoothing will matter most for U.S. public pension funds that invest a greater share of their assets in public
equity. Returns in alternative assets are naturally smoothed because these assets are traded on private markets and
pension funds do not really need the additional smoothing period.
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Results in Table 2.7 show that the allocation to risky assets is positively related to liabil-
ity discount rates. In columns (1) and (8), we document that an increase in the allocation to
equity, alternative assets, and riskier fixed income assets is associated with a higher liability
discount rate. Further, more mature pension funds use lower discount rates, which is in line
with economic theory.
We observe substantial regional differences in liability discount rates. Canadian pension
funds use rates to discount their liabilities that are 30.9-58.6 basis points lower as compared
to U.S. funds. European funds use liability discount rates more than 300 basis points lower
relative to their U.S. counterparts, which is consistent with the regulatory differences.
Whether a pension fund is public or private has a strong effect on the liability discount rate
in the United States. Column (3) indicates that U.S. public pension funds typically use discount
rates that are 64 basis points higher than U.S. private funds. In Canada and Europe, plan type
does not affect the liability discount rates – in those regions, public and private funds behave
in a similar way (see the insignificant coefficient on the Public dummy in columns 3, 5, and 7).
According to column (5), U.S. public pension funds that allocate a larger percentage of their
assets to risky investments tend to use higher liability discount rates. Surprisingly, an even
more important determinant of the liability discount rate among U.S. public pension funds is
fund maturity. Contrary to what economic theory would predict, more mature public pension
funds in the United States use even higher discount rates. In particular, the interaction term
%Retired ∗ Public ∗U.S. is positive and statistically significant. Hence, based on column (7), for
U.S. public pension funds, a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members is asso-
ciated with an increase in the discount rate of 21 basis points (0.1 * (2.393-0.299)). Controlling
for fund-fixed effects in column (12), this economic magnitude increases to 31 basis points (0.1
* (3.989-0.931)).19
In summary, our results show that pension funds that invest in riskier assets typically use
higher rates to discount their liabilities. More mature pension funds in Europe and Canada,
and more mature private pension funds in the United States use lower liability discount rates.
However, in sharp contrast, more mature U.S. public pension funds use the highest discount
rates during 1990-2010 period.
In Table 2.8, we estimate the association between interest rates and liability discount rates
by adding 10-year government bond yields instead of year dummies to the pooled panel regres-
sions. Brown and Wilcox (2009) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) argue that liability discount
rates should be based on the nominal (or real, if inflation protection is offered) Treasury yields,
municipal interest rates, or swap rates.20 Consistent with their typical regulation, we find that
19As a comparison, based on column (7), a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members is associated
with a reduction in the discount rate of 3 basis points among private funds in the United States and all fund types
in other regions.
20Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) find that the effective average duration of U.S. public state funds over the range
of various discount rates is roughly 13 years. We examine whether the liability discount rates follow the trend in
ten-year Treasury yields in the United States, Canada, and Europe (consistent with the duration of liabilities). We
use the ten-year Treasury rate, because the 15-year rate is not available in all regions covered by our study and
because in our estimations we are focused on the trend in Treasury yield, which is highly correlated across Treasury
yields of different maturities.
37
2. PENSION FUND ASSET ALLOCATION AND LIABILITY DISCOUNT RATES
Table
2.7:Panelregressions:Liability
discountrates
In
this
table,w
e
estim
ate
a
panelm
odel.
T
he
dependent
variable
is
the
liability
discount
rate
used
by
the
pension
funds.
A
s
independent
variables
w
e
include
%
R
isky,the
percentage
allocated
to
risky
assets
based
on
strategic
asset
allocation
policy;%
R
etired,the
percentage
of
retired
m
em
bers
from
totalpension
fund
m
em
bers;Fund
size,the
logarithm
of
totalpension
fund
assets;
In
flation
protection,
a
dum
m
y
variable
taking
a
value
of
one
if
a
fund
provides
contractual
inflation
protection;
P
ublic,
a
dum
m
y
variable
taking
a
value
of
one
if
a
pension
fund
is
public;
P
ublic∗
U
.S.,
an
interaction
term
capturing
U
.S.public
funds;
%
R
isky∗
P
ublic,an
interaction
term
capturing
the
percentage
allocated
to
risky
assets
of
public
funds;
%
R
isky∗
P
ublic∗
U
.S.,an
interaction
term
capturing
the
allocation
to
risky
assets
of
U
.S.public
funds;
%
R
etired∗
P
ublic,
an
interaction
term
capturing
the
percentage
of
retired
m
em
bers
am
ong
public
funds;
%
R
etired∗
P
ublic∗
U
.S.,
an
interaction
term
capturing
the
percentage
ofretired
m
em
bers
am
ong
U
.S.public
funds;and
C
anada
and
E
urope,regionaldum
m
y
variables
(the
base
resultrefers
to
U
.S.funds).
W
here
indicated,w
e
include
year
dum
m
ies
and
fund
fixed
effects.
W
e
independently
double
cluster
the
robust
standard
errors
by
pension
fund
and
by
year.
W
e
report
standard
errors
in
brackets.
*,**,and
***
indicate
significance
levels
of0.10,0.05,and
0.01,respectively.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
D
ependentvariable:Liability
discountrate
used
by
pension
funds
%
R
isky
0.604**
0.784***
0.846***
0.054
0.04
0.800***
0.687***
0.960***
0.727*
0.431
0.890***
0.749**
[0.250]
[0.246]
[0.236]
[0.259]
[0.261]
[0.229]
[0.227]
[0.336]
[0.392]
[0.388]
[0.332]
[0.312]
%
R
etired
-0.361**
-0.234
-0.147
-0.185
-0.215*
-0.295**
-0.299**
-0.709***
-0.693***
-0.676***
-0.806***
-0.931***
[0.162]
[0.147]
[0.127]
[0.120]
[0.124]
[0.140]
[0.139]
[0.238]
[0.238]
[0.242]
[0.244]
[0.255]
Fund
size
0.067***
0.038**
0.039**
0.034**
0.037**
0.044***
0.049***
0.077
0.069
0.097
0.056
0.046
[0.017]
[0.017]
[0.016]
[0.016]
[0.016]
[0.016]
[0.017]
[0.120]
[0.120]
[0.115]
[0.120]
[0.123]
Inflation
protection
0.160*
0.037
-0.001
-0.022
-0.013
0.003
-0.002
[0.092]
[0.077]
[0.072]
[0.070]
[0.069]
[0.073]
[0.073]
Public
0.348***
-0.059
-1.345***
-0.481
-0.317**
-0.066
[0.123]
[0.100]
[0.304]
[0.561]
[0.159]
[0.170]
Public*U
.S.
0.644***
0.473***
-0.798
0.663***
-0.168
[0.181]
[0.178]
[0.675]
[0.181]
[0.352]
%
R
isky*Public
2.154***
0.709
0.546
-0.056
[0.495]
[0.922]
[0.348]
[0.389]
%
R
isky*Public*U
.S.
2.033*
1.749***
[1.049]
[0.578]
%
R
etired*Public
0.655*
-0.008
1.218***
0.083
[0.366]
[0.317]
[0.459]
[0.392]
%
R
etired*Public*U
.S.
2.393***
3.989***
[0.745]
[1.409]
C
anada
-0.586***
-0.535***
-0.309***
-0.380***
-0.381***
-0.315***
-0.318***
[0.095]
[0.094]
[0.094]
[0.095]
[0.095]
[0.093]
[0.093]
Europe
-3.316***
-3.174***
-3.027***
-3.086***
-3.101***
-3.044***
-3.060***
[0.174]
[0.194]
[0.213]
[0.210]
[0.212]
[0.214]
[0.215]
Year
dum
m
ies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fund
fixed
effects
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
D
ouble
clustering
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
O
bservations
4,653
4,653
4,653
4,653
4,653
4,653
4,653
4,666
4,666
4,666
4,666
4,666
R
2
0.530
0.542
0.553
0.56
0.562
0.555
0.559
0.773
0.774
0.775
0.775
0.779
38
2.5 Pension fund liabilities valuation
discount rates are strongly positively associated with yields. The average response is less than
proportional, as a 100 basis point decrease in the ten-year government bond yield is associated
with a decrease in the liability discount rate of around 30-40 basis points. Even when control-
ling for Treasury yields, the percentage of retired members remains negative and significant,
especially in the regressions with fund fixed effects. More mature pension funds use lower dis-
count rates regardless of the trend in Treasury yields. The percentage allocated to risky assets
also remains positive and significant.
Table 2.8: Panel regressions: Liability discount rates and Treasury yields
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the liability discount rate used by
the pension funds. We control for Yield, the 10-year Treasury yield; Public ∗ Yield, an interaction term
capturing the effect of the Treasury yield on public funds; and Public ∗Yield ∗U.S., an interaction terms
capturing the effect of the Treasury yield on U.S. public funds. As independent variables we include
%Risky, the percentage allocated to risky assets based on strategic asset allocation policy; %Retired,
the percentage of retired members from total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total
pension fund assets; In f lation protection, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides
contractual inflation protection; Public, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a pension fund is
public; Public ∗U.S., an interaction term capturing U.S. public funds; and Canada and Europe, regional
dummy variables (the base result refers to U.S. funds). Where indicated, we include year dummies and
fund fixed effects. We independently double cluster the robust standard errors by pension fund and by
year. We report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Liability discount rate used by pension funds
Yield 0.389*** 0.392*** 0.390*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.249*** 0.278*** 0.297***
[0.032] [0.031] [0.030] [0.042] [0.042] [0.035] [0.044] [0.048]
Public*Yield -0.257*** -0.077 -0.089* 0.015
[0.051] [0.055] [0.047] [0.041]
Public*Yield*U.S. -0.298*** -0.251***
[0.057] [0.070]
%Risky 0.559** 0.727*** 0.773*** 0.497** 0.457* 0.855** 0.686* 0.522
[0.273] [0.265] [0.255] [0.230] [0.234] [0.380] [0.353] [0.355]
%Retired -0.472*** -0.339** -0.257** -0.231* -0.243* -1.180*** -1.119*** -1.082***
[0.166] [0.148] [0.129] [0.125] [0.126] [0.242] [0.245] [0.237]
Fund size 0.058*** 0.028 0.028* 0.026 0.025 -0.314** -0.316*** -0.294**
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.122] [0.121] [0.118]
Inflation protection 0.151* 0.025 -0.010 0.007 0.007
[0.092] [0.077] [0.072] [0.070] [0.069]
Public 0.358*** -0.032 1.290*** 0.379
[0.123] [0.103] [0.254] [0.277]
Public*U.S. 0.613*** 0.555*** 2.052***
[0.188] [0.195] [0.286]
Canada -0.696*** -0.648*** -0.436*** -0.496*** -0.504***
[0.089] [0.090] [0.107] [0.106] [0.107]
Europe -3.363*** -3.218*** -3.080*** -3.094*** -3.077***
[0.153] [0.175] [0.195] [0.191] [0.189]
Year dummies No No No No No No No No
Fund fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,653 4,653 4,653 4,653 4,653 4,666 4,666 4,666
R2 0.508 0.521 0.531 0.544 0.549 0.761 0.762 0.767
In sharp contrast to all other pension funds, but consistent with the trend in Panel A of
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Figure 2.2, the liability discount rates used by U.S. public pension funds are not responding
to changes in Treasury yields. The triple interaction term Public ∗ Yield ∗U.S. is negative and
significant, completely outweighing the unconditional effect of the Treasury yield on discount
rates. Based on column (8), which includes fund fixed effects, a 100 basis point decrease in the
government bond yield reduces the discount rate by 29.7 basis points on average for private
pension funds in United States and all pension fund types in other regions. However, Treasury
yield changes have no discernible effect on the liability discount rates of U.S. public pension
funds, as a 100 basis point decrease in the Treasury yield reduces the discount rate for U.S.
public funds by around only 4 basis points (1*0.297 + 1*(-0.251)), which is not significantly
different from zero.
Table 2.9: Panel regressions: Liability discount rates by region
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the liability discount rate used by
pension funds. We present the results separately for U.S. funds in columns (1) to (4) and Canadian
funds in columns (5) to (8). As independent variables, we include Yield, the 10-year Treasury yield;
Public ∗ Yield, an interaction term capturing the effect of the Treasury yield on public funds; %Risky,
the percentage strategically allocated to risky assets; %Retired, the percentage of retired members from
total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total pension fund assets; In f lation protection,
a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides contractual inflation protection; Public, a
dummy variable taking a value of one if a pension fund is public; %Risky ∗ Public, an interaction term
capturing the percentage allocated to risky assets of public funds; and %Retired ∗ Public, an interaction
term capturing the percentage of retired members among public funds. Where indicated, we include
year dummies and fund fixed effects. We independently double cluster the robust standard errors by
pension fund and by year. We report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels
of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Liability discount rate used by pension funds
U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. Canada Canada Canada Canada
Yield 0.580*** 0.575*** 0.410*** 0.394*** 0.358*** 0.369*** 0.215*** 0.214***
[0.055] [0.054] [0.072] [0.071] [0.040] [0.041] [0.051] [0.052]
Public*Yield -0.467*** -0.455*** -0.329*** -0.308*** 0.042 0.001 0.034 0.037
[0.061] [0.060] [0.084] [0.077] [0.048] [0.047] [0.046] [0.048]
%Risky 0.215 0.402* -0.073 0.362 -0.196 0.220 -0.097 -0.088
[0.276] [0.222] [0.525] [0.394] [0.457] [0.558] [0.579] [0.435]
%Retired -0.487*** -0.636*** -1.150*** -1.450*** -0.105 0.077 -0.617* -0.615*
[0.154] [0.144] [0.324] [0.340] [0.218] [0.260] [0.317] [0.319]
Fund size 0.053*** 0.065*** -0.301** -0.342** 0.007 0.012 -0.451** -0.450**
[0.017] [0.018] [0.152] [0.149] [0.036] [0.036] [0.206] [0.204]
Inflation protection 0.077 0.087 -0.104 -0.095
[0.095] [0.095] [0.099] [0.103]
Public 2.251*** 2.229*** -0.934 0.192
[0.488] [0.439] [0.770] [0.322]
%Risky*Public 0.818* 1.444 1.193 0.005
[0.486] [0.935] [1.130] [0.506]
%Retired*Public 1.474** 3.724*** -0.511 -0.049
[0.579] [1.122] [0.457] [0.470]
Year dummies No No No No No No No No
Fund fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,854 2,854 2,865 2,865 1,575 1,575 1,577 1,577
R2 0.339 0.343 0.642 0.650 0.305 0.305 0.667 0.667
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Next, we perform a robustness check to examine the relation between liability discount
rates and pension fund characteristics by region. Results in columns (1) to (4) in Table 2.9 con-
firm that U.S. private pension funds use lower liabilities discount rates when Treasury yields
decline and that more mature private pension funds in the U.S. are using significantly lower
discount rates. Consistent with Tables 2.7 and 2.8, U.S. public pension funds are behaving in
the opposite way. We find no such differences between public and private pension funds for
Canada in columns (5)-(8).
Table 2.10: Panel regressions: Liability discount rates and self-reported funding ratios
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the liability discount rate used by
U.S. public pension funds. As independent variables we include %Risky, the percentage allocated to
risky assets based on strategic asset allocation policy; %Retired, the percentage of retired members from
total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total pension fund assets; In f lation protection,
a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides contractual inflation protection; SRFR, the
self-reported funding ratio of U.S. public funds; and Smoothing, a dummy variable taking a value of
one if pension funds smooth their asset valuation over time. In columns (1)-(5) we use all observa-
tions, whereas in columns (6)-(7) we focus on the subperiod 2006-2010. In all models we include year
dummies. We independently double cluster the robust standard errors by pension fund and by year.
We report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Liability discount rate used by U.S. public funds
%Risky 0.993** 0.893* 1.830*** 1.503* 1.608*** 1.476**
[0.440] [0.471] [0.668] [0.903] [0.544] [0.707]
%Retired 0.981** 0.849* 1.34 2.023 1.174 2.687
[0.494] [0.498] [0.953] [1.620] [1.059] [1.749]
Fund size 0.052** 0.068** 0.062** 0.081* 0.065 0.108 0.080
[0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.043] [0.057] [0.067] [0.052]
Inflation protection 0.133 0.162 0.140 0.233 0.141 0.309* 0.043
[0.126] [0.127] [0.128] [0.144] [0.123] [0.162] [0.169]
SRFR -1.139** -1.392* -1.951** -2.162**
[0.554] [0.797] [0.753] [0.910]
Smoothing -0.282* -0.154
[0.168] [0.236]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects No No No No No No No
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,146 1,127 1,127 742 413 316 198
R2 0.041 0.036 0.044 0.081 0.104 0.132 0.142
Overall, the results indicate that U.S. public funds not only use higher discount rates if
they are more mature, but also they do not take into account changes in Treasury yields when
determining their discount rates, contrary to economic theory. Instead, regulations require
U.S. public funds to set their liability discount rate equal to the expected asset portfolio return,
giving them great latitude in determining what those expected returns are. As a result, another
interpretation of the lack of any association between the level of interest rates and the liability
discount rates of U.S. public pension funds, while controlling for the percentage allocated to
risky assets, is that U.S. public pension funds have made the economically surprising choice of
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not lowering their expected return estimates on risky assets (in nominal terms) as interest rates
decline.
Table 2.10 further explores the heterogeneity in liability discount rate decisions among U.S.
public pension funds by considering their relation with self-reported funding ratios (SRFR).
Although increasing the liability discount rate should mechanically increase the funding ratio
(because using a higher discount rate reduces the present value of liabilities while not affecting
asset values), we document that U.S. public pension funds with lower self-reported funding
ratios use higher liability discount rates. The negative association between liability discount
rates and self-reported funding ratios suggests that better funded U.S. public pension funds
engage in less camouflaging behavior, while those with greater underfunding problems are
more likely to do so. Economically, a 13.5 percent decrease in the self-reported funding ratio,
which corresponds to a one standard deviation change, is associated with an increase in the
liability discount rate of around 15-19 basis points. Columns (6) and (7), which only use data
for 2006-2010, show that when underfunding problems become more severe, the economic as-
sociation becomes stronger: a 10 percent decrease in the self-reported funding ratio results in
an increase in the liability discount rate of around 20-22 basis points.21 We thus conclude that
self-reported funding ratios most likely offer a more realistic reflection of the funding situation
of relatively better funded U.S. public pension funds and are more likely to mask the under-
funding problems among poorly funded U.S. public pension funds.
2.5.2 Inflation protection
Next, we estimate the probability that a pension fund provides contractual inflation protection
to its participants. We model these probabilities as a function of pension fund characteristics,
focusing on fund maturity, fund size, and plan type (public or private). To answer this question,
we use a binary response logit model:
Pr(In f Proti,t = 1|X) = F(θ1%Retiredi,t + θ2Zi,t + θ3YDt + θ4Regioni + νi,t) (2.4)
where F is a logit function that takes on values strictly between zero and one. In f Proti,t is a
binary dependent variable equal to 0 if a pension fund i provides ad hoc inflation protection or
no benefits indexation at all in year t, and 1 if the fund provides contractual inflation protection.
Our results in Table 2.11 indicate that public funds are significantly more likely to provide
contractual inflation protection than private funds. Results in column (2) show that the proba-
bility that a private fund provides contractual inflation protection is 17.0 percent, whereas the
probability for public pension funds is 58.7 percent.22 Column (3) shows that U.S. public funds
have the highest probability of providing inflation protection among the pension funds in our
sample.
21In unreported results, we document that the relation between self-reported funding ratios and liability discount
rates is robust to the inclusion of fund fixed effects.
22The probabilities to provide contractual inflation protection are estimated for a discrete change in the Public
dummy variable, setting all other variables at their mean values. The difference in the probability to provide con-
tractual inflation protection between public and corporate funds is equal to 41.7 percent, which is the marginal
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In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.11, we also document that pension funds with a greater
percentage of retired members are less likely to provide contractual inflation protection. For
instance, based on column (2), the probability of providing contractual inflation protection for
pension funds in which 27 percent of members are retired (25th percentile) is 32.0 percent.
This probability decreases to 25.9 percent for funds that have 48 percent retired members (75th
percentile). Fund maturity has a negative effect on the probability of providing contractual
inflation protection by U.S. pension funds (the relation is negative, but insignificant among
Canadian pension funds).
The negative relation between the percentage of retired members and the decision to pro-
vide contractual inflation protection indicates that “younger” pension funds may overpromise
to their plan members. The risk younger cohorts face is that once pension funds mature and
face funding difficulties in delivering the promised benefits, contractual inflation protection
may be removed from the pension deal. Eliminating contractual inflation protection is one of
the measures of last resort available to underfunded pension funds, but its implementation is
difficult, especially in the U.S. context because pension benefit promises have strong protec-
tions. Nevertheless, Rhode Island and New Jersey’s state pension plans recently received court
approval to suspend future cost of living adjustments (COLA) starting January 1, 2011.23 It is
worth noting that many U.S. public pension funds have COLAs that are not actually linked
to the Consumer Price Index. For example, in Illinois, the COLA is set at 3 percent annually,
regardless of the actual inflation rate.24
Furthermore, even after controlling for fund maturity, size, and plan type, the likelihood
that Canadian pension funds provide inflation protection is significantly higher. Our results
also indicate that in Canada, larger funds are more likely to provide inflation protection. Based
on columns (8), (9), and (10), a one-unit increase in the logarithm of assets under management
(i.e., doubling the fund size) increases the probability that a Canadian pension fund provides
contractual inflation protection by 11.9-13.2 percent.
In the previous section, we showed that public pension funds use substantially higher li-
ability discount rates. The results in Table 2.11 indicate that public pension funds are more
generous because they are more likely to promise contractual inflation protection to their ben-
eficiaries. Brown and Wilcox (2009) argue that if a pension fund promises inflation protection,
then their liabilities should be discounted using real interest rates, namely inflation-indexed
rates based on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). Hence, public pension funds ig-
nore both the trends in Treasury yields and the inflation protection promised to their beneficia-
ries when determining liability discount rates.
value of the Public dummy in Table 2.11 column (2).
23The Rhode Island Retirement Security Act of 2011 suspends cost of living adjustments for all public employees
in the plan at the moment, and in the future, COLAs will be tied to the funding level of the pension system (see
http://www.treasury.ri.gov/secure-path-ri/rirsa/legislation.php). The new regulation of the New Jersey
State Treasury Department, Division of Pensions and suspended future COLAs for all retirees of all retirement
systems (see http://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/ret-benefits.shtml#cola).
24See the pension reform proposals for the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois regarding inflation
protection: http://trs.illinois.gov/subsections/press/PensionReformProposals.htm.
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We have documented that U.S. public pension funds behave differently from all other pension
funds by increasing allocations to risky assets despite their maturing member population and
decreasing Treasury yields. While we argue that this is driven by their distinct regulations, an
alternative hypothesis is that U.S. public pension funds collectively have become more positive
about their skills or the investment opportunities in risky assets (irrespective of the incentives
arising from their regulation that links liability discount rates to the expected returns on their
assets). In this section, we examine whether pension fund returns justify their preference for a
riskier asset allocation policy.
We calculate net benchmark-adjusted returns separately for each asset class by subtracting
the total investment costs and the return from the self-reported benchmark (in that asset class)
from the gross returns, and then aggregate up across all asset classes held by the fund. We relate
the net benchmark-adjusted returns (NTR− BMi,t) of fund i in year t to fund characteristics,
such as the percentage of retired members (%Retiredi,t), the percentage allocated to risky assets
(%Riskyi,t), and other pension fund characteristics (Xi,t), using pooled panel regressions with
year (YDt) and regional, or fund fixed effects (FEi):
NTR− BMi,t = ρ0 + ρ1%Riskyi,t + ρ2%Retiredi,t + ρ3Xi,t + ρ4YDt + ρ5FEi + υi,t (2.5)
We also include in the regressions interaction terms to capture the effect of U.S. public pension
funds, the group with significantly different regulations. We independently double cluster the
robust standard errors in all regressions by pension fund and by year.
Results in Table 2.12 show that the percentage of retired members and the allocation to risky
assets are generally not related to the pension fund net benchmark-adjusted returns. In column
(2) we add a public dummy variable and document that public pension funds underperform as
compared to private funds by 24 basis points. Column (3) shows that this underperformance
among public pension funds is due solely to U.S. public pension funds, which underperform by
59 basis points annually on a net benchmark-adjusted basis. There is no significant difference
in the performance of Canadian and European public versus private pension funds.25
In columns (5) and (7), we document substantial heterogeneity in the net benchmark-adjusted
returns of U.S. public pension funds, determined by two main factors: the allocation to risky
assets and fund maturity. U.S. public pension funds with a greater allocation to risky assets un-
derperform more. A 12 percent increase in the strategic allocation to risky assets of U.S. public
pension funds, which corresponds to a one standard deviation change, is associated with an
increase in underperformance of 14 basis points annually. In column (6), we find that more
mature public pension funds underperform, but this underperformance is mainly due to the
returns of U.S. public pension funds. Based on column (7), a 10 percent increase in the percent-
age of retired members of U.S. public funds results in an underperformance of 8 basis points
25We control for European and Canadian pension funds using regional dummy variables, but we do not find
significant regional performance effects.
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compared to all other pension funds. In columns (8)-(11) we add controls for the previous
year’s net benchmark-adjusted performance and for the lagged changes in allocation to risky
assets.26 Even with these controls, U.S. public pension funds underperform by 67 basis points
compared to other pension funds.
Table 2.13: Panel regressions: U.S. public pension fund net benchmark-adjusted performance
In this table, we estimate a panel model. The dependent variable is the net benchmark-adjusted per-
formance of U.S. public pension funds. In columns (1) and (2), we use the net benchmark-adjusted
returns as they are reported in the database. In columns (3) and (4), in the first stage we risk-adjust the
net benchmark-adjusted returns using a five-factor model that includes the equity market return, SMB,
HML, the momentum factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor. In the sec-
ond step, we augment the alphas retrieved from the first step with the error terms of the first step and
estimate panel regressions. In the panel regressions we include the following independent variables:
%Risky, the percentage allocated to risky assets based on strategic asset allocation policy; ∆%Riskyt−1,
the lagged change in the percentage allocated to risky assets; %Retired, the percentage of retired mem-
bers from total pension fund members; Fund size, the logarithm of total pension fund assets; In f lation
protection, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a fund provides contractual inflation protection;
Public, a dummy variable taking a value of one if a pension fund is public; and NTR− BMt−1, the net
benchmark-adjusted return of pension funds in the previous year. Where indicated, we include year
dummies and fund fixed effects. We independently double cluster the robust standard errors by pen-
sion fund and by year. We report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Net benchmark-adjusted returns Risk-adjusted net benchmark-
adjusted returns
%Risky -0.360 1.266 1.144 1.256
[0.997] [2.135] [1.142] [0.890]
∆%Riskyt−1 -1.194 -1.565 -4.981** -1.792*
[1.356] [1.664] [2.132] [0.924]
%Retired -2.747** -4.148* -4.830* -3.821**
[1.192] [2.350] [2.523] [1.905]
Fund size 0.060 1.689 -0.256 1.266
[0.105] [2.013] [0.230] [0.792]
Inflation protection -0.116 -0.242
[0.305] [0.503]
NTR− BMt−1 -0.130 -0.203 0.129* 0.005
[0.150] [0.143] [0.076] [0.033]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Double clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 843 843 805 805
R2 0.127 0.225 0.099 0.732
In Table 2.13, we further explore the underperformance of U.S. public pension funds by
controlling for fund fixed effects and by risk-adjusting the returns. We risk-adjust the net
26Pension funds with greater increases in strategic allocation to risky assets in year t− 1 underperform compared
to their peers in year t. If a pension fund increased the allocation to risky assets by 10 percent in the previous year,
then it has 17 to 20 basis points lower net benchmark-adjusted performance this year. We hence observe that a rapid
increase in the exposure to risky assets results in underperformance, which implies that pension funds should build
their riskier allocations gradually. This effect is not specific to U.S. public pension funds, but observable across all
pension funds in our sample.
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benchmark-adjusted returns using a five-factor model that includes the excess equity market
return, SMB, HML, the momentum factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liq-
uidity factor. Results in columns (3) and (4) show that on a risk-adjusted basis, the percentage
of retired members has an even stronger effect on performance. Among U.S. public pension
funds, a 10 percent increase in the percentage of retired members is associated with a decrease
in the annualized abnormal returns of 38-48 basis points. In addition, the lagged changes in
the allocation to risky assets also maintain the significant negative effect on performance.
In summary, our results show that U.S. public pension funds underperform and that this
underperformance is greater among more mature U.S. public plans and those with a higher
strategic allocation to risky assets.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we employ a comprehensive dataset of U.S., Canadian, and European public and
corporate defined benefit pension funds and investigate their asset allocation, liability discount
rates and contractual inflation protection over the last two decades. We find that U.S. public
(state and local) pension funds behave differently from all other pension funds. We ascribe
their different reaction to the maturing of their participant base and declining government
bond yields to their incentives arising from a distinct regulatory framework. In particular,
U.S. public pension can set their liability discount rate equal to the assumed expected rate
of return on their investments, which means that by investing in more risky assets, they can
adopt a higher liability discount rate and present an improved funding position. In contrast,
the regulations pertaining to Canadian and European public and private funds, as well as to
corporate pension funds in the United States, requires the use of liability discount rates that are
based on high quality interest rates.
Economic theory predicts that mature pension funds should invest less in risky assets and
use lower discount rates for the valuation of their liabilities. U.S. corporate pension funds and
Canadian and European public and private funds indeed lower their liability discount rates if
interest rates decline and use lower liability discount rates as their participant base matures.
However, U.S. public pension funds are allowed to base their discount rates on the expected
rate of return of their asset portfolio, which provides them with incentives to take more risk
over time in response to declining government bond yields. Taking more risk thus enables
public pension funds in the United States to maintain high discount rates and present more
favorable funding ratios to the public, despite the fact that this does not in any way alter the
nature of their liabilities. For U.S. public pension funds, we document that those with a larger
percentage of retired members use even higher discount rates, possibly because the shorter
maturity increases the present value of their liabilities and limits their ability to camouflage
their underfunding.
Gradually, U.S. public funds have become the biggest risk-takers among pension funds
around the globe, especially if they are more mature or the proportion of their members who
are retired increases. At the same time, U.S. public funds have almost no ability to scale back
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spending if risky assets underperform expectations, as their benefits are often given special
protections in state constitutions as well as through statutory and common law (Brown and
Wilcox, 2009).
Moreover, we find that the increased risk-taking of U.S. public pension funds is associated
with poorer investment performance. On average, U.S. public pension funds underperform
their benchmarks annually by about 60 basis points more than other pension funds. Underper-
formance is more severe for more mature funds as well as for those with larger allocations to
risky assets. These results are consistent with asset allocation decisions that are not based on
investment opportunities or asset-liability management, but rather on regulatory incentives to
report lower liabilities.
Hence, a major worry is that their increased risk-taking is reckless and could lead to sub-
stantial future costs to taxpayers or public entities if their more volatile risky investments fail
to meet the expected rates of return. Moreover, the lack of any association between liability
discount rates and contractual inflation protection (which applies particularly to U.S. public
funds) raises the concern that these funds underestimate the costs of these promises, i.e. that
U.S. public funds are camouflaging the real costs of pension promises made to their benefi-
ciaries and taxpayers. The economic consequences of these practices could involve material
wealth transfers from future taxpayers and workers to current pensioners and workers (see
also Kocken, 2012).
The policy implications of our study are clear but challenging. The extent of this challenge
is reflected in the severe levels of underfunding of U.S. public pension funds. In 2010, the aver-
age self-declared funding ratio of U.S. public pension funds was equal to 75 percent. However,
as these funding levels are often based on high liability discount rates and smoothed asset
valuation, the reported level of underfunding would be significantly worse if they had used
market-based asset valuations and liability discount rates, which are based on the actual risk-
iness of the promised pension benefits (i.e., linked to, for example, yields on public bonds or
other interest rates).
The purpose of public and private DB pension plans is the same-to provide a secure and
affordable retirement provision to their members. We see no good economic reason why pub-
lic and private pension funds in the United States should be regulated in different ways. Our
findings indicate that a highly politicized setting, a lax regulatory framework, and a tough eco-
nomic environment for pension funds in general combined to allow U.S. public pension funds
to make strategic decisions that camouflage the real value of their promised pension benefits.
These decisions could have alarmingly negative implications for future stakeholders and tax-
payers through lower returns and masked funding problems. In sum, we argue that U.S. policy
pertaining to public pension funds needs drastic reform and must be brought in line with reg-
ulations around U.S. private pension funds, as current laws and regulations effectively exempt
states and cities from behaving prudently in how they manage and disclose the financing of
pension systems of their employees.
Recently, the GASB issued new proposals that take a major step in this direction. Specifi-
cally, the GASB (2012) proposed severing the link between liability discount rates and expected
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rates of returns but only for funds that can be classified as underfunded, i.e., where the plan
assets are not “projected to be sufficient to pay benefits and the net position projected to re-
main after each benefit payment can be invested long-term.” The GASB notes that for such
underfunded funds in which “the plan assets are projected not to be available to be invested
long-term and, therefore, would be insufficient for paying benefits to current employees, re-
tirees, and their beneficiaries, the projected benefit payments take on attributes that are similar
to other forms of debt. In this circumstance, governments would incorporate into the discount
rate a tax-exempt, high-quality 20-year municipal bond index rate to reflect that future benefit
payments are not expected to be made from long-term investments. High quality would be
defined as being rated AA or higher (or an equivalent rating).” However, for funds for which
plan assets are projected to be sufficient, the wrong incentives would remain in place because
the assumed rates of return of the assets could still be used to discount the liabilities.27 More-
over, these projections (of whether or not assets are sufficient to pay the benefits) can seemingly
still be based on liability discount rates that are linked to expected asset returns. As a result, the
new GASB proposals seem to create even stronger incentives to camouflage liabilities and en-
gage in reckless risk-taking for funds that are close to being underfunded (and that may indeed
be underfunded if liabilities were to be discounted at lower high-quality municipal yields) and
that rationally want to avoid being classified as underfunded. We thus conclude that the new
GASB guidelines are overly complicated and do not solve the incentives problem, but that
subjecting U.S. public DB pension funds to the same regulations currently pertaining to U.S.
corporate plans would.
27Another problem that remains in the guidelines is that GASB still recommends using a fixed liability discount
rate number of around 8 percent to discount all liabilities, regardless of their maturity of the promised pension
benefits, instead of using a term structure of liability discount rates that matches the term structure of promised
benefits.
50
Chapter 3
Can Large Pension Funds Beat the
Market? Asset Allocation, Market
Timing, Security Selection, and the
Limits of Liquidity*
3.1 Introduction
Can large, sophisticated investors beat the market? And if so, what investment skills are
most prevalent? Can investors outperform by periodically changing strategic asset allocation
weights, by deviating from those in short-term market timing, or by selecting particular secu-
rities within asset classes? Are there (dis)economies of scale and liquidity limitations in asset
allocation, market timing or security selection? In this paper, we try to address these questions
by investigating a unique database of the largest U.S. defined benefit (DB) pension funds.
Questions of investment skill and the importance of size and liquidity have been most inten-
sively investigated in the mutual fund literature. However, this literature has focused almost
exclusively on the third component of active management, security selection, largely sidestep-
ping the performance in asset allocation and market timing. We are the first, to the best of our
knowledge, to examine the returns from changes in asset allocation of institutional investors,
as until now a large data sample on strategic asset allocation policy has not been available. On
market timing performance, Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann (1999) and Blake, Rossi, Tim-
mermann, Tonks, and Wermers (2013) find that external managers employed by U.K. pension
funds did not have superior market timing (also called tactical asset allocation) skills across
asset classes. Among mutual funds, Bollen and Busse (2001) and Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) find
that actively managed equity funds have some positive timing ability, whereas Chen, Ferson,
and Peters (2010) find that bond mutual funds have neutral to weakly positive market timing
skills. All of these studies conflate changes in strategic asset allocation with more short-term
market timing. Using our unique data on the strategic asset allocation policy weights, we can
*This chapter is co-authored with Rob Bauer (Maastricht University) and Martijn Cremers (University of Notre
Dame).
51
3. CAN LARGE PENSION FUNDS BEAT THE MARKET
directly assess asset allocation skills and distinguish them more accurately from market tim-
ing decisions (which are captured by the deviations between the policy weights and the actual
asset allocation weights).
There is a very large literature on security selection performance, especially among mu-
tual funds. For example, Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996) and Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002)
find that, on average, mutual funds underperform the market by about the amount of expenses
charged to investors. However, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) and Cremers and Peta-
jisto (2009) document evidence that at least some subset of mutual fund managers may have
skill. Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) find not only that a sizable sub-
group of mutual fund managers exhibits stock-picking skills, but also that the superior alphas
of these managers persist.
We focus on pension funds and our main contribution to the security selection literature
is to document the average security selection skills at the total fund level, rather than at the
level of portfolios managers hired by the pension funds, as considered by Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1992), Goyal and Wahal (2008) and Blake et al. (2013). The existing pension fund
literature focuses primarily on equity investments through external managers. As external
managers are often hired by more than one pension fund and funds typically employ more than
one external manager, such research does not allow for direct analysis of the total performance
of pension funds. We study the overall fund performance, which incorporates the performance
in equity, fixed income and alternative assets.2 Pension funds in our sample have both internal
and external managers, and combine both active and passive strategies.
Moreover, we are the first paper to explore the role of size and liquidity for all three compo-
nents of asset management: asset allocation, market timing and security selection. In an impor-
tant paper, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) find diseconomies of scale related to mutual
fund size, but economies of scale related to mutual fund family size. They relate the former
primarily to within-fund organizational and liquidity problems and the latter to the advantage
of centralizing research and marketing efforts. More recently, Lopez de Silanes, Phalippou, and
Gottschalg (2010) document diseconomies of scale for private equity and Fung, Hsieh, Naik,
and Ramadorai (2008) for hedge funds. Pension funds seem particularly interesting vehicles
to study questions related to size and liquidity in investment management performance. With
their larger average size (about $10 billion in our sample), they are vastly larger than typical
mutual funds, and may be more akin to mutual fund families rather than individual mutual
funds. Further, incentives differ substantially. Mutual funds with the best performance receive
large cash inflows (see, for example, Sirri and Tufano, 1998). As mutual fund manager pay
depends on the size of the assets under management and the relative performance compared
to the benchmark, this can create substantial incentives for mutual fund managers to engage in
2A closely related paper is Blake et al. (1999), who investigate the asset allocation and performance of U.K.
pension funds throughout the period 1986-1994. Their data includes only U.K. funds that maintained the same
external management group during the entire sample period. Another related paper is Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu
(2010), who consider endowment funds. Similar to pension funds, endowment funds also invest in multiple asset
classes. However, the amount of assets under management of pension funds is substantially larger. According to
Brown et al. (2010), endowment funds had on average $287 million assets, while the mean holdings of pension
funds in our sample is $10 billion.
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active management or chase short-term performance. Defined benefit pension fund inflows do
not depend on performance, but on actuarial and demographic factors. This long-term liability
structure further enables pension funds to make substantial investments in illiquid assets.
As a result, the role of size and liquidity for pension fund performance is ex ante unclear. On
the positive side, less liquid investments have potentially higher expected returns. Large scale
may provide significant bargaining power vis-a-vis external money managers or allow funds
to attract investment talent internally. On the negative side, larger size may make trading in
less liquid securities much more difficult, may limit the investment strategies available and
create organizational complexities. Moreover, the size of the assets of DB plans is driven by
the number of plan members and pension promises made to the workers, and not by scale
efficiency considerations (unlike mutual funds that can be closed to new investments due to
diseconomies of scale).
To answer these questions, we use the unique CEM dataset, comprised of 557 U.S. defined
benefit pension funds for the period 1990-2010. Our main findings are six-fold, collectively
suggesting some evidence for the ability of the pension funds in our sample to modestly out-
perform at the total fund level, though this outperformance is subject to significant liquidity
and size limitations.
First, pension fund investment costs are on average 37 basis points per year. Investment
costs are stable during the first half of our sample, but increase to 55 basis points in 2010 due to
the higher allocation to alternative assets. We document significant scale advantages in costs:
one standard deviation increase in the log of assets reduces the total investment costs by 7 ba-
sis points. The scale advantage is much more pronounced for alternative investments, where a
one-unit increase in the log of alternative assets results in 111 basis points lower costs. As ex-
pected, funds managing a greater percent of their assets through active and external mandates
have higher investment costs.
The second contribution is methodological. We decompose pension fund returns in three
components (asset allocation, market timing and security selection) and evaluate the perfor-
mance of each. The first component, asset allocation, consists of the changes over time in each
fund’s ex-ante declared strategic (target) asset allocation policy weights times the self-declared
benchmark returns of the different asset classes. For each asset class within each fund, we ob-
serve the self-declared benchmark as well as the return on these benchmarks. Asset allocation
performance evaluation thus compares the performance of the change in policy weights over
last year, relative to not changing last year’s policy weights.
The second component is market timing (tactical asset allocation), defined as the difference
between strategic policy and actual (realized) allocation weights. Market timing thus captures
the performance related to overweighting or underweighting particular asset classes, relative
to the target weights in that year.3 We further decompose this market timing component into
3For instance, if a fund’s strategic weight for equity is 60%, but the realized weight is 65% (and say for fixed
income the strategic weight is 40% and the realized weight is 35%), the market timing components for equity
(fixed income) equals +5% (-5%), multiplied by the relevant benchmark return. The main difference between asset
allocation and market timing is horizon. Strategic asset allocations change less frequently: 32.67% of the fund-years
observations show no change in these strategic weights in year t as compared to year t− 1. Market timing is shorter-
term, as only 0.51% of the fund-years observations have no difference between the target and the actual weights in
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a passive and an active part, where the passive part consists of changes in actual weights due
to benchmark market movements and the active part is due to reallocations of investments,
taking market movements into account.
The third component is security selection, corresponding to net benchmark-adjusted re-
turns or the difference between realized net returns and benchmark returns for a given asset
class. This captures the returns due to picking securities and timing industries and styles within
an asset class.
Third, we find that pension funds have, on average at the total fund level, positive abnormal
returns of 89 basis points per year after risk-adjusting for equity market, size, value, liquidity
and fixed income market factors, to which each of three components of active management
contributes about equally. Pension funds obtain 25 basis point annual alpha from setting the
asset allocation policy weights and 26 basis points annual alpha due to timing of asset allocation
decisions. Security selection produces returns that are on average 25 basis points per year above
the benchmark returns, but this becomes insignificant after controlling for risk factors (and can
completely be attributed to momentum in equity markets).
Pension funds obtain positive returns from changes in the strategic asset allocation mainly
by increasing their exposure over time to alternative assets in years in which these asset classes
had high positive returns. The 26 basis points abnormal market timing returns can be fully
attributed to passive exposure to ‘time series’ momentum, and not to any active rebalancing.
Times series momentum is the phenomenon that past returns in a particular asset class tend
to be predictive for the return in the asset class, as documented by Moskowitz, Ooi, and Ped-
ersen (2012). They find that ‘12-month time series momentum profits are positive, not just on
average across these assets, but for every asset contract we examine (58 in total).’ Combined
with the insignificant security selection performance, this suggests that pension funds benefit
from simultaneously investing in multiple asset classes, but would do better (after costs and on
average) if they would have invested exclusively in passive mandates without frequent rebal-
ancing across asset classes. For comparison, the average investment cost of passive mandates
is 5.67 basis points compared to 45.22 basis points for active mandates.
Fourth, we relate the risk-adjusted returns for asset allocation, market timing and security
selection components to the total size and liquidity of the funds’ holdings. Our proxy for liquid-
ity is the fund’s loading on the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). We find
that the direct association between the size of the assets under management and performance
is only significantly associated for market timing, which smaller funds do more effectively. In
general, the scale advantage in costs is thus not translated into better overall performance for
larger funds.
All three components of active management exhibit significant liquidity limitations related
to size. The economic effects are meaningful and comparable across the three components of
active management. For example, increasing liquidity by lowering the liquidity beta by 10
percentage points is associated with an improvement of the alpha of a fund at the 75th size
any given year.
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percentile by 13 basis points per year more than the improvement of the alpha of a fund at the
median size percentile.
Fifth, as previously mentioned, our results suggest that especially the largest pension funds
would have performed better if they had invested more in passively managed mandates. We
group all funds into three groups depending on the percentage of their assets that is actively
managed. The most actively managed group has significantly greater size-induced liquidity
constraints, and the largest funds in this group underperform similarly sized funds with much
less active management by about 62 basis points a year. We thus document three reasons for the
attractiveness of passive management, especially for the largest funds. First, pension funds on
average had insignificant risk-adjusted security selection performance. Second, passive man-
agement is much cheaper than active management. Third, performance in passive mandates is
less subject to liquidity-related diseconomies of scale.
Sixth and finally, we document strong performance persistence for both market timing and
security selection using annual quintile rankings. Funds are more likely to end up in a better
performing quintile next year, if they also do so this year, and they are more likely to perform
worse in the ranking next year if they performed relatively poorly this year. Such persistence
is a useful confirmation that we are able to pick up skill, even though our performance data is
limited to the annual frequency.
Blake et al. (1999) find negative returns from market timing, attributed to negative timing
returns within foreign equity (see also Timmermann and Blake, 2005). One important differ-
ence in the construction of the market timing return component is that we have access to the
strategic asset allocation weights and self-determined benchmarks, whereas Blake et al. (1999)
use one benchmark index per asset class as a return proxy for all pension funds and estimate
the strategic weights based on the trend in realized weights. Another difference is that we also
include internal mandates across all asset classes in our analysis. Moreover, we do not require
that a single external manager is employed during the entire sample period.
Similar to our findings, the security selection returns of U.K. funds are positive, but not al-
ways significant (Blake et al., 1999). Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) document that institutional
asset management firms hired by U.S. pension funds deliver alphas statistically indistinguish-
able from zero. In line with our findings, they also find that the security selection alphas of
these institutional managers are mainly driven by momentum in equity markets.
Our findings of liquidity-related diseconomies of scale and the inability to take concen-
trated positions in equity among pension funds are consistent with Chen et al. (2004), who ex-
clusively focus on security selection by mutual funds. That paper does not directly assess any
fund’s exposure to liquidity, but indirectly infers this by comparing the performance of small-
cap funds to large caps funds (which presumably are more liquid). In contrast, we directly
estimate each fund’s loading to the systematic traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003).
Our results partially contradict the existence of economies of scale in pension fund man-
agement as discussed in Dyck and Pomorski (2011), as we find that larger U.S. funds do not
perform better than smaller U.S. funds both before and after risk-adjusting performance. The
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difference in results can largely be explained by a difference in methodology: we analyze not
only the non-risk-adjusted returns, but we also risk-adjust fund performance for factor returns,
investigate the importance of momentum and control for fund fixed effects. Dyck and Po-
morski (2011) do not risk-adjust returns and focus on specifications without fund fixed effects
and without controlling for momentum.4 In our view, especially risk-adjustment is critical for
performance evaluation and merely benchmark-adjusting is insufficient, as is borne out by our
results.
Persistence in security selection performance has been documented by Tonks (2005) and
Blake et al. (2013) among U.K. pension funds’ domestic equity investments, even after risk-
adjusting. When analyzing the security selection skills of U.S. domestic equity institutional
managers, Busse et al. (2010) find only modest evidence of persistence using three-factor mod-
els and little to none using four-factor models. Our contribution is to document persistence in
both market timing and security selection returns on a total fund level, which incorporates the
performance of all managers in all assets. However, we only have access to annual data and
thus cannot test persistence in risk-adjusted alphas.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.3 describes the CEM dataset and considers pos-
sible self-reporting biases. Section 3.3 explains the methodology to decompose fund returns
into asset allocation, market timing and security selection components. Section 3.4 focuses on
the effects of investment style and size on costs. Section 5.6 presents the returns from asset
allocation, market timing and security selection before and after risk-adjusting. Section 5.6.2
describes the relation between fund risk-adjusted performance and its characteristics. Section
5.6.3 briefly discusses the persistence in pension fund performance. Concluding comments are
provided in section 5.7.
3.2 Characteristics of the CEM database
CEM Benchmarking Incorporated (CEM) collects U.S. pension fund data through yearly ques-
tionnaires.5 We focus on defined benefit (DB) funds only, where the pension fund’s Board
makes the asset allocation decisions and is responsible for performance. In defined contribu-
tion (DC) funds, plan sponsors select the menu of available investment options, while each
plan member individually is responsible for the asset allocation decision. Thus, asset alloca-
tion outcomes within DC funds belong more to the literature on individual investors’ decision
making. The CEM database includes details on each fund’s strategic and actual asset allocation
decisions, the self-declared benchmarks for each asset class, and the precise cost structure and
performance for all separate asset classes and their benchmarks. Table 3.1 provides the num-
ber of funds reporting to CEM. In the period 1990-2010, a total of 557 U.S. pension funds have
reported to CEM. The pension funds in our sample on average had around $10 billion assets
under management. Fund size is positively skewed, indicating that the CEM universe consists
4In Appendix Table A.1 we replicate part of Dyck and Pomorski (2011) findings of economies of scale among
pension funds before risk-adjusting.
5Other papers using the CEM database are French (2008), Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013), Bauer, Cremers,
and Frehen (2010) and Dyck and Pomorski (2011).
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Table 3.1: Number of funds and fund size
This table presents the number of U.S. pension funds in the CEM database in the sample period 1990-
2010. We also show the number of funds entering and exiting the database in a given year. The Fund
Size column presents the average assets under management in billion USD. The Total row shows the total
number of funds reporting at least one year to the CEM and the time series average of cross-sectional
mean fund size.
Year # Funds # Enter # Exit Fund Size
1990 35 35 0 9.46
1991 63 39 11 7.28
1992 83 38 18 7.45
1993 134 70 19 5.92
1994 168 68 34 4.85
1995 192 62 38 5.64
1996 185 36 43 6.22
1997 168 29 46 7.73
1998 174 37 31 9.11
1999 182 40 32 10.41
2000 164 22 40 12.02
2001 176 36 24 10.56
2002 156 15 35 10.80
2003 158 27 25 11.02
2004 167 26 17 12.18
2005 156 15 26 13.12
2006 147 18 27 15.79
2007 218 88 17 12.76
2008 212 37 43 12.25
2009 203 34 43 12.22
2010 201 42 44 13.32
Total 557 10.00
of several very large and many smaller funds. For instance, the 25 percentile, median and 75
percentile of fund size are $1.3, $3.0 and $8.6 billion, respectively.
The main motive for funds to enter the database is to benchmark their investment costs
against peers. Funds sometimes decide to stop submitting the questionnaires to CEM for vari-
ous reasons, such as termination of the service due to costs savings, mergers, acquisitions and
bankruptcies of the underlying corporations, etc. As reporting to CEM is voluntary, the dataset
is potentially vulnerable to self-reporting bias. Bauer, Cremers, and Frehen (2010) address
the self-reporting bias by matching the CEM data with the Compustat SFAS data and testing
whether the decision to either start or stop reporting is related to the overall fund performance.
Their results indicate that there is no evidence of a self-reporting bias related to performance in
the exiting and entering years.
Here, we address the self-reporting problem by constructing a Cox proportional hazard
model. We test whether the decision of a particular pension fund to exit the database is related
to its returns, costs or size. The event of interest is the decision of the pension funds not to
report to CEM in a given year. In the Cox hazard model, we treat each fund re-entry as a new
fund, which explains why the number of units in Table 3.2 is higher than the total number
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of funds presented in Table 3.1. The results in Table 3.2 indicate that fund size (LogSize, i.e.
log of the total assets under management) has the strongest effect on the fund’s exit rate, with
smaller funds much more likely to exit the CEM database. This is consistent with the idea that
specialized benchmarking services provided by CEM are more relevant and cost-effective for
larger funds.
Table 3.2: Cox proportional hazard model and self-reporting bias
This table presents the results of a survival analysis using the Cox proportional hazard model. The event
of interest is the decision of the pension funds not to report to CEM in a given year. We treat each fund
re-entry as a new fund which explains why the number of Units is higher than the number of Funds
presented in Table 3.1. Exit Events presents the number of observations when pension funds decided
not to report to CEM again. Observations presents the total number of observations in the database. In-
dependent variables included in the model are LogSize - logarithm of the asset under management, Total
costs in basis points, Gross returns in percentage points, Net returns in percentage points, Net benchmark-
adjusted returns in percentage points and Benchmark returns in percentage points. In this table the hazard
ratios for each independent variable are reported together with their standard errors in brackets and sig-
nificance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. All regressions
use robust standard errors clustered by year.
Interpretation of the hazard ratios: LogSize: when the logsize increases by 1 unit, the dropping rate de-
creases by 26.1% (-0.261). Total costs: when the total costs increase by 1 basis point, the dropping rate
decreases by 0.9% (-0.009).
Dependent variable: Exit event – decision of a pension fund not to report to CEM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LogSize -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.260*** -0.262***
[0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.042]
Total costs -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Gross return 0.006
[0.011]
Net returns 0.006
[0.011]
Net benchmark-adjusted return -0.004 -0.008
[0.016] [0.013]
Benchmark return 0.008
[0.012]
Units 798 798 798 798
Exit events 596 596 596 596
Observations 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298
Further, we relate the fund exit rate to pension fund gross returns, net returns, benchmark
returns and benchmark-adjusted returns. Benchmark returns are calculated using the bench-
marks reported by pension funds for every asset class in which they invest. CEM asks funds to
report, separately for every asset class in which a fund has holdings, the exact definition of the
benchmark they employ as well as the return on that benchmark. We specify net benchmark-
adjusted returns as gross returns minus costs, and minus benchmark returns. The hazard ratios
on net returns, benchmark returns and net benchmark-adjusted returns are always insignifi-
cant, so exit events are not related to funds underperforming or outperforming their bench-
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mark.6 Hence, we find no evidence that the CEM database suffers from self-reporting bias
related to performance.7
Funds included in the CEM database cover a substantial share of the pension fund assets
under management and stock market capitalization. Over 1990-2010, U.S. funds included in
the CEM database account for approximately 30-40% of the asset under management by U.S.
pension funds. In 2010, the holdings in U.S. equity of U.S. pension funds included in the CEM
universe represent 4.2% of the market capitalization of the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX and
their fixed income holdings are equal to about 2% of the total outstanding U.S. bond market
debt in 2010.8
We can distinguish the following asset classes, with their average portfolio weights over
the full sample: equity (57.52%), fixed income (31.31%), cash (1.98%) and alternatives (9.19%).
Figure 3.1 presents the time trend in the allocation to equity, fixed income, cash and alternative
assets. In the period 1990-2000, allocations to equity increase, while declining significantly after
2005. During the second decade of our sample period, alternative assets have been growing in
importance at the expense of declining allocations to equity and fixed income. Around 85%
of the pension funds invested in alternative assets, which include investments in real estate,
private equity, hedge funds, commodities, natural resources, infrastructure and global tactical
asset allocation. The most important alternative asset class is real estate, while funds allocate
also a significant percentage of their assets to private equity and, especially recently, to hedge
funds.
Figure 3.2 plots the time variation in asset allocation within equity, fixed income and al-
ternative asset classes. Panel A shows that pension funds invest the majority of their equity
holdings in the domestic U.S. stock market, with international diversification increasing over
time. For instance, funds invested 89.47% of their total equity holdings in U.S. markets in 1990,
while this percentage decreased to 58.76% in 2010. The decrease in domestic equity is reallo-
cated to either an EAFE mandates (equity investments in Europe, Australasia and Far East),
capturing about 18% of the equity holdings, or a global equity (ACWxUS) mandates, which
account for 17.21% of the equity assets in 2010.
Panel B in Figure 3.2 plots the time variation of allocation to various fixed income asset
classes. Here, the focus on domestic investments is even more striking. In 1990, funds held
96.64% of their fixed income investments in the U.S. market, with only very limited interna-
tional diversification since then. For instance, the allocations to EAFE, Emerging Markets and
Global fixed income mandates remain low and stable over the 1990-2010 period (less than 8%
combined).
6In Appendix Table A.4 we sort the funds into five quintiles based on their market timing and security selection
returns. For both return components, the percentage of funds exiting the database is similar across all quintiles, i.e.
top performers have very similar exit rates as the worst performers.
7Total costs are somewhat negatively related to the exit rate of U.S. funds. The hazard ratio of -0.009 indicates
that an increase in costs by one basis point results in 0.9% decrease in the exit rate. Funds with higher costs may
benefit more from the cooperation with CEM, because the company is specialized in advising on costs.
8For the comparison, we used market capitalization data from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE).
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Figure 3.1: Asset allocation of U.S. pension funds
In addition to realized (actual) asset allocation weights, CEM also provides information on
the pension fund strategic (target) policy weights, which are determined by the pension funds’
Boards. The changes in policy weights from year t− 1 to year t show how pension fund strate-
gic allocations evolve over time. Table 3.3 shows that funds modified their strategic allocation
by adding more alternative assets at the expense of equity, fixed income and cash. Table 3.3 fur-
ther presents that the differences between the reported strategic weights and actual weights are
close to zero on average, but exhibit substantial (averaged across time) cross-sectional standard
deviations of 2.36% to 5.50%.
On the total fund level (All assets), Table 3.4 shows that pension funds paid on average 37
basis points for investing in all asset classes during 1990-2010. Figure 3.3 presents the trend
in pension fund investment costs. Over the entire period, alternatives are the most expensive
asset classes (average fees of 133 basis points),9 while the least expensive assets are fixed income
(20 basis points). The total investment costs are steady during the 1990-2000, but significantly
increase after 2000 from 31 basis points in 2000 to 55 basis points in 2010. This trend is primarily
due to the increasing costs for alternative investments as well as the greater allocations to these
alternative assets.
Table 3.4 reports also the return summary statistics. The average gross return during the
1990-2010 is 9.89 percent. Figure 3.4 presents the annual gross returns on a fund level and sep-
arately for equity, fixed income and alternative assets. On average, funds obtain positive net
9This estimation understates the actual costs of investing in some alternative assets, like private equity (see
Phalippou, 2009), as it captures only management fees, while performance fees are subtracted directly from the
returns. In the calculation of private equity net returns both management and performance fees are deducted.
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Figure 3.2: Asset allocation of U.S. funds within equity, fixed income and alternatives
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics: strategic (policy) and actual asset allocation
This table presents the strategic policy weights of the pension funds and the realized policy weights.
Column Policy weight presents the time series averages of cross-sectional mean strategic policy weights
(target weights) for different asset classes for the period 1990-2010. We present the results for equity,
fixed income, cash and alternative assets. Alternative assets include investments in tactical asset al-
location, commodities, natural resources, real estate, infrastructure, private equity and hedge funds.
Column Actual weight presents the time series averages of cross-sectional mean realized weights for
different asset classes for the period 1990-2010. The means in column Policyt − Policyt−1 displays the
time series averages of cross-sectional mean differences between the strategic policy weights in year
t and the strategic policy weights in the previous year t − 1, whereas the StDev column presents the
time series average of cross-sectional standard deviations of the differences between the strategic pol-
icy weights from year t and year t− 1. The means in column Actualt − Policyt display the time series
averages of cross-sectional mean differences between the actual weights and strategic policy weights,
whereas the StDev column presents the time series average of cross-sectional standard deviations of the
mean differences between the actual (realized) weights and strategic (target) weights.
Policy weight Actual weight Policyt − Policyt−1 Actualt − Policyt
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
Equity 57.46% 11.54% 57.52% 12.15% -0.18% 4.65% 0.06% 5.50%
Fixed income 31.71% 11.07% 31.31% 11.57% -0.22% 4.45% -0.40% 4.95%
Cash 1.16% 2.60% 1.98% 3.14% -0.10% 1.43% 0.82% 2.36%
Alternatives 9.68% 8.53% 9.19% 8.47% 0.51% 3.57% -0.49% 5.21%
benchmark-adjusted returns on a total fund level, which are primarily due to positive perfor-
mance in equity and fixed income.10 From the alternative asset classes, pension funds obtained
lower gross returns than the stock market and net benchmark-adjusted returns equal to zero.
However, returns on alternative investments have significantly higher cross-sectional variation
compared to equity and fixed income investments, which can be seen in the high standard de-
viation. These high standard deviations imply that pension funds experience high volatility
and large differences in performance in alternative asset classes.
3.3 Methodology
First, we analyze the overall level of investment costs, the differences in costs for equity, fixed
income and alternative assets, and the role of investment style and size as determinants of cost
differences. To disentangle effects of pension fund size, allocation decisions and investment
style, we use pooled panel regressions with year and fund fixed effects:
Ci,t = β0 + β1Sizei,t + β2%Acti,t + β3%Exti,t + β4%Allocationi,t + β5YDt + β6FEi + ui,t (3.1)
where Ci,t refers to the investment costs of fund i in year t, FEi captures fund-fixed effects
and ui,t are idiosyncratic errors. Sizei,t is the log of the US$ value of the pension fund assets,
10These are the most frequently reported benchmarks by the pension funds: U.S. equity – S&P500, Russell 1000,
Russell 2000 and Russell 3000; U.S. fixed income – Citi Group US Big Index and Barclays US Aggregate; real estate –
NCREIF and NAREIT; private equity – Wilshire 5000 + 200b.p., Cambridge Private Equity, Venture Economics and
custom benchmarks; hedge funds – CSFB Tremont, HFRI Indices and custom benchmarks.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics: returns and costs
This table presents the pension fund costs, benchmark returns and realized return in percentages. De-
scriptive Statistics include the time-series averages of cross-sectional, annualized mean gross returns,
costs, net returns, benchmark returns and net benchmark-adjusted returns (Net− Bench. return, i.e. the
security selection return (SS) component) for the 1990-2010 period. Standard deviations are given be-
tween the brackets. All assets uses the overall returns in all asset classes on a fund level. We also report
the results separately for equity, domestic equity, fixed income, domestic fixed income and alternative
assets.
Gross Costs Net Bench. Net-Bench.
return return return return (SS)
All assets 9.89 0.37 9.52 9.21 0.31
[3.85] [0.19] [3.83] [2.58] [2.91]
Equity 11.05 0.33 10.72 10.44 0.28
[3.81] [0.17] [3.80] [2.27] [3.24]
Domestic equity 11.21 0.29 10.92 10.74 0.18
[3.34] [0.17] [3.33] [1.54] [3.26]
Fixed income 8.17 0.20 7.96 7.54 0.42
[3.14] [0.15] [3.11] [2.33] [2.29]
Domestic fixed income 7.89 0.19 7.70 7.24 0.46
[2.73] [0.15] [2.70] [1.60] [2.29]
Alternatives 9.80 1.33 8.47 8.47 0.00
[12.67] [0.99] [12.80] [7.73] [11.80]
%Acti,t and %Exti,t refer to the percentage allocation to active mandates and external managers,
respectively. %Allocationi,t represents the percentage of pension fund i holdings invested in
fixed income and alternative asset classes in year t.
Pension funds make three distinct active asset management decisions. First, they define
their strategic asset allocation policy, which changes infrequently. For instance, 32.67% of the
fund-years observations show no change in these strategic allocation weights in year t as com-
pared to year t− 1. Second, pension funds engage in market timing by overweighting or un-
derweighting particular asset classes relative to the strategic weights. Third, pension funds
engage in security selection and try to beat their self-declared benchmarks within particular
asset classes.
Our total return (Ri,t) measure represents a sum of these three active asset management
components:
Ri,t =
M
∑
j=1
(wi,j,tri,j,t − wAAi,j,t−1rBMi,j,t ) (3.2)
where wi,j,t is the actual (realized) weight of fund i for asset class j in year t, and ri,j,t is the
realized net return of fund i in asset class j in year t. In the second term, wAAi,j,t−1 represents the
strategic asset allocation policy weight of fund i for asset class j in year t − 1, and rBMi,j,t is the
benchmark return on asset class j for fund i from the end of year t− 1 to the end of year t (i.e.,
in year t).
Next, we examine separately the contribution of each asset management return component.
To estimate and evaluate the asset allocation skills of pension funds, we look at the yearly
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changes in pension fund strategic asset allocations. We look at the outcome of active decisions
made by the pension fund to modify the strategic asset allocation policy in year t compared
to year t− 1. The returns due to such changes (RAAi,t ) are estimated as the difference between
pension fund’s i strategic policy (i.e., target) weights for asset class j at the end of year t com-
pared to the policy weights at the end of year t− 1, multiplied with the benchmark return of
that asset class from the end of year t− 1 to the end of year t:
RAAi,t =
M
∑
j=1
(wAAi,j,t − wAAi,j,t−1)rBMi,j,t (3.3)
where wAAi,j,t is the policy weight of fund i for asset class j in year t, and r
BM
i,j,t is the benchmark
return on asset class j for fund i from the end of year t− 1 to the end of year t (i.e., in year t).
We define market timing as the pension fund return due to a deviation from the strategic as-
set allocation policy weights. Therefore, RMTi,t captures market timing as the difference between
actual realized weights and target asset allocation weights in different asset classes, times the
benchmark return on each asset class:
RMTi,t =
M
∑
j=1
(wi,j,t − wAAi,j,t )rBMi,j,t (3.4)
The market timing term will account for returns due to changes only in the weights between
asset classes, not within a particular mandate. For instance, it will capture returns due to a
higher allocation to equity at the expense of bonds, or returns due to a higher allocation to
domestic equity instead of an EAFE mandate. However, the market timing component will
not capture returns due to overweighting particular industry sectors within the U.S. equity
mandate.
In general, the differences between actual and policy weights can result from either mar-
ket movements or active rebalancing decisions of investment managers. If the fund does not
actively change asset allocations, then naturally asset classes with higher (lower) returns will
have increased (decreased) actual weights. We decompose the market timing return compo-
nent into these two parts, which allow us to distinguish changes in actual weights due to mar-
ket movements versus active rebalancing.
In order to do so, we construct hypothetical actual asset allocation weights that the pension
fund would have achieved if it would not have rebalanced across asset classes within a par-
ticular calendar year. The hypothetical weights are constructed in two steps. In the first step
for each fund we multiply the actual asset weights at the end of year t− 1 with the benchmark
returns in year t, resulting in a hypothetical portfolio at the end of year t. In the second step, we
rescale this portfolio such that the year t weights sum to 1. Using these hypothetical weights
(wHYPi,j,t ) we estimate the passive market timing return of fund i in year t (attributed to market
movements) as:
RPasMTi,t =
M
∑
j=1
(wHYPi,j,t − wAAi,j,t )rBMi,j,t (3.5)
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Next, the active market timing returns due to rebalancing (RActMTi,t ) is the difference between the
actual asset allocation weights and the hypothetical allocation weights, times the benchmark
returns in each asset class:
RActMTi,t =
M
∑
j=1
(wi,j,t − wHYPi,j,t )rBMi,j,t (3.6)
The third and last component of active management is security selection (RSSi,t ) estimated as the
difference between the realized net returns and the benchmark returns. Hence, the security
selection component is equivalent to net benchmark-adjusted returns and accounts for all re-
turns that are not attributable to asset allocation policy decisions or market timing across asset
classes (though it would include any market timing done within asset classes). Our security se-
lection return component (RSSi,t ) of fund i in year t represents net benchmark-adjusted returns,
i.e. returns that are due to deviations from self-declared benchmarks within particular asset
classes:
RSSi,t =
M
∑
j=1
wi,j,t(ri,j,t − rBMi,j,t ) (3.7)
When risk-adjusting the changes in asset allocation, market timing and security selection return
components on a fund level, we run the following random coefficient model:
Rki,t = αi + β1,i MKTt + β2,iSMBt + β3,i HMLt + β4,i MOMt + β5,iLIQt + β6,iFIMKTt + ε i,t (3.8)
where k = AA, MT, SS. The model assumes that αi and βi, the coefficients for fund i, are drawn
independently from a distribution with constant mean and variance. We use the following
factors: MKT (excess market return), SMB (small-minus-big), HML (high-minus-low), FIMKT
(fixed income excess market return) and LIQ (traded liquidity factor). We also add MOM
(momentum factor) to the risk-adjusting model, to control for returns on momentum trading
strategies. MKT, SMB, HML, MOM are taken from Kenneth French’s website. The fixed
income excess returns (FIMKT) are the returns on U.S. Broad Investment-Grade Bond Index
(US BIG) from City Group.
The traded liquidity factor has been defined by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) as the value-
weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio from a sort of stocks into decile groups depending on
their historical liquidity betas, or stock sensitivities to innovations in the aggregate liquidity.
The aggregate liquidity captures the temporary price fluctuations induced by order flow and
measures the liquidity dimension associated with the strength of volume-related return rever-
sals, which seem most relevant for large investors (like pension funds) susceptible to market
movements.
We examine separately the performance of pension funds in equity, fixed income and al-
ternative assets (which includes real estate, private equity, hedge funds and other assets). For
equity return components we run the following risk-adjusting random-coefficient model:
Rki,t = αi + β1,i MKTt + β2,iSMBt + β3,i HMLt + β4,i MOMt + β5,iLIQt + ε i,t (3.9)
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where k = AA, MT, SS. The return components capture changes in asset allocation, market
timing and security selection within equity assets.
Following Blake, Elton, and Gruber (1993), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) and Cici and
Gibson (2010), we risk-adjust the performance of fixed income assets using the following fac-
tors: MKT (equity market), FIMKT (fixed income market), HY (high yield) and OPTION
(option-like characteristics of mortgage securities):
Rki,t = αi + β1,i MKTt + β2,iFIMKTt + β3,i HYt + β4,iOPTIONt + ε i,t (3.10)
where k = AA, MT, SS. HY is the return difference of the Merrill Lynch High Yield and Gov-
ernment index for U.S. funds. OPTION is estimated as the return difference of the US BIG
Mortgage Index and US BIG Government Index.
We use the random coefficient model because it allows for heteroskedasticity and fund-
specific betas, while being more robust to outliers than the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973)
approach. As Swamy (1970) explains, the random coefficient model is similar to a generalized
least squares approach that puts less weight on the return series of funds that are more volatile.
In addition, we are interested in the relation between certain pension fund characteristics
and pension fund performance. Particularly, we would like to see whether fund characteristics
like asset size and investment style have a systematic association with any of the three return
components. These relations are tested using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of changes
in asset allocation, security selection and market timing return components on the characteris-
tics:
Ri,t = αt + δ1,tLogSizei,t + δ2,t%Acti,t + δ3,t%Exti,t + νi,t i = 1, 2, ..., N for each t. (3.11)
αˆ =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
αˆt δˆ1 =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δˆ1,t δˆ2 =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δˆ2,t δˆ3 =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δˆ3,t (3.12)
where Rki,t refers to the return components of fund i in year t and νi,t is a normally distributed
zero-mean error term. We correct the standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
using the Newey-West procedure with three lags. %Act and %Ext refer to the percentage al-
location to active mandates or externally managed mandates and LogSize is the log of pension
fund assets under management (fund size).
We run the Fama-MacBeth regressions on both non-risk-adjusted and risk-adjusted return
components. When using the risk-adjusted return components, the estimation proceeds in two
steps. In the first step, we perform a time-series regression of each fund’s returns on the factor
models as described above. We run these regressions for every fund that has at least one more
observation than coefficients to be estimated (our findings do not change when we include only
funds with at least 13 observations, see Appendix Table A.2). In the second step, we run Fama-
MacBeth regressions of the alphas plus residuals retrieved in the first step, correcting standard
errors for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West procedure.
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3.4 Pension fund investment costs
Table 3.5 presents the results of pooled panel costs regressions. The investment costs include
the costs of all internal and external money managers hired by the pension fund to invest
in all asset classes. Internal investment costs include direct investment costs (compensation
and benefits of employees managing internal portfolios and support staff, related travel and
research expenses, etc.) and allocated overhead costs. External investment costs include all
fees paid to third-party managers including investment management fees, fund-of-fund fees,
performance-based fees, commitment fees and ‘hidden’ fees netted from the returns as well
as fees paid to investment consultants.11 External investment costs also include the costs for
internal staff whose sole responsibility is overseeing the external managers.
Regressions for total costs in Table 3.5 (columns 1-3) indicate that larger pension funds re-
alize scale advantages in their investment costs, but only after controlling for the percentage
allocation to the most expensive asset class of alternative assets in columns (2) and (3). Focus-
ing on column (3), a one standard deviation increase in the log of the pension fund holdings
reduces the costs by some 4.4 basis points (1.464 * 4.816), when controlling also for investment
style, percentage allocations to fixed income and alternative assets, year and fund-fixed effects.
Unsurprisingly, allocations to active and externally managed mandates increase the invest-
ment costs. For example, a 10 percentage points increase in the allocation to actively managed
assets results in 1.8 (0.1 * 18.130) basis points higher total costs.
In columns (4)-(6) we document economies of scale in investment costs on an asset class
level. Pension funds that invest more assets in equity, fixed income and alternatives obtain
lower costs in every asset class. The economies of scale are especially strong in alternative
assets, where a one unit increase in the log of assets results in 111 basis points lower investment
costs. In line with the results for total costs, a greater allocation to actively managed mandates
and external managers results in higher investment costs for equity and fixed income assets.
For alternative assets, an allocation to fund-of-funds results in substantially higher costs. For
example, in column (6), a 10 percent points increase in the allocation to fund-of-funds results
in 48 basis points (0.1 * 478.236) increase in the investment costs in alternative assets.
Bauer et al. (2010) also document a negative relationship between fund size and costs for
investing in U.S. equities. Andonov, Eichholtz, and Kok (2013) find cost economies of scale
in real estate investments of U.S., Canadian, European and Australian funds. This negative
relationship is robust to the investment style, i.e. it is not driven by the higher proportion of
passive and internal investments among larger funds. Larger funds are able to negotiate lower
fees for external mandates and organize more cost-efficient internal mandates. We find that the
negative relationship between fund size and costs exists on a total fund level as well as within
all asset classes. Summarizing, we document that larger pension funds realize strong scale
11The exception is that for private equity and real estate the performance fees, carried interest and rebates are
subtracted directly from the returns and are not incorporated in the costs figures. Hence, the costs estimations
for these alternative assets usually include only the management fees and understate the total investment costs.
However, the returns even for these alternative assets are net of both management and performance fees.
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advantages in their investment costs. On the other hand, greater active management, exter-
nal management and allocation to fund-of-funds considerably increase the overall investment
costs. In section 5.6.2, we will consider whether the scale advantage in costs is translated into
higher net performance.
Table 3.5: Costs regressions
This table reports the results of pooled panel regressions of the pension fund investment costs. Re-
gressions (1), (2) and (3) report the results of pooled panel regressions of the total investment costs. In
models (4)-(6) we use equity, fixed income and alternatives investment costs as dependent variables.
Alternative assets include investments in real estate, private equity, hedge funds, tactical asset alloca-
tion, infrastructure, commodities and natural resources. As independent variables, we include the log of
pension fund assets in millions of dollars (LogSize), and the percentage allocations to externally (%Ext)
and actively (%Act) managed mandates. When analyzing the alternatives costs, we also include the per-
centage of assets allocated to fund-of-funds (%FoF) as independent variable. In models (4)-(6), LogSize
refers to the logarithm of holdings in the particular asset class. In models (2) and (3) we control for the
percentage allocation to alternative assets (%Alternatives), whereas in model (3) we also add the per-
centage allocation to fixed income assets (%Fixed income) as independent variable. In the pooled panel
regressions we include with year dummies and fund fixed effects. All regressions use robust standard
errors clustered by fund. We report standard errors in brackets and significance levels with *, ** and ***,
which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Dependent variable: Investment costs in basis points
Total costs Total costs Total costs Equity Fixed income Alternatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LogSize -2.430 -4.411** -4.816** -4.053** -5.119** -111.023**
[3.343] [2.113] [2.196] [1.609] [2.189] [45.989]
%Act 29.086*** 17.348*** 18.130*** 26.717*** 8.223***
[5.965] [3.528] [3.594] [2.052] [2.433]
%Ext 13.967* 11.291** 9.823** 15.219*** 14.669*** 120.638**
[8.410] [4.845] [4.402] [5.206] [3.380] [51.442]
%FoF 478.236***
[148.984]
%Alternatives 123.615*** 118.675***
[9.579] [10.341]
%Fixed income -14.845**
[5.762]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,342 3,342 3,342 3,325 3,329 2,845
R-squared 0.809 0.878 0.880 0.868 0.607 0.812
3.5 The performance of pension funds
In this section, we discuss whether asset allocation, market timing and security selection de-
cisions result in outperformance or underperformance of pension funds. We first analyze the
performance on a fund level and then look separately at the performance in equity, fixed in-
come and alternative assets. Our focus is on the changes in asset allocation, market timing and
security selection return components as defined previously.
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3.5.1 Risk-adjusted performance at the pension fund level
In Figure 3.5, we show the average total returns and the three components at the (aggregated
across asset classes) pension fund level. Security selection returns (the fourth bar in any given
year) exhibit substantially higher volatility as compared to changes in asset allocation and mar-
ket timing returns.
Table 3.6 indicates that U.S. pension funds on average obtain positive returns from their
active asset management decisions. For the total return and for each component of active man-
agement, we first run a random coefficient regression with just a constant (columns 1, 4, 7
and 10). Next, we estimate random coefficient models that include multiple factors to assess
whether the outperformance remains after risk-adjusting the returns. This adjustment is impor-
tant because benchmarks are chosen (and reported) by the funds themselves, such that funds
could potentially choose benchmarks that are relatively easy to beat. The standard model we
employ includes five factors, namely the standard three Fama-French factors (market, size and
value) augmented with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor and the ex-
cess return on a fixed income market index. We compare results using this baseline 5-factor
model with using a 6-factor model that also includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. Re-
sults in Table 3.6 show the annual alpha and beta coefficients on these factors, plus the root
mean squared error (RMSE) of the residuals. The robustness of our risk-adjusted results can
be checked by comparing Appendix Table A.2 with Table 3.6, where we include only pension
funds with a higher number of observations per fund in the regressions.
The results in column (1) show that pension funds obtain a positive return of 57 basis points
at the total fund level from their active asset management decisions before risk-adjusting. After
risk-adjusting, their total return increases to 89 basis points. The total return becomes insignif-
icantly positive after controlling for momentum in column (3). However, if we include only
funds with a higher number of observations, for which we can estimate risk loadings more
accurately, the total return is significantly positive and equal to 55 basis points (see Appendix
Table A.2). The total return incorporates all three asset management decisions: changes in as-
set allocation, market timing and security selection. Next, we look at each return component
separately.
Before risk-adjusting, changes in the asset allocation policy produce an insignificant return
of 5.2 basis points. After risk-adjusting (column 5), the changes in asset allocation policy deliver
a significant positive alpha of 25 basis points per year. Inclusion of the momentum factor
(column 6) increases the estimated asset allocation alpha of U.S. funds to 30 basis points per
year. This suggests that changes in target weights are not made in order to capture asset class
momentum. Positive returns from the changes in asset allocation policy over time are due
to changes in policy weights across broader asset classes over time. For example, funds on
average increased their policy allocation to private equity, hedge funds and other alternative
assets at the expense of fixed income and equity.
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3. CAN LARGE PENSION FUNDS BEAT THE MARKET
In columns (7)-(9) of Table 3.6, we find that market timing delivers about 25 basis points re-
turn per year before risk-adjusting. This is not materially affected by risk-adjusting with the 5-
and 6-factor models. The beta coefficients indicate that pension funds, on average, do not sys-
tematically overweight a particular style. There is an economically small positive marginally
significant coefficient on the SMB factor, but all other coefficients are statistically indistinguish-
able from zero. These results confirm the findings in Table 3.3, as the time averages of the mean
differences for all asset classes are close to zero. However, Table 3.3 shows that pension funds’
actual weights fluctuate substantially around policy weights. The results in Table 3.6 show
that these fluctuations co-vary positively with benchmark returns, evidenced by the positive
coefficient of the constant, indicating market timing skill.
The random coefficient model results for security selection (i.e., net benchmark-adjusted
returns) show positive abnormal returns of 25 basis points per year from security selection
(column 10). However, after risk-adjusting (column 11), security selection does not deliver a
significant alpha. Once we add the momentum factor, the performance becomes even (though
insignificantly so) negative: -9 basis points per year. These results indicate that momentum
trading strategies on average deliver around 35 basis points annually.12
Overall, our paper provides clear evidence that pension funds obtain positive alphas from
intentional changes in strategic asset allocation and market timing (or tactical asset allocation)
decisions. The insignificantly negative security selection alpha (after controlling for momen-
tum) offsets part of the positive returns from strategic asset allocation and market timing. These
results suggest that pension funds have most expertise in dynamically maneuvering between
various asset classes, rather than in security selection or identifying superior active managers
for given asset classes.
3.5.2 Market timing returns
In Table 3.6, we document that pension funds obtain positive returns from market timing, i.e.
from overweighting or underweighting particular asset classes, relative to the target weights
in that year. In this section, we examine the sources of positive market timing returns in greater
detail. First, we distinguish between market timing returns due to market movements (not re-
balancing) versus performing resulting from active rebalancing decisions. Second, we examine
the market timing returns within the two main asset classes of equity and fixed income, where
funds can rebalance across multiple domestic, international and global sub-asset classes.
In Table 3.7, we distinguish between passive market timing and active market timing. Pas-
sive market timing can be interpreted as the performance when not rebalancing the portfolio,
i.e. letting the portfolio drift towards or away from the strategic allocation weights depending
on the benchmark returns. Active market timing can be interpreted as intentional deviations
12Controlling for momentum has even stronger effect on the security selection returns if we focus only on the
1990-2008 period. When examining only this shorter time period the security selection alpha is significantly nega-
tive and equal to -105 basis points after controlling for momentum factor. The momentum factor has weaker effect
when adding the last two years of our sample period, because in 2009 this factor has an extreme negative return of
-83.29 percent.
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Table 3.7: Market timing returns
In Panel A we split the market timing return into two parts. The passive market timing return com-
ponent captures the returns due to market movement. The active market timing component captures
the returns dues to active rebalancing. In Panel B we estimate the market timing alphas within eq-
uity and fixed income assets. Within equity and fixed income assets, we can estimate the returns due
to market timing, because both of them incorporate multiple asset classes. We risk-adjust the market
timing returns within equity for MKT, SMB, HML, LIQ and MOM. We risk-adjust the market timing
returns within fixed income for MKT, FIMKT, HY and OPTION. We report the annual alpha with stan-
dard errors in brackets and significance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01,
respectively. RMSE is the root mean square error.
Panel A: Two market timing components Panel B: Market timing return per asset class
Passive market timing Active market timing MT within equity MT within fixed income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 1.080*** 1.300*** -0.842*** -1.055*** 0.224*** 0.208*** 0.026 0.011
[0.063] [0.208] [0.045] [0.138] [0.038] [0.067] [0.024] [0.034]
MKT -0.033*** 0.026*** 0.004 -0.003
[0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]
FIMKT 0.069*** -0.068*** 0.008
[0.019] [0.013] [0.009]
SMB 0.011** -0.000 0.003
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
HML -0.022*** 0.020*** 0.003
[0.007] [0.004] [0.002]
LIQ -0.014 0.013** 0.002
[0.010] [0.005] [0.005]
MOM -0.020*** 0.022*** -0.002
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
HY 0.011**
[0.005]
OPTION -0.000
[0.024]
Funds 134 134 134 134 191 191 210 210
Observations 1,780 1,780 1,780 1,780 2,447 2,447 2,571 2,571
RMSE 1.899 1.758 1.376 1.187 1.184 1.180 1.210 1.187
from strategic asset allocation weights, i.e. active rebalancing of the portfolio with actual trad-
ing. Such active rebalancing can be also be due to guidelines where funds define ex ante in
which range individual asset class weights are allowed to drift (bandwidths).
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that U.S. pension funds could have obtained substantially high
alphas from market timing if they would have not rebalanced their portfolios. They would
have obtained passive market timing returns of 108 basis points before and 130 basis points
after risk-adjusting. The large positive alphas on the passive market timing component indi-
cate that the market timing returns of pension funds in Table 6 are mainly due to market-wide
movements, or the phenomenon that past asset class returns tend to positively predict future re-
turns in the same asset class, termed ‘time series’ momentum by Moskowitz et al. (2012). How-
ever, pension funds cannot fully exploit time series momentum, as they are typically bound
by the bandwidths stated in their investment guidelines. Columns (3) and (4) document that
pension funds underperform when trying to actively rebalance money across asset classes, 84
basis points before and 106 basis points after risk-adjusting. The net (or aggregated) effect of
passive and active market timing can be found in Table 6 (25 basis points before and 19 after
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risk adjusting).
In Panel B of Table 3.7, we present the market timing results within equity and fixed income,
which can be measured only when funds invest in at least two categories within equity or fixed
income assets.13 Results in columns (5) and (6) indicate that pension funds can create abnormal
returns from timing their allocation decisions within equity investments. Before risk-adjusting,
U.S. pension funds can beat their ex ante stated equity benchmarks by about 22 basis points
per year using market timing. After risk-adjusting and controlling for momentum, the alpha
remains 21 basis points. As the market timing results at the total fund level produced about 26
basis points alpha per year, this implies that a large part of the abnormal market timing return
is due to timing the performance across various equity classes (such as moving from domestic
equity to international equity), rather than timing the performance across broader asset classes
(such as moving from equity to fixed income or real estate).
In columns (7) and (8), we examine the fixed income market timing returns. Our results
indicate that market timing within fixed income assets does not deliver any abnormal returns.
Before and after risk-adjusting, U.S. pension funds are not able to generate abnormal returns
from timing their allocations between various fixed income categories.
3.5.3 Security selection returns per asset class
Table 3.8 presents the results for security selection returns separately for equity, fixed income
and alternative assets. In columns (1)-(3), we focus on the security selection, i.e. net benchmark-
adjusted returns within equity before and after risk-adjusting. We risk-adjust the security se-
lection returns for exposure to MKT, SMB, HML and LIQ factors. In column (3) we also add
momentum. In line with our findings at the total fund level, pension funds on average demon-
strate security selection skills within equity, but only when not adjusting for momentum. Be-
fore risk-adjusting, the average fund beats its equity benchmarks by about 23 basis points using
security selection. After controlling for risk factors, the alpha from random coefficient regres-
sions on equity net benchmark-adjusted returns equals 37 basis points and is still significant
at the 10% level. However, when we also control for momentum, the alpha from security se-
lection becomes insignificant at 7 basis points. Again, these results show that the momentum
factor plays an important role in explaining pension fund security selection returns.
In columns (4) and (5), we examine security selection skills within fixed income assets.
Using a random-coefficient model, we risk-adjust the fixed income net benchmark-adjusted re-
turns for MKT, FIMKT, HY and OPTION. Pension funds are able to outperform their bench-
marks within fixed income assets before risk-adjusting (column 4). However, the results in
column (5) show that alphas disappear after controlling for the high yield spread and option
elements in fixed income returns. In Figure 3.6, we also observe that security selection returns
within fixed income became much more volatile in the last three years of our sample period
13For example, based on the strategic policy a pension fund should invest in 50% in U.S. equity, 30% in EAFE
equity and 20% in Emerging markets equity. If the actual allocation percentages are different from the above-
mentioned policy weights, that fund will generate returns from market timing within equity, measured as the
difference between actual and policy weights times the benchmark returns. However, it does not capture returns
from overweighting certain industries within U.S. equity mandate.
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(2008-2010). This trend closely matches the returns on high yield assets. Overall, pension funds
are not able to obtain positive abnormal returns in fixed income assets after risk-adjusting.
Table 3.8: Security selection returns
In this table we analyze the security selection (net benchmark-adjusted) returns on an individual asset
class level. For equity and fixed income assets, we run a random coefficient model with a constant only
and we also risk-adjust the returns. We risk-adjust the security selection returns within equity using the
following factors: MKT, SMB and HML – the Fama-French factor returns, MOM – momentum factor
and LIQ – Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor. Within fixed income, security selection
returns are risk-adjusted using the following factors: FIMKT – fixed income excess return, HY – high
yield spread, OPTION – option-like characteristics of mortgage securities returns and MKT – equity
excess return. For alternative assets, security selection returns (net benchmark-adjusted returns) we just
run a random coefficient model with a constant. Alternative assets include investments in tactical asset
allocation, commodities, natural resources, real estate, infrastructure, private equity and hedge funds.
We report the annual alpha with standard errors in brackets and significance levels with *, ** and ***,
which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. RMSE is the root mean square error.
Dependent variable: security selection (net benchmark-adjusted returns) per asset class
Equity Equity Equity Fixed income Fixed income Alternatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.233** 0.366* 0.071 0.330*** -0.061 -0.672
[0.095] [0.212] [0.296] [0.080] [0.103] [0.724]
MKT -0.016* -0.010 0.012
[0.009] [0.010] [0.008]
FIMKT 0.041*
[0.025]
SMB 0.063*** 0.073***
[0.012] [0.013]
HML 0.002 0.012
[0.009] [0.010]
LIQ -0.022 -0.022
[0.016] [0.019]
MOM 0.022**
[0.010]
HY 0.066***
[0.016]
OPTION 0.036
[0.066]
Funds 191 191 191 211 207 343
Observations 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,530 2,513 2,576
RMSE 3.598 3.497 3.519 3.220 2.758 15.499
Finally, we investigate the security selection skill of pension funds in alternative assets. Al-
ternative assets include investments in external global tactical asset allocation (GTAA) man-
dates, commodities, natural resources, real estate, infrastructure, private equity and hedge
funds. Results in column (6) of Table 3.8 indicate that pension fund benchmark-adjusted per-
formance in all alternative assets together is negative, but insignificant.14
14This paper focuses on overall pension fund performance, such that we combine all alternative assets together
as this group of assets represents only small part of total fund holdings, on average around 10 percent. We leave
detailed analysis of pension fund performance in individual alternative asset classes, like private equity and hedge
funds, for future research.
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In this section, we relate the risk-adjusted total return, asset allocation, market timing and se-
curity selection alphas to certain characteristics of pension funds using Fama-MacBeth regres-
sions. Specifically, we examine whether differences in performance are associated with fund
(asset class) size, liquidity, investment costs and investment style (referring to whether assets
are managed internally or externally, and passively or actively). Fund size reflects the total size
of the pension fund holdings, which is a sum of holdings in all asset classes, while ‘asset class
size’ reflects the size of the holdings in a particular asset class, like equity or fixed income. The
analysis again is first conducted on a fund level and later by individual asset class.
Table 3.9 presents the results for the total return and its three components (asset allocation,
market timing and security selection returns). Estimation consists of two steps. In the first
step, we risk-adjust returns using a six factor model that includes MKT, SMB, HML, LIQ,
FIMKT and MOM. In the second step, we augment the alphas with the error terms retrieved
from the first step and run Fama-MacBeth regressions, while correcting for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity using Newey-West standard errors with three lags.
When analyzing the total return, which represents the sum of all three return components,
pension fund size (LogSize) is negatively related to performance, especially for funds whose
investments have exposure to systematic liquidity risk. Columns (2) and (3) indicate that a
one unit increase in the LogSize (i.e. doubling the fund size) results in 11-15 basis points lower
performance. The interaction between fund size and the fund’s liquidity beta (i.e. the exposure
to the Pastor-Stambaugh traded liquidity factor) is negative and significant. Based on column
(3), increasing liquidity by lowering the liquidity beta by 10 percentage points, would be asso-
ciated with an improvement of the alpha of funds at the 75th size percentile by 16 basis points
per year (= -0.1 * -1.539 * (ln[8582]-ln[3025]) more than the improvement of the alpha of a fund
at the median size percentile. This result shows that larger pension funds face diseconomies
of scale when redesigning their strategic asset allocation policy, timing the market in multiple
asset classes and deviating from the benchmarks by active security selection.
Pension funds using more external managers realize lower total returns from asset man-
agement decisions. Column (3) shows that a 10 percentage points increase in the proportion of
externally managed assets is associated with 5.4 basis points lower annual total returns. This
may be partly due to lower investment costs for internal management (see Table 3.5). In addi-
tion, Lakonishok et al. (1992) suggest that external management may create potential agency
conflicts or that incentives of internal managers may be better aligned with those of the overall
pension fund.
When examining the return component separately, we find that fund size is not related di-
rectly to the abnormal returns from changes in asset allocation policy. However, the interaction
between fund size and the fund’s liquidity beta (i.e. the exposure to the Pastor-Stambaugh
traded liquidity factor) is negative and significant. The interaction coefficient equals -1.991 in
column (6) of Table 3.9. Economically, this coefficient means that increasing liquidity by lower-
ing the liquidity beta by 10 percentage points, would be associated with an improvement of the
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-0.390
0.629***
0.587***
0.563***
-0.908
-1.400**
0.257
[0.724]
[0.463]
[0.530]
[0.257]
[0.320]
[0.457]
[0.206]
[0.150]
[0.103]
[0.718]
[0.680]
[0.776]
LogSize
-0.069
-0.111**
-0.151***
0.031
-0.031
-0.002
-0.053**
-0.043**
-0.043***
0.106
0.137*
-0.005
[0.073]
[0.051]
[0.056]
[0.027]
[0.040]
[0.041]
[0.022]
[0.017]
[0.013]
[0.070]
[0.074]
[0.097]
%
A
ct
0.170
0.671***
0.024
0.286
[0.327]
[0.193]
[0.085]
[0.692]
%
Ext
-0.541**
0.082
-0.003
-0.881
[0.214]
[0.146]
[0.065]
[0.554]
Size*Liq
-1.517***
-1.539***
-2.005***
-1.991***
-1.804***
-1.734***
-1.069***
-1.250***
[0.443]
[0.449]
[0.273]
[0.270]
[0.089]
[0.085]
[0.230]
[0.183]
O
bservations
1,766
1,766
1,766
1,780
1,780
1,780
2,277
2,277
2,277
2,277
2,277
2,277
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alpha of funds at the 75th size percentile by 21 basis points per year (= -0.1 x -1.991 x (ln[8582]-
ln[3025]) more than the improvement of the alpha of a fund at the median size percentile. This
finding implies that larger funds face significant liquidity limitations when redesigning their
strategic asset allocation: shifts in the strategic asset allocation towards more illiquid assets
hurt the performance of larger funds relative to smaller funds.
In columns (7)-(9) of Table 3.9, we consider the relation between market timing returns
and pension fund characteristics. Fund size is negatively related to market timing abilities.
Additionally, the interaction between fund size and the fund’s liquidity beta is negative and
highly significant. In columns (8) and (9), a one-unit increase in LogSize, i.e. doubling the fund
size, reduces the market timing returns by 4.3 basis points. The interaction effect of size and
liquidity has an even stronger economic effect on the market timing returns.
In the last part of Table 3.9, we analyze the relation between fund characteristics and the
security selection component (net benchmark-adjusted returns). At the fund level, U.S. fund
security selection performance is unrelated to fund size (column 12). Again, the security se-
lection performance of larger funds seems particularly constrained by liquidity, as evidenced
by the large, negative coefficients on the interaction between fund size and the liquidity beta.
The interaction coefficient equals -1.250 in column 12 of Table 3.9. Economically, this coefficient
means that increasing liquidity by lowering the liquidity beta by 10 percentage points, would
be associated with an improvement of the alpha of funds at the 75th size percentile by 13 basis
points per year (= -0.1 * -1.250 * (ln[8582]-ln[3025]) more than the improvement of the alpha of
a fund at the median size percentile.
We also look at the influence of pension fund characteristics on performance on a lower
level of aggregation, or how concentration, size, liquidity, costs and investment style relate to
the performance in individual asset classes. Appendix Table A.3 shows the results for pension
fund security selection performance within equity. Funds with higher allocations to equity
(as a percentage from total assets) have better performance in equity. Based on column (3),
an increase in the allocation to equity of 10 percent points results in 21 basis point better net
benchmark-adjusted returns in equity. The effect of the concentration in equity assets on the
performance of equity is even stronger after risk-adjusting. However, our results in columns
(5) and (7) indicate that the relation between concentration in equity and performance becomes
insignificant, once we control for the liquidity-size interaction. This suggests that larger funds
face liquidity constraints when investing in equity and cannot allocate a substantial share of
their assets to equity investments. It likewise suggests that funds with high equity allocations
tend to deviate from their benchmark by selecting relatively illiquid stocks, which only results
in better performance if the funds are relatively small.
We also study the relation between pension fund characteristics and their performance in
fixed income assets. In unreported results, we do not find a significant effect of the allocation to
fixed income assets, size of the holdings or investment style on the cross-sectional differences
in fixed income performance. Compared to equity, the influence of pension fund characteristics
has a much lower effect on the fixed income performance.
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Next, we examine whether larger pension funds consider the liquidity-related diseconomies
of scale when designing their investment approach. We split the pension funds into tertiles
based on their percentage of assets allocated to actively managed mandates. In the first tertile,
the median percentage of actively managed assets is 59 percent, whereas in the second and
third tertile this precentage is 80 and 98 percent of the total assets, respectively. Pension fund
size plays an important role when designing the investment approach. In line with our evi-
dence on liquidity-diseconomies of scale, larger pension funds manage greater percentages of
their assets passively. The median size of a pension fund belonging to the tertile with lowest
active management is $10.37 billion, while the median size of the funds in the second and third
tertile is $4.82 and $4.05 billion, respectively.
Table 3.10 compares the relation between size and performance for the tertiles with lowest
and highest degree of active management. In columns (1) and (5) we show that pension funds
in both tertiles obtain positive total returns after risk-adjusting. However, the size-liquidity in-
teraction has a significantly different association with the performance across the two tertiles.
In both tertiles, the interaction term has a negative coefficient, but the economic magnitude
is significantly larger in the tertile with highest percentage of actively managed assets (coeffi-
cient of -2.269***) compared to the passively managed tertile (coefficient of -0.887**). Here, it is
important to note that the liquidity betas themselves are not significantly different across the
tertiles (average coefficient of -0.041, -0.022 and -0.029 in the three respective tercile groups).
In columns (4) and (8), we include dummy variables capturing the smallest and largest
pension funds. These dummy variables are obtained by independently sorting the fund into
quartiles based on their size, such that the Small (Large) dummy equals one for funds in the
smallest (largest) quartile size group, and zero otherwise. The median size of the small quartile
is $1.3 billion assets, while the median size of the funds in the large quartile is $34 billion.
In the more passively managed tertile, the Small and Large dummy variables are similar and
insignificant. However, in the more actively managed tertile, the dummy variable capturing
the largest funds is significantly negative and reduces substantially their risk-adjusted total
return. The most actively managed group of funds thus has significantly greater size-induced
liquidity constraints, and its funds that are in the largest quartile group underperform similarly
sized funds with much less active management by about 62 (= 45.8 + 40.1 – 91.7 + 68.0) basis
points a year, which difference is statistically significant at 5%.
To sum up, we find that the economies of scale in pension fund costs do not material-
ize in better returns. Larger pension funds perform worse in all three components of active
management if they invest in less liquid assets (i.e., that have exposure to systematic liquidity
risk). Large funds seem to experience liquidity-related diseconomies of scale, including in their
largest asset class, equity. Larger pension funds that are predominantly actively managed may
have done better if they would have implemented a more passive approach.
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Table 3.10: Pension fund active management tertiles: size and performance
In this table we sort the pension funds into tertiles base on their percentage allocation to actively man-
aged assets. Afterwards, we regress the total returns on a six factor model that includes the MKT, SMB,
HML, LIQ, MOM and FIMKT. In the next step we augment the alphas retrieved from the risk-adjusting
regressions with the error terms of the first step and run Fama-MacBeth regressions and correct for auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity (using Newey-West with three lags). We include the following char-
acteristics in all models: LogSize – log of average pension fund holdings in a given year and Size ∗ Liq
is an interaction term of the log fund size with the first step fund-specific loading on the liquidity fac-
tor. We also include two dummy variables Small and Large. These dummy variables are constructed
by independently sorting the pension funds into four quartiles based on their assets under manage-
ment. Small dummy refers to the pension funds belonging to the smallest size quartile, while Large
captures the pension funds from the largest quartile. Columns (1)-(4) present the results for the tertile
with the lowest percentage of actively managed assets. Columns (5)-(8) show the results for the tertile
with the highest percentage of actively managed assets. The last row reports the number of observa-
tions included in the analysis. We report the coefficients with standard errors in brackets and denote
significance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Tertile with the lowest percentage active Tertile with the highest percentage active
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.669*** 0.984 1.172** 0.458* 0.811*** 1.619 -0.993 0.917***
[0.178] [0.854] [0.519] [0.278] [0.238] [1.463] [0.974] [0.226]
LogSize -0.034 -0.093 -0.105 0.168
[0.091] [0.063] [0.144] [0.125]
Size*Liq -0.887** -2.269***
[0.396] [0.767]
Small 0.351 0.023
[0.387] [0.761]
Large 0.401 -0.680**
[0.379] [0.341]
Observations 596 596 596 596 582 582 582 582
3.7 Persistence in pension fund performance
Previous sections showed that pension funds obtain positive returns from market timing and
security selection, some of which remain significant even after risk-adjusting. If this is due
to skill, an important robustness check is whether there is any persistence in pension fund
performance. To answer this question we split pension funds into five quintiles based on either
their market timing or their net security selection performance (after costs). We run an ordered
logit model, where the dependent variable is the quintile ranking based on the performance in
year t + 1 and the main independent variable is the quintile ranking in year t. Marginal effects
from the ordered logit model for every outcome (quintile ranking) are presented in Table 3.11.
Panel A presents the results for market timing returns, whereas Panel B covers the persistence
in security selection returns of U.S. funds.
Results indicate that funds are more likely to end up in a better performing quintile next
year, if they belong to a better performing quintile already this year. Pension funds are also
more likely to be ranked among the worst performers next year, if they performed relatively
poorly this year. The persistence is observed in both market timing and security selection
returns. For example, looking at U.S. funds market timing returns (Panel A), an increase in the
quintile ranking from 3 to 4 reduces the probability of ranking among the worst performers
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in year t + 1 by 3.3%. Results in models (2), (3) and (4) show that the marginal effects of last
year’s ranking remain even after controlling for fund size, costs, and the percentage of assets
managed actively and externally.
Table 3.11: Ordered logit: persistence in pension fund performance
This table presents the marginal effects after an ordered logit model. The dependent variable is the quin-
tile ranking based on returns in year t + 1 with 1 being lowest quintile ranking and 5 being the quintile
with highest returns. The LY ranking independent variable is the quintile ranking in the previous year
t. We also include the following variables: LogSize – log of average pension fund holdings in a given
year, Costs – total fund costs, %Act – percentage of all holdings invested in active mandates and %Ext
– percentage invested in external mandates. The marginal effects are estimated at the median values. In
the ordered logit model we also add year dummy variables and cluster the standard errors by funds.
Panel A presents the marginal effects for U.S. funds market timing returns and Panel B for U.S. funds
security selection returns. The marginal effects are presented with their standard errors in brackets. We
denote significance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Ranking Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LY ranking LY ranking LogSize LY ranking Costs LY ranking %Act %Ext
Panel A: Market timing returns
1 -0.033*** -0.033*** 0.003 -0.033*** -0.067* -0.032*** 0.017 -0.047*
[0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009] [0.036] [0.009] [0.034] [0.029]
2 -0.009 -0.009 0.001 -0.009 -0.018 -0.009 0.005 -0.014
[0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] [0.016] [0.006] [0.011] [0.013]
3 0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.013 0.006 -0.003 0.008
[0.006] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]
4 0.016*** 0.016*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.032* 0.016*** -0.008 0.023*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.017] [0.003] [0.016] [0.014]
5 0.020*** 0.020*** -0.002 0.020*** 0.041* 0.020*** -0.011 0.030
[0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.025] [0.006] [0.021] [0.022]
Panel B: Security selection returns
1 -0.017*** -0.016** -0.014* -0.017*** 0.055 -0.017** -0.004 0.049
[0.005] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.035] [0.008] [0.031] [0.036]
2 -0.007*** -0.007 -0.006 -0.007*** 0.023 -0.006 -0.002 0.019
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.014] [0.005] [0.012] [0.017]
3 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.006
[0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.020]
4 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007** 0.009*** -0.029 0.009*** 0.002 -0.026
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.018] [0.003] [0.016] [0.016]
5 0.013*** 0.013* 0.011* 0.013*** -0.043* 0.012* 0.003 -0.036
[0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.026] [0.007] [0.023] [0.026]
In Appendix Table A.4 we present the actual transition matrixes. The percentage of funds
repeating as best performers is in all cases higher than the percentage of best performers of
last year ending in one of the four lower quintiles this year. The same holds for the worst
performing funds. We also look at the returns in year t + 1 of funds ranked in the lowest and
highest quintile in year t. Funds ranked in the top quintile have higher average returns in the
following year than the funds ranked in the bottom quintile.
These persistence tests are performed directly on the benchmark-adjusted market timing
and security selection returns. As we only have access to annual data, we cannot use the risk-
adjusted performance in these estimations. Hence, we do not test whether pension funds can
persistently deliver abnormal returns, or estimate the effect of liquidity constraints on persis-
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tence. Nevertheless, these results show that certain pension funds are persistently better in
outperforming their benchmarks using market timing and security selection.
3.8 Conclusion
After risk-adjusting and net of all costs, pension funds obtain a positive return of 89 basis points
per year from their asset management decisions, i.e. compared to maintaining the strategic
asset allocation policy from the previous year and investing in the benchmark. Pension funds
are thus on average able to provide positive returns to their participants. To identify the sources
of the positive total return, we decompose it into three active asset management components:
asset allocation, market timing and security selection. For each of the three return components,
pension funds are able to beat their benchmarks before and after risk-adjusting. Changes in
asset allocation policy result in positive abnormal returns of 25 basis points per year. These
abnormal returns are due to pension funds changing their asset allocation policy across broader
asset classes over time, not to changes within equity or fixed income.
Market timing delivers a positive alpha of 26 basis points per year. This abnormal return is
larger among smaller funds. Market timing alpha is completely due to passive market move-
ments, i.e. the ability of pension funds to exploit ‘time series’ momentum by investing in mul-
tiple asset classes. Pension funds do not have active rebalancing skills. In addition, more than
half of the alpha comes from market timing within different equity styles (such as domestic
versus international stocks, and large versus small cap stocks). Overall, these results suggest
that funds that try to stay as close as possible to their strategic asset allocation policy may miss
market timing opportunities. If fund managers can obtain positive returns from the passive
market movements due to time series momentum (see Moskowitz et al., 2012), as our results
indicate, letting the actual weights deviate from the strategic weights and not rebalancing back
immediately can in fact improve performance, in line with Sharpe (2010) idea of an ‘adaptive
asset allocation policy.’
Security selection delivers an insignificant return of 25 basis points per year after risk-
adjusting, which is driven by the momentum factor. Once we control for this factor, security
selection delivers an insignificant negative alpha of -10 basis points per year.
Larger pension funds do not manage to transfer their lower investment costs into higher
net returns. Rather, we document diseconomies of scale in pension fund performance. The dis-
economies of scale are primarily apparent for funds investing in less liquid assets, as proxied
by fund total return loadings on the traded systematic liquidity factor. As a result, the perfor-
mance of large pension funds seems to be subject to size-induced liquidity limitations. These
liquidity limitations related to size are significant in all three asset management components.
Larger funds face liquidity constraints even when investing in public equity. Our results sug-
gest that funds with high equity allocations tend to deviate from their benchmark by selecting
relatively illiquid stocks, which only results in better performance if the funds are relatively
small. Smaller pension funds obtain higher total returns and especially higher market timing
returns. The better market timing returns of smaller funds can be explained by two effects.
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First, smaller funds can be regulated in a more flexible way with wider bandwidths that enable
them to deviate further from their strategic asset allocation weights and exploit the across as-
set class momentum. Second, even if smaller pension funds have to rebalance to restore their
strategic weights, such rebalancing has lower market impact.
Lastly, we find persistence in pension funds’ ability to deliver higher market timing and
security selection returns. Funds belonging to the best performing quintile this year are more
likely to remain among the best performers in the following year.
Overall, pension funds seem to have most expertise in designing strategic asset allocation
and market timing policies, rather than in actively selecting securities or in finding external
managers with superior security selection skills. Pension funds benefit significantly from time
series momentum across multiple asset classes. Our results thus suggest that pension funds,
and especially the larger funds, would have done better if they invested in passive mandates
without frequent rebalancing across asset classes. This conclusion is confirmed when we com-
pare the total performance of funds depending on the percentage of their assets that is ac-
tively managed. The most actively managed group of pension funds has significantly greater
liquidity-related diseconomies of scale, as its funds that are in the largest quartile group un-
derperform similarly sized funds with much less active management by about 62 basis points
a year. Our paper thus documents three separate reasons for the attractiveness of passive man-
agement, especially for the largest pension funds. First, pension funds on average had in-
significant risk-adjusted security selection performance. Second, passive management is much
cheaper than active management. Third, performance in passive mandates is less subject to
liquidity-related diseconomies of scale.
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Table A.1: Replication of Dyck and Pomorski (2011)
This table can be compared with Table 3 of Dyck and Pomorski (February 2011). The dependent vari-
able is the overall fund net benchmark-adjusted return in year t (security selection return component
on a fund level). The main independent variable is the log of year t − 1 fund size. Regressions are
estimated over the pooled sample of U.S. and Canadian funds (All) or on a single-country level and,
where indicated, we use also year fixed effects. Corporate is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if
the pension fund is classified as corporate and 0 otherwise. Panel A presents the results using the entire
sample period 1990-2010 period, whereas in Panel B we use a shorter sample period (1990-2008), which
is comparable with Dyck and Pomorski (2011).
U.S. U.S. U.S. Canada All
Panel A: Sample period 1990–2010
Log of end of year t− 1 plan size 0.054 0.051 0.075
(1.11) (1.10) (1.58)
Corporate plan dummy 0.386
(2.81)
Observations 2,501 2,501 2,501
R-squared 0.001 0.136 0.139
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
Plan fixed effects No No No
Panel B: Sample period 1990–2008
Log of end of year t− 1 plan size 0.108 0.090 0.107 0.068 0.086
(2.28) (1.97) (2.31) (1.50) (2.65)
Corporate plan dummy 0.268 0.179 0.221
(1.98) (1.38) (2.22)
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175 1,393 3,568
R-squared 0.002 0.144 0.145 0.236 0.118
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plan fixed effects No No No No No
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Table A.3: Pension fund characteristics and security selection returns in equity
In columns (1)-(3) we do not risk-adjust the security selection (net benchmark-adjusted returns) re-
turns in and directly estimate the relations between them and pension fund characteristics using Fama-
MacBeth regressions and correcting for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using Newey-West with
three lags. Estimations in columns (1)-(3) include all funds (observations), whereas in columns (4)-(7) we
risk-adjust the equity returns and include only funds with at least seven observations. In columns (4)-(7)
in the first step we regress the equity security selection returns on a five factor model that includes the
MKT, SMB, HML, LIQ and MOM. In the second step we augment the alphas retrieved from the first step
with the error terms of the first step and run Fama-MacBeth regressions and correct for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity (using Newey-West with three lags). The following characteristics are included
in the Fama-MacBeth regressions: %Equity – percentage allocation to equity from total assets, LogSize
– log of the total equity holdings, Costs – investment costs, %Act - percentage in active mandates and
%Ext - percentage in external mandates from the equity holdings. We also include Size ∗ Liq, which
is an interaction term of the log mandate size with the first step fund-specific loading on the liquidity
factor. The Observations row presents the number of observations included in the analysis. We report
the coefficients with standard errors in brackets and denote significance levels with *, ** and ***, which
correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Security selection returns in equity Risk-adjusted security selection returns in equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -0.697* -0.168 -0.278 -1.236*** 0.341 -0.682 1.767
[0.356] [0.609] [0.758] [0.432] [1.066] [0.550] [2.148]
%Equity 1.692** 1.313* 2.109** 2.529*** -0.576 2.574*** -1.725
[0.661] [0.754] [0.851] [0.789] [0.997] [0.774] [2.068]
LogSize -0.105 -0.005 -0.148
[0.120] [0.081] [0.179]
Costs -0.797 -1.780
[1.121] [1.395]
%Act 1.447 1.795
[1.422] [1.784]
%Ext -1.018 -1.058
[0.768] [0.844]
Size*Liq -1.432*** -1.493***
[0.254] [0.274]
Observations 3,268 3,268 3,268 2,412 2,412 2,412 2,412
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Table A.4: Transition matrixes: persistence in pension fund performance
In Panel A funds are placed into quintiles based on their market timing returns. In Panel B funds
are placed into quintiles based on their security selection (net benchmark-adjusted) returns. High row
or column represents the quintile with the highest market timing return. Percentages represent the
probability that a fund which was ranked in one of the 5 quintiles in year t ends up in one of the
quintiles in year t + 1 or exits the database. Exit column presents the percentage of funds exiting the
CEM database in year t + 1. Return in t + 1 columns present the market timing or security selection
returns in year t + 1 of the top and bottom quintiles, which are formed in year t. Test Di f f column is a
t-statistic of the difference in returns between the low and high quintile.
Panel A: U.S. Funds Market Timing Returns
Year t + 1 ranking Return in t + 1 Test
Low 2 3 4 High Exit Low High Diff
Low 22.71% 17.26% 11.95% 13.13% 12.54% 22.42% 0.086 0.211 1.36
Year t 2 16.44% 18.09% 16.89% 12.11% 10.46% 26.01%
ranking 3 12.44% 16.19% 19.94% 15.59% 11.84% 23.99%
4 11.66% 15.55% 15.99% 18.24% 13.75% 24.81%
High 17.75% 10.17% 11.23% 15.63% 20.64% 24.58%
Panel B: U.S. Funds Security Selection Returns
Year t + 1 ranking Return in t + 1 Test
Low 2 3 4 High Exit Low High Diff
Low 20.06% 12.87% 13.77% 14.82% 13.77% 24.70% 0.130 0.450 1.27
Year t 2 12.71% 16.79% 16.94% 16.49% 11.04% 26.02%
ranking 3 13.24% 16.89% 16.89% 15.53% 13.09% 24.35%
4 12.25% 16.04% 18.31% 17.10% 14.52% 21.79%
High 15.82% 11.83% 12.29% 14.29% 20.58% 25.19%
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Chapter 4
Delegated Investment Management in
Alternative Assets
4.1 Introduction
Institutional investors have increased the amount of investments in alternative asset classes, at-
tracted by the promise of superior absolute returns and low correlation with traditional assets
such as equities and bonds. Despite the marked increase in the popularity and size of portfolio
allocations to these alternative asset classes, relatively few empirical papers have considered
how institutional investors choose in which alternative asset class to invest and how the level
of intermediation and the level of specialization affect their performance. In this paper, I ex-
amine the allocations of institutional investors to real assets, private equity and hedge funds,
quantifying the performance and costs of the intermediation and specialization decisions.
I can distinguish three levels of intermediaries serving as interface between investors and
assets. Institutional investors can manage the alternative investments internally (in-house),
delegate the asset management to external managers or delegate even the selection of external
managers to fund-of-funds. Investors usually hire financial intermediaries because they lack a
high level of expertise necessary to achieve superior returns in private markets (Allen, 2001).
Financial intermediaries, such as external managers and fund-of-funds, focus on gathering in-
formation only in one asset class, which may enable them to obtain superior returns by capi-
talizing on the acquired informational advantage (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Additionally,
financial intermediaries pool capital from multiple institutions and can spread the evaluation,
monitoring and transaction costs as well as the liquidity needs across these institutions.
However, relying on financial intermediaries may expose institutional investors to agency
conflicts. According to Sharpe (1981) and Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2008), decentral-
ized delegated investment management can cause several misalignments of objectives between
the institutional investors and the financial intermediaries, such as loss of diversification, un-
observable managerial appetite for risk, and different investment horizons. When investing
through financial intermediaries, institutional investors extensively use placement agents and
consultants (Cain, Davidoff, and McKeon, 2013; Goyal and Wahal, 2008), whose compensa-
tion may depend on kickbacks (Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner, 2011). In this case, the external
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managers and fund-of-funds can capitalize on the relations to the detriment of investors. Over-
all, when delegating the asset management to financial intermediaries, institutional investors
trade-off higher anticipated returns from these intermediaries against the increased difficulty
in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty about their true incentives and
skills.
Alternatively, if institutional investors expect that the coordination problems will prevail,
they can bypass the financial intermediaries by establishing internal investment divisions to di-
rectly select alternative assets. Establishing a competitive internal asset management division
requires investor to pay high fixed costs for employee compensation, information gathering
and structuring of investments. The private markets for alternative assets offer an appropriate
setting to compare the performance across the three levels of intermediation (internal manage-
ment, external management and fund-of-funds), since the identification of good managers or
projects is impeded by limited disclosure, rapidly growing number of funds and proliferation
of investment strategies in all three alternative asset classes (real assets, private equity and
hedge funds).
Next, I consider the specialization decision, which captures whether institutions invest only
in one alternative asset class or, invest simultaneously in two or three alternative asset classes.
Prior research has examined the role of specialization at the asset manager level by comparing
the risk-taking and performance of balanced (multi-asset) managers with specialized equity
managers (Blake, Rossi, Timmermann, Tonks, and Wermers, 2013). I analyze the specializa-
tion decision on an institutional investor (sponsor) level. From a mean-variance perspective,
adding asset classes to the overall portfolio brings diversification benefits. However, each al-
ternative asset class is different and requires its own expertise. For instance, if an institution
has investment skills in real assets, that does not necessarily enable this investor to implement
better hedge fund trading strategies internally, or to select better hedge fund managers.
My main contribution is to consider how levels of intermediation and specialization relate
to costs and performance of institutional investors in real assets, private equity and hedge
funds. The investment approach and specialization decisions are interrelated and can jointly
influence the allocation and performance of institutional investors in alternative assets.
This paper employs the CEM data1 which provides information on alternative investments
of institutional investors, mainly pension funds, for the 1990-2011 period. The institutional
investors are based in four regions: U.S., Canada, Europe and Australia / New Zealand. I cat-
egorize the alternative investments in three broad groups. Based on the amount of assets, the
largest group is real assets, which includes investments in real estate, infrastructure, natural
resources and commodities. Private equity is the second group and includes investments in
1CEM Benchmarking Inc. (CEM) collects data from institutional investors through yearly questionnaires. CEM
data provides a detailed perspective on the strategic asset allocation and performance of institutional investors
during the 1990-2011 period, and the data has been used previously by French (2008) to study the cost of active
investing, and by Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013) to examine the pension fund asset allocation and liability
discount rates.
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venture capital, LBO, mezzanine, and distressed financing. The third group includes invest-
ments in hedge funds and tactical asset allocation (TAA) mandates.2
I document that institutional investors across all regions have increased their allocation
to alternative assets from 8 percent in 1990 to more than 15 percent in 2011. However, for
larger institutional investors, the increase in the allocation to alternative assets is relatively
more pronounced. Large investors allocate a greater percentage of their assets to alternative
investments, and are also more likely to invest simultaneously in multiple alternative asset
classes. For example, doubling the fund size increases the probability that an institution invests
simultaneously in real assets, private equity and hedge funds & TAA by 9.5 percent.
In addition to size, institutional investors that diversify their public equity investment in-
ternationally, invest also a higher percentage of their total assets in multiple alternative asset
classes at the same time. So both methods of diversifications, across asset classes and across ge-
ographical regions, complement each other. Institutional investors that use more active rather
than passive management in public equity, are investing relatively more in alternative asset
classes, where passive investing is virtually impossible. My results suggest that institutional
investors do not substitute active management in public equity with alternative investments,
but rather engage simultaneously in active investing in public and private markets.
With respect to the levels of intermediation, I observe that larger institutional investors es-
tablish internal management divisions significantly more frequently than smaller investors. A
one unit increase in the log of investor size reduces the allocation to external managers and
fund-of-funds by 7.1 and 5.7 percent, respectively, while increasing the allocation to internal
managers. This suggests that size is a major determinant of the levels of intermediation stand-
ing between investors and assets, consistent with economies of scale associated with manag-
ing large alternative asset portfolios internally. Examining heterogeneity in investment ap-
proach across regions, I document that Canadian, European and Australian / New Zealand
institutional investors tend to invest more internally, whereas U.S. investors are more inclined
towards delegating asset management of alternative investments to external managers and
fund-of-funds, even after controlling for size.
In alternative assets, the average allocation to internal mandates has declined from 22 per-
cent in 1990 to 9 percent in 2011, at the expense of increased relative importance of external
managers and fund-of-funds. I consider what explains this move towards delegated portfolio
management. When investing through financial intermediaries institutional investors trade off
higher expected returns from their expertise against potential agency conflicts. One possibil-
ity is that institutional investors rely more on delegated investment management because they
have become more successful in coordinating and monitoring financial intermediaries. If this
is the case, external managers and fund-of-funds will deliver higher gross returns in alterna-
tive assets than internal mandates, which may transfer in a better net performance, depending
2I combine TAA mandates with hedge funds, because both investments include long only and long/short strate-
gies and may allow leveraged positions. I use the term asset class to refer to hedge fund and TAA mandates, even
though they can be also described as vehicles and trading strategies.
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on the investment costs. Alternatively, the increased prevalence of delegated asset manage-
ment over time may simply be due to institutional investors paying higher fees to reduce anx-
iety about risk taking or to shift responsibility for potentially poor performance to external
managers and fund-of-funds (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2013; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1992). Based on this hypothesis, even though the investments made by external man-
agers and fund-of-funds deliver lower net returns than the internally managed investments,
institutions will still retain the financial intermediaries, because they are anxious to make risky
investments on their own.
In terms of net benchmark-adjusted returns, institutional investors that invest through in-
ternal managers tend to perform better than their counterparts, which rely on financial in-
termediaries. More layers of financial intermediation result in lower performance in all three
alternative asset classes: real assets, private equity and hedge funds & TAA. Fund-of-funds sig-
nificantly underperform as compared to external and internal managers, while external man-
agers underperform internal managers. For example, in private equity, internally managed
investments have 5.72 percentage points higher net benchmark-adjusted returns than invest-
ments managed by external managers, and 7.54 percentage points higher annual returns than
investments managed by fund-of-funds.
My results suggest that the outperformance of internal managers compared to financial in-
termediaries stems from two sources. First, for sufficiently large institutional investors, estab-
lishing internal management divisions costs significantly less than investing through external
managers and fund-of-funds. Second, internal managers can successfully compete with finan-
cial intermediaries in the private markets and manage to obtain similar or higher gross returns
in all three alternative asset classes: real assets, private equity and hedge funds & TAA. Simi-
larly, using data on the direct private equity investments of seven large institutional investors,
Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2013) document that direct investors outperform intermediaries,
especially when investing locally or in later stage deals.
I observe that the effect of specialization on performance is non-uniform and depends on
mandate size. Smaller institutional investors that specialize in one alternative asset class per-
form significantly better than smaller investors that invest simultaneously in multiple alterna-
tive asset classes. Small specialized institutional investors obtain 1.51 percentage points higher
net benchmark-adjusted returns than small funds that invest at the same time in real assets,
private equity and hedge funds. The opposite is true for larger institutions. Large specializing
investors may face liquidity related diseconomies of scale and are better off when investing
simultaneously in multiple alternative assets. Overall, the increased investments in multiple
alternative asset classes by larger institutional investors are, in part, a response to the scale dis-
economies. On the other hand, specialization enables smaller investors to outweigh the scale
disadvantages in alternative assets. My conclusion about the relation between performance
and specialization is based primarily on institutional allocation to real assets, as more than 80
percent of the specialization observations are in real assets, whereas few institutional investors
specialize in private equity and hedge funds & TAA.
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Prior literature has mainly analyzed performance on an asset class level, but the investor
experience might differ.3 The returns of investors in alternative assets depend not only on the
investment costs and returns of assets they hold, but also on the timing and magnitude of their
flows into and out of these assets, possibly creating a gap between asset and investor returns.
For example, Dichev and Yu (2011) estimate that investor dollar-weighted returns in hedge
funds are significantly lower than the buy-and-hold hedge fund returns and even lower that
the return on the S&P500 Index. In this paper, I analyze the actual investor experience in all
alternative assets. I find that especially smaller institutional investors would have been better
off by not investing in alternative assets. Using the self-reported benchmark returns and asset
allocation weights in public equity, I document that smaller investors would have obtained at
least two percentage points higher annual returns, if they invested passively in public equity
rather than alternative assets. Smaller institutional investors consistently underperform their
self-reported public equity benchmarks in real assets, private equity and hedge funds over the
1990-2011 period.
The results on the effect of investment approach and size on performance in alternative as-
sets are consistent with the model of financial intermediation by Stoughton et al. (2011). The
fund-of-funds underperformance on a gross and net basis relative to internal and external man-
agers, confirms the Stoughton et al. (2011) prediction that, in markets with kickback payments
to placement agents, underperforming assets are more likely to be sold indirectly, through mul-
tiple layers of financial intermediaries.4 Economies of scale in alternative assets exist because
only large investors can afford to pay high fixed search costs to identify profitable projects or
skilled external managers. Thus, larger institutions invest more directly and bypass multiple
levels of intermediaries. Even when investing through financial intermediaries larger investors
can negotiate access to better projects at lower fees.
My findings on the economies of scale in institutional investor performance in all three
alternative assets are in line with the evidence on private equity funds and hedge funds. Kaplan
and Schoar (2005) document a concave relation between fund size and performance of private
equity funds, whereas Agarwal, Nanda, and Ray (2013) find that larger institutions invest more
directly instead of using funds of hedge funds, and outperform the smaller institutions.
The paper adds also to the recent literature on private equity mandates, which has docu-
mented systematic differences in private equity returns and investment strategies across sev-
eral different types of institutional investors (Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai, 2007). Hochberg
and Rauh (2013) extend the analysis of heterogeneity in the performance of institutional pri-
vate equity investments, documenting that especially public pension funds exhibit substan-
3Hedge fund performance studies find either small and sporadical alpha in part of their holdings (Agarwal,
Jiang, Tang, and Yang, 2013; Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2008) or no investment skills once controlling
for liquidity restrictions and style allocations (Aragon, 2007; Griffin and Xu, 2009). For private equity, Kaplan and
Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) document that the average performance of buyout funds is
below that of the S&P500 after fees are taken into account. In real estate, Hochberg and Mu¨hlhofer (2011) document
that the vast majority of both public REIT and private real estate portfolio managers possess little or even negative
market timing and investment selection skills, but there is persistence in manager abilities.
4The findings in this paper also complement the empirical evidence on the agency conflicts and inferior in-
vestment performance resulting from intermediation among equity mutual funds (see, for example, Bergstresser,
Chalmers, and Tufano, 2009; Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik, 2013).
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tial home-state bias and underperform with their local investments. My contribution is to
shed light on two asset management decisions in alternative assets, the level of intermedia-
tion and specialization, as potential contributors to the differences in institutional investors
performance.
Even though delegated asset managers on average underperform the internal investments
net of fees, this is an equilibrium for some institutional investors that delegate portfolio man-
agement to intermediaries based on trust (Gennaioli et al., 2013). Despite the underperfor-
mance, these institutional investors will prefer to hire financial intermediaries as compared
to investing on their own, because the delegation reduces their anxiety about taking risk. In-
vestors will retain the external managers, as an institutional investor who trusts a particular
manager perceives returns on risky investments delivered by this manager as less uncertain
than those delivered by a less trusted manager (see Gennaioli et al., 2013).
However, institutional investors, relying on financial intermediaries in order to shift re-
sponsibility and reduce anxiety, violate their fiduciary duty and do not act in the best interest
of their beneficiaries. My findings have some general implications for the asset management
industry. Larger investors should evaluate the possibility of investing internally because fewer
levels of intermediation enable institutional investors to access better investment opportuni-
ties in alternative asset classes. Smaller institutions should consider substituting fund-of-funds
with other investment approaches, and specializing in one alternative asset class, instead of
simultaneously investing in multiple alternative assets. If smaller investors do not have suffi-
cient skills and resources, they should invest passively in public equity instead of going into
alternative assets.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.3 introduces the institutional investor database.
In Section 4.3, I investigate the determinants of investor allocation to alternative assets and
the financial intermediation choice. I present results on the investment costs in Section 5.5. In
Section 5.6, I analyze the effect of intermediation level, size and specialization on performance
in alternative assets. Section 4.6 compares the performance of alternative assets with passive
investments in equity. Section 5.7 concludes.
4.2 Data
For this study, I use data from CEM Benchmarking Inc. on institutional investor characteris-
tics and their alternative assets investments over the period 1990-2011. The majority of the
investors are defined benefit pension funds, but there are also defined contribution funds,
sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and natural disaster insurance funds. These
investors come from four broad regions (countries): United States (U.S.), Canada, Europe and
Australia/New Zealand. The dataset includes the type of investor (public or corporate), their
size in terms of asset under management, their allocations to different alternative asset classes,
levels of intermediation, costs, returns and benchmarks.
The CEM database provides a broad and detailed perspective on the choices and outcomes
of institutional investor allocations to alternative assets. Using data at the investor level, rather
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than on an asset class level, provides some unique insights into the allocation decisions, costs
and returns of alternative investments. First, the CEM data allows me to analyze the charac-
teristics that determine whether an institution invests in alternative asset classes or not, as this
dataset also includes information on institutional investors that have no exposure to alternative
assets. Second, the CEM data incorporates information on investors preference for financial
intermediation through external managers or fund-of-funds, allowing me to distinguish the
effects of three different investment approaches on costs and performance. Third, CEM returns
of investors reflect the costs of real-life constraints involved in alternative asset investments,
such as commitment periods and delays on the withdrawal of capital that external parties im-
pose. Fourth, CEM returns reflect the costs of managing a portfolio of underlying alternative
investments in real assets, private equity and hedge funds, as the returns are reported net of an
additional layer of fees.
I classify the alternative investments in three broad groups. The first group, real assets,
incorporates investments in real estate, REITs, infrastructure, natural resources and commodi-
ties.5 Private equity is the second group and includes investments in venture capital, LBO and
energy partnerships, as well as equity or fixed income investments in turnarounds, start-ups,
mezzanine, and distressed financing. The third group includes investments in hedge funds and
tactical asset allocation (TAA) mandates. I combine TAA mandates with hedge funds, because
they include long only and long/short strategies, and may allow leveraged positions.
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 978 institutional investors.
U.S. investors represent the majority of the observations, but the database provides also good
coverage of Canadian institutional investors. For European, Australian and New Zealand in-
vestors, I have fewer observations. Institutional investors have on average 9.7 billion US$ assets
under management.
Figure 4.1 Panel A shows that, on average, 74 percent of the investors in the database invest
in real assets, which is higher than the number of funds investing in private equity (54 percent)
and hedge funds & TAA (25 percent). The percentage of institutions investing in hedge funds
& TAA has increased substantially during the last decade: in 2000 only 10 percent of the insti-
tutional investors invested in hedge funds & TAA, while in 2011 more than 55 percent of the
institutions invested in hedge funds & TAA.
Figure 4.1 Panel B presents the total allocation to alternative assets, which declined from 8.6
percent in 1990 to 4.9 percent in 1999. Afterwards, the allocation to alternative assets increased
substantially in all regions, reaching 15.3 percent of the assets under management in 2011. Real
assets have always been the most important alternative asset class and represent 4.42 percent
5Real estate includes direct real estate holdings, segregated real estate holdings and real estate limited partner-
ships, whereas REITs capture investments in real estate investment trusts. Infrastructure asset class covers invest-
ments in local distribution networks for electricity, water and gas, and certain transportation assets, such as toll
roads, airports, bridges and tunnels. Investments in commodities and natural resources refer to actual physical
exposures in commodities (i.e., crude oil, sugar, copper etc) or timber, and to commodity funds or products that
may invest in an index like the Goldman Sachs Commodities Index (GSCI). The composition of real assets changes
over time, but on average direct real estate and REITs represent 91 percent, infrastructure accounts for 4 percent,
and commodities and natural resources cover 5 percent.
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Figure 4.1: Institutional investments in alternative assets
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics: Institutional investors
This table shows the number of funds and observations in the CEM dataset. I present the descriptive
statistics for all funds together (Total) as well as separately for every region. Size (AUM) presents
the mean investor size, measured as asset under management in million US$. In Percentage allocation
columns, I present the equally weighted average allocation to real assets, private equity and hedge funds
& TAA from total assets, taking into account also institutional investors that do not invest in alternative
assets. Simultaneous investment columns present the number of observations for all possible values of
NSI. The number of simultaneous investments (NSI) in alternative asset classes is equal to 0, if an
institution does not invest in any alternative assets class. NSI = 1, NSI = 2 or NSI = 3 means that an
institution invests at the same time in one, two or all three alternative asset classes (real assets, private
equity and hedge funds & TAA).
Institutional investors Percentage allocation Simultaneous investments
Funds Obs Size (AUM) Real Private Hedge funds NSI=0 NSI=1 NSI=2 NSI=3
assets equity & TAA
Total 978 6,129 9,730 4.42% 2.17% 2.10% 1,145 1,649 2,108 1,227
U.S. 573 3,545 10,700 4.26% 2.92% 2.78% 507 810 1,405 823
Canada 250 2,055 4,137 3.29% 0.89% 1.01% 598 745 519 193
Europe 136 449 27,632 9.45% 1.91% 1.61% 31 81 159 178
Aus/Nzd 19 80 9,955 12.70% 3.87% 2.79% 9 13 25 33
of the total assets, on average. Private equity accounts for 2.17 percent, while hedge funds &
TAA account for 2.10 percent of the total investor assets.
In almost 20 percent of the observations, institutions do not invest in alternative assets
(NSI=0). Figure 4.1 Panel C shows that the percentage of institutional investors without alter-
native investments is highest in 1999, but declines afterwards to 11 percent in 2011. In the last
decade, the percentage of institutions that invest simultaneously in all three alternative asset
classes (NSI=3) increased substantially. On the contrary, the percentage of investors that spe-
cialize into investing in one alternative asset class (NSI=1) declined from 32 percent in 2000 to
18 percent in 2011. Table 4.2 reports that vast majority of the specialization observations are in
real assets. Less than 20 percent of the investor specializing observations are in private equity
and hedge funds & TAA.
Institutions invest through three levels of intermediation in alternative assets: internal man-
agement, external management and fund-of-funds. Internal investing means that the buy-sell
decisions for the individual assets are made within the institution (including wholly-owned
subsidiaries). When delegating the asset management to financial intermediaries, institutional
investors can directly select the external managers or invest through fund-of-funds. In case of
the latter, the fund-of-fund manager selects the external managers (funds), who then acquire
the assets.
Figure 4.2 shows the trend in percentage of alternative assets invested through each finan-
cial intermediation level. Over time, institutional investors have increased their allocation to
fund-of-funds from 0 to 20 percent, primarily at the expense of internal mandates, not external
managers. Investing through external managers is the dominant investment approach during
the entire period, accounting for roughly 75 percent of the institutional investments in alterna-
tive assets.
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4.2 Data
Figure 4.2: Percentage allocated to internal managers, external managers and fund-of-funds
Table 4.2 Panel A presents the investment approach by alternative asset class. In all three al-
ternative asset classes, internal management is less implemented than delegated management
to external parties. Internal asset management is mostly used by institutions when investing
in real assets and represents 17.34 percent of the real assets. Internal private equity divisions
manage only 8.27 percents of the assets invested by institutional investors in private equity,
whereas internal hedge funds & TAA mandates are even less frequent, managing around 3.28
percent of the investments. Investing through fund-of-fund accounts for 32.59 percent of the
assets allocated to hedge funds & TAA, 21.29 percent of the assets invested in private equity
and only 1.99 percent of the investments in real assets. There are significant regional differ-
ences in the level of intermediation. U.S. institutions invest less through internal mandates in
all three alternative asset classes and rely more on external managers.
Table 4.2 Panel B presents the investment costs across different levels of intermediation
and alternative asset classes. Internal investment costs include compensation and benefits of
employees managing internal portfolios, as well as expenses for support staff, consulting, re-
search, legal, trading services and allocated overhead costs.6 External investment costs capture
the management fees paid to investment consultants and external asset managers. The per-
formance fees, carried interest and rebates7 are directly subtracted from the returns and are
not incorporated in the cost figures. External investments costs also include costs (compensa-
tion, benefits, travel and education costs) for internal staff whose sole responsibility is to select
and monitor external managers in alternative assets. Similarly, for fund-of-funds, cost figures
6The overhead costs include expenses for rent, utilities, IT, investment accounting, financial control, HR, etc.
7Carried interest is a fee that is a portion of returns exceeding a hurdle rate. Rebates are the limited partner
share of certain fee income realized by the general partner in connection with the fund, such as fees for break-up,
monitoring and funding.
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capture the base management fee paid to both the fund-of-funds manager and the underlying
managers, but they do not include performance fees and carried interest on either level.
Private equity is the most expensive alternative asset class with average annual costs of 3.41
percentage points, followed by hedge funds & TAA (1.43 percentage points) and real assets
(0.84 percentage points). Investing in real assets costs less than investing in the other alterna-
tive assets classes, partially because of the higher allocation to internal management divisions,
which cost significantly less than delegating asset management to financial intermediaries.
Institutional investment costs in alternative assets documented in the CEM data are compa-
rable with those documented in prior literature. Based on Table 4.2, the average management
fees paid by institutional investors for external investing in hedge funds or through funds-of-
hedge-funds are around 1.10 and 2.31 percent, respectively. Similarly, French (2008) documents
that the average annual hedge fund management fee is 1.16 percent over the 1996-2007 period,
and for funds-of-hedge-funds the estimate is around 2.36 percent. For private equity, Phalip-
pou (2009) and Metrick and Yasuda (2010) estimate that the average buyout fund charges only
management fee of more than 2 percent of capital commitments, while the total fee is around 7
percent. According to CEM data, external investing in private equity costs around 2.73 percent
annually.
Panel C of Table 4.2 shows the gross returns of institutional investors in alternative assets.
Institutions on average obtain the highest gross returns in private equity, whereas real assets
and hedge funds & TAA deliver substantially lower returns. Institutional investors obtain an
annual gross return of 13.31 percentage points in private equity. The average gross return in real
assets is 7.68 percentage points annually, whereas the return in hedge funds & TAA is roughly
6.61 percentage points. The gross returns of U.S. institutions are higher than the returns of
other institutions in all three alternative asset classes.
On a gross return basis, internal managers perform better than the external managers in
all three alternative assets, while fund-of-funds deliver the lowest returns. In the performance
analysis, I subtract the investment costs and the benchmark returns from the gross returns, and
then focus on the net benchmark-adjusted returns.
4.3 Institutional investments in alternative assets
I first explore how the allocation to alternative assets is related to investor size, diversification
and active management use. Subsection 4.3.2 focuses on the number of alternative asset classes
in which institutions invest simultaneously and analyze the association between the number of
simultaneous investments and institutional investor characteristics. Subsection 4.3.3 analyzes
how investor size and specialization influence the allocation to the three intermediation levels.
4.3.1 Percentage allocated to alternative assets
I estimate the relation between percentage allocated to alternative assets (%Alternatives) and
investor characteristics using Tobit regressions that control for left censoring in the allocation
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variable:
%Alternatives∗i,t = β0 + β1Zi,t + β2Regioni + β3YDt + υi,t (4.1)
%Alternativesi,t =
{
%Alternatives∗i,t if %Alternatives
∗
i,t > 0
0 if %Alternatives∗i,t ≤ 0
(4.2)
where Zi,t represents the main variables of interest: Fund size, the logarithm of total insti-
tutional investor assets; %IntEquity, the percentage allocated to international (non-domestic)
equity assets from total public equity holdings; MSCI World, the annual returns on the MSCI
World equity index expressed in local currency; the percentage of public equity and fixed in-
come investments managed actively and externally (%ActEquity, %ActFI, %ExtEquity and
%ExtFI). I control for investor type using the Public dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if
an institutional investor is a public fund and 0 for corporate funds.8 I also control for region
fixed effects (Regioni), include year dummies (YD) and I cluster the robust standard errors by
investor, allowing for intragroup correlation.
In Table 4.3, I find that percentage allocated to alternative assets is positively and signifi-
cantly associated with institutional investor size. Larger funds invest relatively more in alter-
native assets: a one unit increase in the Fund Size, i.e. doubling the fund size, results in 1.9
percentage points increase in the allocation to alternative assets. Importantly, larger institu-
tions invest relatively more in all three alternative asset classes: real assets, private equity and
hedge funds & TAA.
There are two ways for institutional investors to diversify their portfolios: by investing in
more asset classes and by investing across more geographical regions. Table 4.3 sheds light
on whether investments in alternative assets are driven by demands for diversification. Inter-
estingly, funds, that have more internationally diversified public equity holdings, invest also
relatively more in alternative assets. For example, based on column (2), if an institution invests
50% of the public equity assets in non-domestic markets, than this institution will also allocate
7.25 percent more to alternative assets (0.5 * 0.145). Institutional investors with international
public equity holdings invest especially more in private equity and hedge funds & TAA. My
results suggest that both methods of diversification complement each other: institutions that
invest more internationally, at the same time, allocate higher percentage of their assets to alter-
natives. Contrasting, institutional investors that hold only domestic equity will invest less in
alternative assets.
The use of active management in public equity also explains the percentage allocated to
alternative assets. Institutional investors can decide whether to engage in active management
in all asset classes or to combine active management in alternative assets with passive manage-
ment in traditional assets such as public equity and bonds. I document that institutional in-
vestors that use more passive rather than active management in public equity, invest relatively
less in alternative assets. For instance, an investor that manages all public equity investments
in an active way will invest 5.5 percent more in alternative assets as compared to an investor
8The majority of the public investors are public defined benefit pension funds, but there are also defined contri-
bution funds and few sovereign wealth funds in the database.
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that manages all equity investments in a passive way. Institutions that manage their public
equity holdings passively invest less especially in hedge funds & TAA, which is the alternative
asset class exposed mainly to listed securities.
Table 4.3: Tobit regressions: Percentage allocated to alternative assets
The dependent variable is the percentage allocated to alternative assets from total investor assets,
%Alternatives. I estimate a Tobit regression, since the allocation variable is censored at 0. The de-
pendent variable is defined based on the actual asset allocation in columns (1) and (2), and based on the
strategic asset allocation in columns (3) and (4). In columns (5), (6) and (7) I decompose the dependent
variable to percentage allocated to real asset, private equity and hedge funds & TAA. As independent
variables, I include: Fund size, the logarithm of total institutional investor assets; %IntEquity, the per-
centage allocated to international (non-domestic) equity assets from total public equity holdings; MSCI
World, the annual returns on the MSCI World equity index expressed in local currency; %ActEquity,
%ActFI, %ExtEquity and %ExtFI, which capture the institutional investment approach in public eq-
uity and fixed income (the percentage of public equity investments managed actively, the percentage of
fixed income investments managed actively, the percentage of public equity investments managed by
external managers and the percentage of fixed income assets managed by external managers). I control
for investor type using the (Public) dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the institutional investor is
a public fund and 0 for corporate funds. Canada, Europe and Aus/Nzd are regional dummy variables
(the base result refers to U.S. investors). I include year dummies and cluster the robust standard errors
by institutional investor. I report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
%Alternatives %Alternatives %Alternatives %Alternatives %Real %Private %Hedge funds
(actual) (actual) (strategic) (strategic) assets equity and TAA
Constant -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.097*** -0.110*** -0.064*** -0.118*** -0.205***
[0.026] [0.032] [0.027] [0.035] [0.021] [0.020] [0.051]
Fund size 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.013***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
%IntEquity 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.021 0.067*** 0.172***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.029] [0.029] [0.014] [0.014] [0.040]
MSCI World 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.046* 0.046* 0.017 0.025** -0.028
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.012] [0.011] [0.037]
Public -0.013* -0.013* -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.014*** -0.033***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.012]
%ActEquity 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.039** 0.040** 0.016** 0.016* 0.082***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.008] [0.009] [0.024]
%ActFI 0.014 0.014 0.020* 0.021* 0.010* 0.015** -0.012
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.006] [0.006] [0.020]
%ExtEquity 0.005 0.016 0.003 -0.003 0.002
[0.019] [0.021] [0.010] [0.013] [0.025]
%ExtFI -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003
[0.015] [0.016] [0.008] [0.010] [0.021]
Canada -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.008 -0.037*** -0.101***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.018]
Europe -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.024 -0.023 0.038*** -0.050*** -0.088***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.010] [0.007] [0.017]
Aus/Nzd 0.053 0.053 0.047 0.047 0.081*** -0.005 -0.046*
[0.039] [0.039] [0.037] [0.037] [0.019] [0.029] [0.026]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Funds 972 972 972 972 972 972 972
Observations 6,091 6,091 6,091 6,091 6,091 6,091 6,091
Even after controlling for size, international equity investments and preferences for active
management, I still find significant regional differences in percentage allocated to alternative
assets. Canadian and European institutional investors allocate lower percentage of their assets
to alternative investments as compared to U.S. investors. Non-U.S. investors have substantially
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lower exposure to hedge funds & TAA and private equity, while European and Australian /
New Zealand funds invest slightly more in real assets than U.S. funds.
4.3.2 The number of simultaneous investments in alternative assets
The next question I consider is whether institutions decide to specialize in one alternative asset
class or to diversify across multiple alternative asset classes. I estimate the determinants of the
number of simultaneous investments (NSI) in alternative assets using an ordered logit model.
The dependent variable NSI takes a value of one, if an institution invests only in one alternative
asset class. The dependent variable can have a maximum value of three, if an institution invests
at the same time in real assets, private equity and hedge funds & TAA.
NSI∗i,t = γ1Zi,t + γ2Regioni + γ3YDt + ε i,t (4.3)
NSIi,t =

1 if NSI∗i,t ≤ µ1
2 if µ1 < NSI∗i,t ≤ µ2
3 if µ2 < NSI∗i,t
(4.4)
where Zi,t represents the main variables of interest: Fund size, the logarithm of total investor
assets; %Alternatives, the percentage allocated to alternatives from total assets; %IntEquity,
the percentage allocated to international (non-domestic) equity assets from total public equity
holdings; MSCI World, the annual returns on the MSCI World equity index expressed in local
currency; the percentage of public equity and fixed income investments managed actively and
externally (%ActEquity, %ActFI, %ExtEquity and %ExtFI). I control for investor type using
the Public dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if an institutional investor is a public fund and
0 for corporate funds. I also control for region fixed effects (Regioni), include year dummies
(YD) and I cluster the robust standard errors by investor, allowing for intragroup correlation.
Table 4.4 presents the marginal effects estimated at median values for every potential out-
come of the dependent variable NSI. I test whether institutional investors substitute active
management in public equity with investing in multiple alternative assets, where passive man-
agement is not possible. However, I document that institutional investors using more ac-
tive rather than passive management in public equity also invest in multiple alternative asset
classes at the same time. An institution that manages all public equity investments in an active
way has 17.8 percent higher probability to invest at the same time in all three alternative asset
classes as compared to an institution that manages all public equity investments in a passive
way. This result suggests that institutional investors do not substitute active management in
public equity with investments in alternative assets, but rather that if institutional investors
use active management, they do that in multiple public and private markets at the same time.
Diversification is another important determinant of the number of simultaneous invest-
ments in alternative assets. Institutional investors, that diversify their public equity assets by
investing internationally, are also more likely to diversify across asset classes by holding mul-
tiple alternative asset classes at the same time.
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Table 4.4: Ordered logit regressions: Number of simultaneous investments (NSI)
I estimate an ordered logit model and the dependent variable equals the number of alternative asset
classes in which an institution invests at the same time. The NSI dependent variable takes a maximum
value of three when an institution invests at the same time in real assets, private equity and hedge funds
& TAA. The sample is restricted to investors with at least one alternative asset class in their portfolio.
As independent variables, I include: Fund size, the logarithm of total fund assets; %Alternatives, the
percentage allocated to alternatives from total assets; %IntEquity, the percentage allocated to interna-
tional (non-domestic) equity assets from total public equity holdings; MSCI World, the annual returns
on the MSCI World equity index expressed in local currency; %ActEquity, %ActFI, %ExtEquity and
%ExtFI, which capture the institutional investment approach in public equity and fixed income (the
percentage of public equity investments managed actively, the percentage of fixed income investments
managed actively, the percentage of public equity investments managed by external managers and the
percentage of fixed income assets managed by external managers). I control for investor type using
the (Public) dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the institutional investor is a public fund and 0 for
corporate funds. Canada, Europe and Aus/Nzd are regional dummy variables (the base result refers to
U.S. investors). I include year dummies and cluster the robust standard errors by institutional investor.
I report the the marginal effects estimated at median values for all probability outcomes (NSI=1, NSI=2
and NSI=3). I report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01, respectively.
NSI=1 NSI=2 NSI=3
Fund size -0.083*** -0.012 0.095***
[0.012] [0.020] [0.015]
%Alternatives -1.834*** -0.269 2.103***
[0.278] [0.437] [0.239]
%IntEquity -0.161* -0.024 0.184**
[0.086] [0.038] [0.089]
MSCI World 0.076 0.011 -0.087
[0.095] [0.018] [0.101]
Public 0.080*** -0.010 -0.070***
[0.031] [0.018] [0.024]
%ActEquity -0.155*** -0.023 0.178***
[0.046] [0.039] [0.060]
%ActFI -0.012 -0.002 0.013
[0.039] [0.007] [0.045]
%ExtEquity 0.054 0.008 -0.062
[0.062] [0.014] [0.069]
%ExtFI 0.016 0.002 -0.019
[0.049] [0.009] [0.056]
Canada 0.100** -0.018 -0.083***
[0.041] [0.024] [0.028]
Europe 0.092 -0.015 -0.078**
[0.057] [0.026] [0.039]
Aus/Nzd 0.098 -0.017 -0.081
[0.098] [0.043] [0.060]
Year dummies Yes
Funds 832
Observations 4,968
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Investor size and percentage allocated to alternative assets have the expected positive effect
on the number of simultaneous investments. Larger institutional investors are more likely to
invest in multiple alternative asset classes at the same time. A one unit increase in the log of
Fund size increases the probability that a fund invests simultaneously in real assets, private
equity and hedge funds & TAA by 9.5 percent. Similarly, if an investor allocates higher per-
centage of the total assets to alternative investments, than this fund is also more likely to invest
in multiple alternative asset classes at the same time.
Furthermore, I observe significant regional effects: Canadian and European institutions are
less likely to simultaneously invest in all three groups of alternative assets. The probability
that a Canadian institutional investor specializes in one alternative asset class (NSI = 1) is 10
percent higher than the probability for a U.S. institutional investor, controlling for size, inter-
national diversification and active management in public equity.
4.3.3 Financial intermediation levels
In this section, I analyze the determinants of institutional decision to manage the alternative
investments internally, to select external asset managers or to invest through fund-of-funds.
For every intermediation level, I estimate a Tobit model where the dependent variable is the
percentage of assets managed internally, externally and by fund-of-funds. The Tobit regres-
sions in Table 4.5 control for left-censoring of the investment approach variables at 0 and right-
censoring at 1. For example, the dependent variable %Internal equals 0 if investor i does not
manage alternative investments internally in year t, and 1 if all the alternative investments are
managed internally.
%InvApproach∗i,t = δ0 + δ1Zi,t + δ2Regioni + δ3YDt + νi,t (4.5)
%InvApproachi,t =

1 if %InvApproach∗i,t ≥ 1
%InvApproach∗i,t if 0 < %InvApproach
∗
i,t < 1
0 if %InvApproach∗i,t ≤ 0
(4.6)
where Zi,t represents the independent variables. To estimate the effect of specialization in alter-
native assets on the percentage allocated to the different intermediation levels, I include three
variables: Specialzie, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if an institution invests only in one
alternative asset class and 0, if it invests in more than one alternative asset class; NSI, a count
variable that measures the number of alternative asset classes in which an institution invests;
and Concentartion, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measure of alternative investments con-
centration. I control for region fixed effects (Regioni), include year dummies (YD) and cluster
the robust standard errors by investor, allowing for intragroup correlation.
Columns (1), (4) and (7) in Table 4.5 present the base results. In line with expectations, larger
institutions invest more internally and less through external managers and fund-of-funds. Ac-
cording to column (1), a one unit increase in the logarithm of assets (i.e., doubling the fund
size) increases the allocation to internal managers by 29 percent. Smaller institutional investors
delegate the asset management responsibilities to external managers and fund-of-funds. A one
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-0.054
-0.069
[0.128]
[0.128]
[0.128]
[0.082]
[0.082]
[0.082]
[0.072]
[0.071]
[0.071]
Specialize
-0.105
0.311***
-0.428***
[0.116]
[0.079]
[0.066]
N
SI
0.086
-0.209***
0.273***
[0.070]
[0.045]
[0.035]
C
oncentration
-0.307
0.528***
-0.679***
[0.239]
[0.152]
[0.114]
C
anada
1.287***
1.287***
1.295***
-0.575***
-0.564***
-0.573***
-0.098
-0.113
-0.099
[0.144]
[0.144]
[0.144]
[0.089]
[0.089]
[0.090]
[0.073]
[0.071]
[0.073]
Europe
1.121***
1.120***
1.151***
-0.399***
-0.395***
-0.441***
-0.106*
-0.113**
-0.052
[0.163]
[0.163]
[0.161]
[0.092]
[0.090]
[0.088]
[0.058]
[0.056]
[0.057]
A
us/N
zd
0.909***
0.908***
0.952***
-0.147
-0.146
-0.199*
-0.174*
-0.176*
-0.109
[0.193]
[0.193]
[0.200]
[0.105]
[0.111]
[0.112]
[0.090]
[0.102]
[0.094]
Year
dum
m
ies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Funds
836
836
836
836
836
836
836
836
836
O
bservations
4,984
4,984
4,984
4,984
4,984
4,984
4,984
4,984
4,984
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unit increase in the log size decreases the percentage of alternative investments delegated to
external managers by 7.1 percent and the percentage of assets allocated to fund-of-funds de-
creases by 5.7 percent. Interestingly, the relative importance of alternative assets, measured as
the percentage invested in alternatives from total assets, is not a significant determinant of the
chosen investment approach.
In addition to investor size, another important determinant of the level of intermediation
in allocations to alternatives is the decision to specialize or diversify across multiple alterna-
tive asset classes. Institutional investors that specialize in one alternative asset class invest less
through fund-of-funds. Based on column (7), if an investor decides to specialize in one al-
ternative assets class (usually real assets), the percentage of assets managed by fund-of-funds
declines by 42.8 percent. The specializing investor usually hires external managers directly,
instead of delegating the hiring responsibility to fund-of-funds.
In columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 4.5, I replace the specialize dummy variable with the
number of simultaneous (NSI) investments in alternative assets. Institutions investing at the
same time in multiple alternative asset classes delegate the management of their investments
to fund-of-funds, instead of selecting directly external managers. As another robustness check,
I measure the concentration of fund alternative asset investments across the three groups. I
use the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index instead of the specialize dummy variable
in models (3), (6) and (9). Institutional investors that hold more diversified alternative portfo-
lios rely more on fund-of-funds, whereas those investors with highly concentrated alternative
investments select directly external managers instead of delegating this responsibility to fund-
of-funds.
Finally, I find differences in the level of intermediation across institutional investors based
on their region. Canadian, European and Australian / New Zealand institutions invest more
through internal managers and rely less on external managers and fund-of-funds as compared
to U.S. institutional investors.
Overall, larger funds manage internally their alternative investments and avoid delegating
the investment management to financial intermediaries. Controlling for fund size, the decision
to specialize in one alternative assets class results in lower allocation to fund-of-funds.
4.4 Investment costs
As a next step, I investigate the effect of mandate size, intermediation level and specialization
on investment costs in alternative assets. In Table 4.6, I estimate the cross-sectional differences
in institutional investor costs using panel regressions:
InvCostsi,t = θ0 + θ1Zi,t + θ2Regioni + θ3YDt + ei,t (4.7)
where Zi,t represents the independent variables. To estimate the effect of intermediation level
on investment costs, I include %External, the percentage allocation to external managers, and
%FoF, the percentage allocation to fund-of-funds. I examine the effect of size and specialization
on costs by controlling for LogAssets, the logarithm of institutional investor holdings in every
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alternative asset class, and Specialzie, a dummy variable that equals 1 if an institution invests
only in one alternative asset class and 0, if it invests in more than one alternative asset class.
YD are the year dummies, Regioni captures regional fixed effects, and ei,t is the idiosyncratic
error. I independently double cluster the robust standard errors in all regressions by investor
and by year.
Investing through financial intermediaries, such as external managers and fund-of-funds
significantly increases the investment costs in all three alternative asset classes. The effect is
particularly pronounced in private equity investments, where an institution that invests inter-
nally has 1.14 percentage points lower investment costs than an institution that delegates the
asset management to external managers. Similarly, institutional investor managing the private
equity investments through fund-of-funds has more than 4.00 percentage points higher invest-
ment costs than internal investor. In real assets and hedge funds, external managers have
around 0.50 percentage points higher investment costs than internal managers, while fund-of-
funds have roughly 1.60 percentage points higher investment costs.
When investing in alternative asset classes, institutional investors generally realize strong
scale advantages in their investment costs. In real assets, a one unit increase in the log of
assets (i.e., doubling the holdings size) reduces the investment costs by approximately 0.11
percentage points, even after controlling for the level of intermediation. The economies of scale
are stronger for private equity investments, where a one unit increase in the log of assets results
in around 0.70 percentage points lower costs, whereas for hedge funds & TAA investments
asset size does not provide scale advantages, once controlling for investment approach.
Previously I documented that in more than 80 percent of the specialization observations
are in real assets and that specializing investors prefer external managers to fund-of-funds. In
Table 4.6, I find that, the decision to specialize leads to lower investment costs in real assets,
when controlling for size and intermediation level. Institutional investors that specialize in
real assets negotiate around 20 basis points lower investment fees. In private equity and hedge
funds & TAA, there are no differences in the investment costs of specializing and diversifying
investors.
I find strong regional effects only in the real asset investment costs. Based on column (3), in
real assets, U.S. institutional investors pay 0.26 percentage points higher investment fees than
Canadian, 0.39 percentage points than European and 0.36 percentage points than Australian /
New Zealand institutional investors. Institutional investors from different regions pay similar
investment fees in private equity and hedge funds.
Overall, cost savings are an important advantage of internal investing in alternative assets.
This confirms the observation by Fang et al. (2013) that the compensation is significantly dif-
ferent from the “2-and-20” fee structure in internal (direct) private equity deals of institutional
investors. In case of private equity co-investments, which are also classified as internal invest-
ing, large institutions have a negotiation power and resent paying additional charges for these
deals originated by general partners. Similarly, Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2012) document
economies of scale in investment costs on an overall investor level. I find that the economies of
scale are especially economically significant in alternative assets.
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4. DELEGATED INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ASSETS
4.5 Performance in alternative assets
In the performance analysis, I focus on the effect of intermediation level and investor size on
returns in real assets, private equity and hedge funds. I also estimate whether investor size
and specialization are interrelated and can jointly influence the performance of institutional
investors in alternative assets.
4.5.1 Financial intermediation level and performance
In this section, I analyze how the level of intermediation influences the performance in al-
ternative assets. One possibility is that alternative investments require more knowledge and
monitoring skills, and the vast majority of institutional investors are not able to establish ef-
ficient internal asset management divisions. If the external managers and fund-of-funds have
an informational advantage compared to internal management departments of institutional in-
vestors, one would expect that the investments through financial intermediaries deliver higher
gross returns than internally managed alternative assets. Hence, the savings in costs achieved
through internal investing will not translate into better performance. Another possibility is
that financial intermediaries do not have an informational advantage and investing through
them is akin not only to higher costs, but also to agency conflicts, which may lead to lower net
returns than following an internal investment approach.
Table 4.7 presents the net benchmark-adjusted returns of institutional investors in alter-
native assets. To estimate the net benchmark-adjusted returns I deduct the investment costs
and the self-declared benchmark returns from the gross returns. In the CEM database, institu-
tional investors declare their benchmarks, which are usually market indexes (for example, the
NCREIF Index and the FTSE/NAREIT Index for U.S. real estate investments or the HFRI In-
dex for hedge fund investments), against which performance is measured. Benchmark returns
can also be a weighted combination of multiple indices. The realized returns and benchmark
returns are generally provided in the local currency, but if an investor hedges the currency risk,
than the hedged returns and benchmarks are provided. Appendix Table B.1 presents the most
frequent self-reported benchmarks in every alternative asset class.
The advantage of using self-declared benchmarks is that these benchmarks more precisely
reflect the geographical allocation and risk exposure of the alternative asset investments. For
example, if an institutional investor is exposed only to office buildings in the U.S., benchmark-
ing its returns against the NCREIF Office Index is more appropriate than using the broader
NCREIF Property Index or IPD Global Index. Similarly, if an institution invests internationally
and engages in any currency management, the benchmark returns are a weighted average of
indices in multiple countries and account for the implemented hedging policy.
Institutional investors on average obtain negative net benchmark-adjusted returns in all
three alternative asset classes. The underperformance is largest in hedge funds & TAA, where
investors obtain an annual net benchmark-adjusted return of -1.12 percentage points. In real
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assets funds underperform the benchmarks by 0.57 percentage points annually, whereas the
underperformance in private equity is roughly 0.12 percentage points.
Table 4.7 presents t-tests of differences in net benchmark-adjusted returns between the three
intermediation levels separately for every alternative asset class. I analyze the differences in net
benchmark-adjusted returns across all institutional investors, as well as by splitting the sample
by region and by the decision to specialize in one alternative asset class. Each set of three rows
consists of a row of means, a row of standard errors, and a third row with observation counts
and t-statistics. The t-statistic is for the test with the null hypothesis that the difference between
the net benchmark-adjusted returns across different investment approaches equals zero.
The real assets panel of Table 4.7 shows that in terms of net benchmark-adjusted returns,
internal investments outperform external managers and fund-of-funds by 2.13 and 6.44 per-
centage points and the difference is statistically significant with t-statistics of 5.53 and 6.34,
respectively. Investments through fund-of-funds are exposed to one more level of financial
intermediation than investments through external managers and underperform compared to
external managers by 4.31 percentage points (t-stat of 4.95). The return differences are stronger
for private equity investments, where internal managers outperform external managers by 3.76
and fund-of-funds by 8.81 percentage points. For hedge funds & TAA investments, I observe
the same pattern. Thus, based on the average net benchmark-adjusted returns, more levels
of intermediation result in lower returns: internal managers perform better than the external
managers, while fund-of-funds deliver the lowest returns in all three alternative asset class.
This pattern appears particularly strong among institutions that invest simultaneously in
multiple alternative assets. If an institutional investor diversifies across alternative assets in-
stead of specializing in one asset class, than the level of intermediation has a stronger effect
on performance. For diversifying investors, the difference between internal and external net
benchmark-adjusted returns in real assets is 2.60, between internal and fund-of-funds returns
is 7.01, and between external and fund-of-funds returns is 4.41 percentage points.
When examining the differences in returns by region, I observe similar effects of the inter-
mediation level on performance across all regions. Internal management delivers higher net
benchmark-adjusted returns than external managers and fund-of-funds consistently in all re-
gions and alternative asset classes, but the differences are not always significant, as the number
of observations in some cases is low. The number of return observations is lowest for hedge
funds & TAA investments, where the dataset has only 59 internal net benchmark-adjusted re-
turns.
Appendix Table B.2 shows that internally managed investments obtain higher returns not
only due to lower costs, but also from higher gross returns. In real assets, internal mandates
deliver 1.52 and 4.56 percentage points higher gross benchmark-adjusted returns than external
managers and fund-of-funds. On a gross basis, internal mandates also have better performance
in private equity and hedge funds & TAA, though the difference is not always significant.
Using univariate tests, I document that internal investments by institutional investors out-
perform investments delegated to external managers and fund-of-funds. Tables 4.8 and 4.9
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present regression versions of the t-test results in Table 4.7. In the panel regressions, the de-
pendent variable is the investor net benchmark-adjusted return (NTRi,t − BMi,t) in real assets,
private equity and hedge funds & TAA.
NTRi,t − BMi,t = λ0 + λ1Zi,t + λ2Regioni + λ3YDt + ξi,t (4.8)
The independent variables of primary interest are the percentage of assets invested through ex-
ternal managers and fund-of-funds. I cluster the standard errors independently on an investor
and year level to control for potentially correlated performance shocks within investors and
across (vintage) years. I also examine the effect of specialization on performance by including
an indicator for whether the institutional investor has allocation only to one alternative asset
class. I further augment the models with the log of institutional assets under management in
real assets, private equity or hedge funds & TAA to control for potential economies of scale in
performance. In all models, I include region and time fixed effects.
In Table 4.8, I observe similar patterns across all three alternative asset classes. Based on col-
umn (3), in real assets, investments managed by external managers and fund-of-funds under-
perform internally managed investments by 1.58 and 2.19 percentage points annually. In pri-
vate equity, I observe economically stronger effects of the intermediation level on performance:
institutional investments in private equity through external managers and fund-of-funds have
5.55 and 7.30 percentage points lower net benchmark-adjusted returns than internally managed
investments.
For hedge fund & TAA investments, the number of internal management observations
is low (59 non-zero observations). Hence, in columns (8) and (11), I estimate the effect of
%Internal and %External on performance relative to %FoF. I find that hedge funds & TAA
investments managed by external managers deliver around 3.20 percentage points higher net
benchmark-adjusted returns than investment managed by fund-of-funds. Internal hedge fund
& TAA asset management divisions also seem to perform better than fund–of-funds, but the
difference is not statistically significant due to the low number of internal observations.
Institutional investors realize significant economies of scale in alternative assets, even after
controlling for differences in intermediation level. I document that institutional investors with
more assets under management have better performance in real assets and private equity. For
hedge funds & TAA, the positive economies of scale are not significant once I control for the
effect of investment approach on performance. Based on column (6), a one unit increase in the
log of private equity assets (i.e. doubling the holdings size) results in 1.18 percentage points
higher returns.
Table 4.9 repeats the analysis in Table 4.8, substituting the pooled panel regressions with
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. Panel regression results might be influenced by years
with higher number of observations and Fama and MacBeth (1973) overcome this potential bias
by putting equal weight on every year. In Table 4.9, I present the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regression results for institutional investments in real assets and private equity. For hedge
fund & TAA, I cannot estimate these regressions as the number of cross-sectional observations
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is very low at the beginning of the sample period and continuously increasing afterwards (see
Figure 4.1 Panel A).
Table 4.9: Fama-MacBeth regressions: Net benchmark-adjusted returns
I estimate a Fama and MacBeth (1973) model and correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity us-
ing Newey-West with three lags. The dependent variables are the net benchmark-adjusted returns in
percentage points for real assets and private equity. The private equity net benchmark-adjusted re-
turns are winsorized at the 0.5% level. For hedge funds & TAA returns, I am not able to estimate the
Fama-MacBeth regressions because the number of institutions investing in hedge funds & TAA increases
continuously over time (see Figure 4.1 Panel A). %External, the percentage allocated to external man-
agers, and %FoF, the percentage allocated to fund-of-funds, capture the effect of these intermediation
levels on performance relative to internal asset management. As independent variables, I also include:
LogAssets, the logarithm of investor holdings in every alternative asset class, and Specialzie, a dummy
variable that equals 1 if an institution invests only in one alternative asset class and 0, if it invests in more
than one alternative asset class. Canada, Europe and Aus/Nzd are regional dummy variables (the base
result refers to U.S. investors). I report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance
levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real assets Real assets Real assets Private equity Private equity Private equity
Constant 1.320** -3.839*** -1.745 8.803*** -5.501** 0.241
[0.607] [0.307] [1.209] [3.199] [2.513] [3.976]
%External -2.264*** -1.745** -8.494*** -5.025**
[0.683] [0.857] [2.030] [2.172]
%FoF -3.327*** -2.839*** -10.745*** -6.458**
[0.807] [0.812] [3.031] [3.203]
LogAssets 0.579*** 0.496*** 1.097*** 0.993***
[0.137] [0.171] [0.344] [0.353]
Specialize 0.788*** 0.891*** 0.312 0.797
[0.262] [0.277] [1.919] [1.641]
Canada 0.326 1.399** 0.892 -3.444 0.560 -1.093
[0.599] [0.652] [0.644] [2.334] [1.744] [2.188]
Europe 1.620** 1.325* 0.875 3.392 4.339 3.742
[0.812] [0.679] [0.689] [4.173] [4.409] [4.114]
Aus/Nzd 0.151 0.094 0.173 -1.486 -0.686 -0.966
[0.517] [0.560] [0.650] [1.441] [1.021] [1.298]
Funds 715 715 715 522 522 522
Observations 3,881 3,881 3,881 2,759 2,759 2,759
In Table 4.9, I continue to observe that investments in alternative asset made through fi-
nancial intermediaries have lower performance and the effect is statistically stronger in some
specifications. Institutional investments managed by fund-of-funds underperform internally
managed investments by 2.84 percentage points in real assets and by 6.46 percentage points
in private equity. Investments through external managers have also significantly lower net
benchmark-adjusted returns than investments done by internal asset management divisions
in real assets and private equity. The relation between the mandate size and performance re-
mains positive and significant. Larger institutional investors are able to access better invest-
ment projects in alternative assets at lower investment costs.
I extend the analysis on the effect of investment approach on performance by controlling for
different definitions of the specializing variable and by estimating the effect of investor asset
management policy in other assets. In Table 4.10, in addition to the Specialize dummy variable,
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I control for the number of simultaneous investments in alternative assets and for the concen-
tration of alternative investments. To control for the asset management policy of institutional
investors in public equity and fixed income, I include the %IntEquity, %ActEquity and %ActFI
in the panel regressions. One possibility is that institutional investors which engage in active
management in public equity and fixed income have more active investing experience, which
will enable them to select better investments or managers in alternative asset classes. Alterna-
tively, these investors do not have a sufficient capacity to monitor active investments in public
and private markets at the same time, which will lead to suboptimal allocation decisions in al-
ternative assets. I do not find a consistent effect of the percentage allocation to active managers
in equity and fixed income on the performance of institutional investors in real assets, private
equity and hedge funds & TAA. The degree of international diversification of investor holdings
in public equity also does not have a consistent effect on the net benchmark-adjusted returns
across the three alternative assets.
Importantly, the delegated investment approach variables, capturing the percentage alloca-
tion to external managers and fund-of-funds, remain negative and significant in all models in
Table 4.10. For example, in private equity, external managers and fund-of-funds underperform
internally managed investments by 5.72 and 7.54 percentage points annually. The economies
of scale in alternative assets also remain significant in real assets and private equity. Doubling
the holdings size in real assets results in 0.49 percentage points higher net benchmark-adjusted
returns.
Based on the results in Table 4.10, the effect of specialization on performance varies across
alternative asset classes. Institutional investors that specialize in real assets perform better than
investors who simultaneously invest in multiple alternative asset classes. A specializing insti-
tutional investors obtains around 0.87 percentage points higher annual returns in real assets as
compared to investor who combines real asset holdings with other alternative assets. In private
equity and hedge funds & TAA, specialization has neutral to weakly negative effect on perfor-
mance. In the next section, I test whether the effect of specialization on performance differs
across smaller and larger institutional investors.
4.5.2 Specialization and performance
When analyzing the effect of specialization on performance, I focus primarily on institutional
allocation to real assets. The vast majority of the specializations are happening in real assets
(1,291 out of 1,649 specializing observations are in real assets), whereas few institutional in-
vestors specialize in private equity and hedge funds & TAA. In Table 4.11, I split the institu-
tional investors into tertiles (small, medium and large) based on the amount invested in real
assets. I estimate whether specialization has different effects on performance among small and
large institutional investors. The markets for alternative assets are generally less transparent
than public (equity and bond) markets, and institutional investors face higher fixed costs re-
lated to understanding, monitoring and learning about the investments. Hence, for smaller
118
4.5 Performance in alternative assets
Ta
bl
e
4.
10
:P
an
el
re
gr
es
si
on
s:
N
et
be
nc
hm
ar
k-
ad
ju
st
ed
re
tu
rn
s
w
it
h
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
I
es
ti
m
at
e
a
pa
ne
lm
od
el
an
d
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
th
e
ne
t
be
nc
hm
ar
k-
ad
ju
st
ed
re
tu
rn
s
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
po
in
ts
fo
r
ev
er
y
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
as
se
t
cl
as
s.
T
he
pr
iv
at
e
eq
ui
ty
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
w
in
so
ri
ze
d
at
th
e
0.
5%
le
ve
l.
%
E
xt
er
na
la
nd
%
Fo
F,
m
ea
su
re
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
al
lo
ca
te
d
to
ex
te
rn
al
m
an
ag
er
s
an
d
fu
nd
-o
f-
fu
nd
s
on
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
re
la
ti
ve
to
in
te
rn
al
as
se
t
m
an
ag
em
en
t.
Fo
r
he
dg
e
fu
nd
s
&
TA
A
re
tu
rn
s,
Ie
st
im
at
e
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
%
E
xt
er
na
la
nd
%
In
te
rn
al
on
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
as
se
ts
in
ve
st
ed
th
ro
ug
h
fu
nd
-o
f-
fu
nd
s.
To
es
ti
m
at
e
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
sp
ec
ia
liz
at
io
n
in
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
as
se
ts
on
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
,I
in
cl
ud
e
th
re
e
va
ri
ab
le
s:
S
pe
ci
al
zi
e,
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1
if
an
in
st
it
ut
io
n
in
ve
st
s
on
ly
in
on
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
as
se
tc
la
ss
an
d
0,
if
it
in
ve
st
s
in
m
or
e
th
an
on
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
as
se
t
cl
as
s;
N
S
I,
a
co
un
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
th
at
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
as
se
tc
la
ss
es
in
w
hi
ch
an
in
st
it
ut
io
n
in
ve
st
s;
an
d
C
on
ce
nt
ar
ti
on
,t
he
H
er
fin
da
hl
-H
ir
sc
hm
an
In
de
x
m
ea
su
re
of
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n.
In
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
Ia
ls
o
in
cl
ud
e:
Lo
gA
ss
et
s,
th
e
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
in
ve
st
or
ho
ld
in
gs
in
ev
er
y
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
as
se
tc
la
ss
;%
In
tE
qu
it
y,
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
al
lo
ca
te
d
to
in
te
rn
at
io
na
le
qu
it
y
as
se
ts
fr
om
to
ta
lp
ub
lic
eq
ui
ty
ho
ld
in
gs
;%
A
ct
E
qu
it
y
an
d
%
A
ct
F
I,
w
hi
ch
ca
pt
ur
e
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
pu
bl
ic
eq
ui
ty
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
m
an
ag
ed
ac
ti
ve
ly
an
d
th
e
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
fix
ed
in
co
m
e
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
m
an
ag
ed
ac
ti
ve
ly
.
I
in
cl
ud
e
re
gi
on
al
an
d
ti
m
e
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
in
de
pe
nd
en
tl
y
do
ub
le
cl
us
te
r
th
e
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
by
in
ve
st
or
an
d
by
ye
ar
.
I
re
po
rt
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
*,
**
,a
nd
**
*
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
le
ve
ls
of
0.
10
,0
.0
5,
an
d
0.
01
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
R
ea
la
ss
et
s
R
ea
la
ss
et
s
R
ea
la
ss
et
s
Pr
iv
at
e
eq
ui
ty
Pr
iv
at
e
eq
ui
ty
Pr
iv
at
e
eq
ui
ty
H
F
&
TA
A
H
F
&
TA
A
H
F
&
TA
A
%
Ex
te
rn
al
-1
.6
13
**
-1
.6
33
**
-1
.5
96
**
-5
.7
22
*
-5
.6
29
*
-5
.7
05
*
3.
20
3*
*
3.
25
7*
*
3.
28
3*
*
[0
.7
50
]
[0
.7
67
]
[0
.7
59
]
[3
.3
55
]
[3
.3
40
]
[3
.3
42
]
[1
.5
09
]
[1
.5
13
]
[1
.5
21
]
%
Fo
F
-1
.9
09
*
-1
.9
40
*
-1
.8
70
*
-7
.5
35
**
-7
.4
10
**
-7
.5
51
**
[1
.1
03
]
[1
.0
96
]
[1
.0
81
]
[3
.2
57
]
[3
.2
50
]
[3
.2
63
]
%
In
te
rn
al
2.
85
2
2.
90
2
2.
87
4
[3
.8
03
]
[3
.8
19
]
[3
.8
22
]
Lo
gA
ss
et
s
0.
48
8*
**
0.
49
3*
**
0.
49
0*
**
1.
19
4*
**
1.
14
2*
**
1.
06
8*
**
0.
33
6
0.
32
1
0.
32
5
[0
.1
68
]
[0
.1
57
]
[0
.1
55
]
[0
.3
77
]
[0
.3
78
]
[0
.3
67
]
[0
.2
62
]
[0
.2
73
]
[0
.2
60
]
Sp
ec
ia
liz
e
0.
87
2*
*
-0
.1
50
-2
.6
12
**
[0
.4
00
]
[0
.9
37
]
[1
.2
72
]
N
SI
-0
.5
65
*
1.
01
3
0.
71
8
[0
.3
26
]
[0
.6
54
]
[0
.5
40
]
C
on
ce
nt
ra
ti
on
1.
54
9*
-2
.9
93
-2
.5
35
[0
.9
13
]
[2
.5
82
]
[1
.5
63
]
%
In
tE
qu
it
y
2.
22
3*
*
2.
29
6*
*
2.
31
2*
*
-3
.2
69
-3
.5
53
*
-3
.4
29
0.
40
6
0.
18
4
0.
14
1
[1
.0
74
]
[1
.0
96
]
[1
.1
13
]
[2
.1
03
]
[2
.0
65
]
[2
.1
11
]
[1
.6
09
]
[1
.6
03
]
[1
.5
96
]
%
A
ct
Eq
ui
ty
1.
30
3*
1.
34
5*
1.
29
9*
-1
.8
91
-2
.0
59
-2
.0
45
1.
01
2
1.
28
8
1.
27
3
[0
.6
98
]
[0
.7
04
]
[0
.7
03
]
[3
.4
26
]
[3
.4
00
]
[3
.3
62
]
[1
.2
83
]
[1
.2
94
]
[1
.2
69
]
%
A
ct
FI
-0
.4
06
-0
.4
28
-0
.3
99
-2
.5
25
-2
.4
32
-2
.5
13
-0
.9
33
-1
.0
27
-1
.1
33
[0
.7
40
]
[0
.7
38
]
[0
.7
46
]
[2
.4
20
]
[2
.3
98
]
[2
.3
98
]
[0
.7
48
]
[0
.7
60
]
[0
.8
03
]
Ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
R
eg
io
n
du
m
m
ie
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Fu
nd
s
71
4
71
4
71
4
51
9
51
9
51
9
36
7
36
7
36
7
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
3,
87
5
3,
87
5
3,
87
5
2,
75
4
2,
75
4
2,
75
4
1,
37
4
1,
37
4
1,
37
4
R
2
0.
07
9
0.
07
9
0.
07
8
0.
23
2
0.
23
2
0.
23
2
0.
19
6
0.
19
4
0.
19
4
119
4. DELEGATED INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ASSETS
investors it may be beneficial to specialize in one alternative assets class, rather than diversify-
ing across multiple alternative assets. However, for larger institutional investors, specialization
can lead to lower performance due to liquidity related diseconomies of scale, because all alter-
native asset classes can be classified as illiquid investments.
In the panel regressions, I include interaction terms between the size tertiles and the spe-
cialize dummy variable to test whether the specializing decision has a non-uniform effect on
performance in alternative assets. In addition to size and specialization, I also control for inter-
mediation level, asset management policy in equity and fixed income, regional and time fixed
effects.
Based on column (1), small investors have 1.37 percentage points lower net benchmark-
adjusted returns. However, smaller institutional investors that specialize in real assets manage
to overcome the scale disadvantages in performance. The interaction term Small ∗ Specialize
shows that specializing small investors outperform diversified small investors by 1.79 percent-
age points. In the second part of Table 4.11, I examine whether small specializing investors
underperform compared to large investors, by testing whether Small + Small ∗ Specialize = 0.
In all columns, the two coefficients together are not significantly different from zero, which
shows that small investors can significantly offset the economies of scale in alternative assets
by focusing only on one alternative asset class.
The tertile dummy variables confirm the previously documented economies of scale in the
returns of institutional investors in alternative assets. Large institutional investors obtain sig-
nificantly higher net benchmark-adjusted returns than small and medium investors. However,
large specializing institutional investors do not enjoy economies of scale in alternative assets.
The interaction term Large ∗ Specialize is negative and significant, while the joint test of Large
+ Large ∗ Specialize = 0 is not different from zero. When large institutional investors specialize
in one alternative asset class, they underperform other investors with similar amount of in-
vestments, but exposed to multiple alternative asset classes, by around 1.40 percentage points
annually.
Overall, the majority of the specializing investments are done in real assets and their effect
on performance is non-uniform. Taken together, my results suggest that in the small tertile,
specialization results in higher returns, while in the large tertile specializing investors under-
perform. In private equity and hedge funds & TAA, I observe similar non-uniform trend as in
real assets, but the effect of specialization on performance is not significant, possibly due to the
low number of specializing observation.
In sum, institutional investments in alternative asset managed by external managers and
fund-of-funds have worse performance than their internally managed investments, by roughly
2-6 percentage points of net benchmark-adjusted returns per year, and these differences cannot
be explained solely by the lower investment costs. I observe that investments through finan-
cial intermediaries perform significantly worse in all three alternative asset classes. In addition
to the level of intermediation, holdings size provides significant positive economies of scale
in alternative assets. Larger institutional investors manage to select and retain better internal
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4.5 Performance in alternative assets
Table 4.11: Panel regressions: Specialization and performance across size tertiles
I split the institutional investors into tertiles (small, medium and large) based on the amount invested in real assets. I estimate
a panel model and the dependent variable is the net benchmark-adjusted returns in real assets. In the regressions, I include
Small and Large dummy variables to control for the effect of mandate size on returns. Specialzie is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if an institution invests only in one alternative asset class and 0, if it invests in more than one alternative asset class.
Small ∗ Specialize and Large ∗ Specialzie are two interaction terms, capturing the difference in specialization effect on performance
between small and large investors. %External, the percentage allocated to external managers, and %FoF, the percentage allocated
to fund-of-funds, measure the effect of these investment approaches on performance relative to internal asset management. In
column (6), I also include: %IntEquity, the percentage allocated to international equity assets from total public equity holdings;
%ActEquity and %ActFI, the percentage of public equity investments managed actively and the percentage of fixed income
investments managed actively. Canada, Europe and Aus/Nzd are regional dummy variables (the base result refers to U.S.
investors). I report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. In the
second part of the table, I test whether specialization in one alternative asset class can mitigate the scale economies in alternative
assets. P-values of the tests are presented in the parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Net benchmark-adjusted returns in real assets
Specialize -0.364 -0.108 0.751* 0.814** 0.119 0.194
[0.357] [0.328] [0.392] [0.382] [0.391] [0.414]
Small -1.371* -0.901 -0.384 -0.836 -0.840
[0.702] [0.702] [0.581] [0.712] [0.709]
Large 0.960*** 1.408*** 1.264*** 1.069*** 1.076***
[0.351] [0.441] [0.369] [0.409] [0.401]
Small * Specialize 1.791*** 1.508** 1.280* 1.307*
[0.628] [0.644] [0.737] [0.733]
Large * Specialize -1.369** -1.431*** -0.738 -0.600
[0.538] [0.542] [0.648] [0.671]
%External -2.017*** -1.862** -1.918*** -1.842** -1.866** -1.916**
[0.780] [0.779] [0.728] [0.786] [0.779] [0.754]
%FoF -2.632** -2.238** -2.591** -2.503** -2.282** -2.014*
[1.139] [1.134] [1.110] [1.157] [1.135] [1.085]
%IntEquity 2.406**
[1.004]
%ActEquity 0.957
[0.718]
%ActFI -0.384
[0.743]
Canada 0.025 0.164 0.157 0.236 0.158 -0.437
[0.585] [0.602] [0.586] [0.611] [0.601] [0.639]
Europe 1.001 0.817 0.820 0.851 0.829 0.147
[0.921] [0.914] [0.926] [0.915] [0.918] [0.915]
Aus/Nzd -0.376 -0.533 -0.441 -0.469 -0.523 -1.045
[1.046] [1.005] [1.002] [1.004] [1.012] [0.949]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Funds 715 715 715 715 715 714
Observations 3,881 3,881 3,881 3,881 3,881 3,875
R2 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.076
The effect of specialization on performance: Joint tests
Small + Small * Specialize = 0 0.420 0.607 0.444 0.467
(0.497) (0.308) (0.485) (0.458)
Large + Large * Specialize = 0 0.039 -0.167 0.331 0.476
(0.943) (0.724) (0.501) (0.367)
Large – Small = 0 1.861** 1.648** 1.905** 1.916***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010)
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and external managers, which results in better performance. However, among real asset in-
vestments, where the vast majority of the institutional specializations are happening, there is
a significant non-uniform effect of specialization on performance. While specialization is an
advantage for smaller investor in alternative assets, for larger investors it is a limitation and
results in lower net benchmark-adjusted returns.
I acknowledge that precise measures of risk for the alternative investments are not avail-
able and therefore that differences in returns may in theory be attributed to differences in risk
profiles of investments managed internally, externally or by fund-of-funds. However, there
is little reason to believe that riskier projects will be managed internally and not by financial
intermediaries focused on one asset class and potentially higher expertise.
4.6 The contribution of alternative assets to investor performance
I now examine the contribution of alternative investments for the overall performance of insti-
tutional investors. Even though external managers and fund-of-funds underperform internal
managers, it could be that they deliver higher net returns than public equity. In this case,
the decision of institutional investors to rely on delegated investment management in alterna-
tive assets benefits their overall performance despite the underperformance on an asset class
level. I compare the net returns of institutional investors in alternative assets with the poten-
tial returns they could have achieved, if they invested all their alternative holdings passively
in public equity. In the CEM database, investors report their self-designated benchmarks and
asset allocation weights for all public equity asset classes. Hence, the potential passive perfor-
mance in equity is estimated separately for each institutional investor, as a weighted average
of benchmark returns across all equity asset classes. This scenario takes into account the actual
investor allocation in public equity and assumes that investors can spread their holdings in
alternative assets across passive mandates in these equity asset classes.
In Table 4.12, I conduct the analysis separately for large, medium and small institutional
investors, because mandate size is an important determinant of performance in alternative
assets. I split the institutional investors into tertiles (small, medium and large) separately for
every alternative asset class, based on the amount of assets invested in that alternative asset
class. Investors in the small tertile invest around 24-63 million US$ in alternative assets, while
large investors manage more than 2 billion US$ in every alternative asset class.
Using the self-reported benchmark returns and asset allocation in public equity, I observe
that private equity is the only alternative asset class that delivered higher returns than passive
investing in public equity. Institutional investors significantly underperform their passive eq-
uity benchmarks by investing in real assets and hedge funds & TAA. Nevertheless, one can
argue that this estimation is based on historical data and the comparison between asset classes
is not capturing the expected returns.
However, across all three alternative asset classes there is strong underperformance pattern
among small institutional investors. Even in private equity, which delivered higher average
net returns, small investors significantly underperform their passive equity benchmarks by
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4.7 Conclusion
Table 4.12: Scenario: Passive investments in public equity instead of alternative assets
I split the institutional investors into tertiles (small, medium and large) separately for every alternative
asset class, based on the amount of assets invested in that alternative asset class. All investors column
presents the estimates for the three size tertiles together. Assets row presents the average assets invested
in million US$. The scenario analysis compares the net returns in alternative assets (NRAlter) with the
potential passive returns in public equity (BMREquity). The potential passive performance in public
equity is estimated separately for each institutional investor as a weighted average of benchmark returns
across all public equity asset classes. In the estimation, I use the self-reported benchmarks and allocation
weights for every public equity asset class in the CEM data, which differ significantly across investors.
Panels A, B and C present the differences in returns between alternative assets and public equity for real
assets, private equity and hedge funds & TAA, respectively.
Small Medium Large All investors
Panel A: Real assets
Assets in million $US 31 176 2,417
NRAlter − BMREquity -3.044*** -2.316*** -2.028*** -2.464***
Panel B: Private equity
Assets in million $US 24 164 2,201
NRAlter − BMREquity -2.786*** 3.733** 3.797*** 1.558**
Panel C: Hedge funds and TAA
Assets in million $US 63 273 2,031
NRAlter − BMREquity -2.321*** -1.897*** -0.938 -1.726***
2.79 percentage points annually. Small institutional investors underperform their self-reported
equity benchmarks in real assets and hedge funds & TAA by similar amount. I observe that
small investors would have obtained at least 2 percentage points higher annual returns, if they
invested passively in public equity rather than alternative assets.
The scenario analysis suggests that, when investing in alternative assets, investor size is an
important determinant of performance. Smaller investors should reconsider their allocation to
alternative asset classes, since these results suggests that they cannot get access to the same in-
vestment projects as larger investors. The amount of asset under management limits the ability
of small institutional investors to select and retain good managers or investment projects.
4.7 Conclusion
I examine the allocations and performance of institutional investors in alternative assets. In
private equity, real assets and hedge funds, institutional investors usually do not act as the
ultimate portfolio manager, but rather delegate the asset management decisions to financial
intermediaries. When investing through financial intermediaries, institutional investors trade-
off higher expected returns from these intermediaries against the increased exposure to agency
conflicts arising from greater coordination problems and uncertainty about their skills and in-
centives. Institutional investors can also bypass the financial intermediaries, by investing in-
ternally and select directly alternative investments.
123
4. DELEGATED INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ASSETS
Over time, the average allocation to internal mandates has declined at the expense of ex-
ternal managers and fund-of-funds, even though institutional investors that establish internal
asset management divisions in alternative assets tend to perform better than their counter-
parts, which rely on financial intermediaries. The underperformance of financial intermedi-
aries in real assets, private equity and hedge funds is consistent with the Stoughton et al. (2011)
theoretical model of financial intermediation. I document that multiple levels of delegated
asset management result in lower performance in all three alternative asset classes. This re-
sult confirms the implication of the Stoughton et al. (2011) financial intermediation model that
underperforming assets are more likely to be sold indirectly, through external managers and
fund-of-funds, in private markets which allow kickback payments to consultants and place-
ment agents.
Fund size is an important determinant of intermediation level and performance. Larger
institutional investors are more likely to invest internally in alternative assets, which reduces
their investment costs and improves significantly their performance. In addition to establishing
efficient internal mandates, the large amount of asset under management provides negotiation
power to these large institutional investors, which enables them to select and retain better ex-
ternal managers at lower investment costs. Smaller institutional investors can offset the scale
disadvantage by specializing in one alternative asset class. Small specializing investors rely
less on fund-of-funds and perform significantly better than small institutional investors that
invest simultaneously in real assets, private equity and hedge funds. However, the majority of
the small investors do not specialize, and I document that they would have obtained at least 2
percentage points higher annual net returns, if they invested passively in public equity rather
than alternative assets.
Overall, the levels of intermediation serving as interface between investors and assets lead
to systematic differences across institutional returns in alternative assets. Even though dele-
gated asset managers underperform the internal investments net of fees, this is an equilibrium
for institutional investors that delegate portfolio management to intermediaries based on trust.
According to the Gennaioli et al. (2013) asset management model, investors will retain under-
performing external managers, as an institutional investor who trusts a particular manager
perceives returns on risky investments delivered by this manager as less uncertain than those
delivered by a less trusted manager. These institutional investors will also continue investing
through funds-of-funds, because this intermediation level enables institutions investing based
on trust to reduce the responsibility and anxiety about external managers selection.
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Table B.1: Examples of self-reported benchmarks in the CEM data
This table presents the most frequent return benchmarks for every alternative asset class. For real assets,
I present the benchmarks separately for direct real estate, REITs, infrastructure, natural resources and
commodities. In private equity, investors report benchmarks separately for venture capital, leveraged
buyout and diversified private equity, which includes VC, LBO, turnarounds, start-ups, mezzanine, and
distressed financing.
Benchmark description
Real assets
- Direct real estate NCREIF (national, regional and property types); Wilshire RE Securities
IPD Global; RCPI; ICREIM/IPD; GPR 250; EPRA Global; Carnegie Real estate
Custom (XX% NCREIF + XX% REIT); CPI + X%; Government bonds + X%
- REITs FTSE EPRA/NAREIT; Wilshire REIT; MSCI US REIT; S&P/TSX REIT
GPR250 Europe; FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed RE
- Infrastructure CPI + X%; Eurozone inflation + X%; Australian CPI + X%; Euribor + X%
S&P Global Infrastructure Index; Dow Jones Infrastructure Index; BNP Clean Energy
Target IRR or Absolute return of X%; 5year Barclays Bellwether swap + X%
50% DEX Real Bonds + 50% MSCI World; ASX300+X%; GSCI and S&P Materials
Cambridge Associates Private Equity Index; NCREIF; ICREIM/IPD; Energy LPs
- Natural resources NCREIF Timberland; NZSU Timber; S&P Global Timber and Forestry Index
Energy Index; TSX Oil&Gas; S&P GSCI; 50% S&P GSCI + 50% NCREIF Timber
Barclays US Aggregate; Barclays US TIPS; Handelsbanken Index-linked + X%
NCREIF ODCE; 10 year Euro government bonds + X%; Russell 2000 + X%
LIBOR + X%; Local CPI + X% + country risk premium; X% Hurdle; T-Bills + X%
- Commodities S&P GSCI Index; Dow Jones UBS Index; Schroder / Wellington Commodities
XAU Gold and Silver Mining Index; S&P GSCI light energy
Forward Oil Contract; GSCI Petroleum; GSCI excluding Gas / Oil
RPI + X%; 3 months Euribor + X%; CPI Qtr lag + X%
Custom (XX% Equity index + XX% Commodity Index)
Private equity
- Venture capital Cambridge VC; Thomson Venture Economic Index
Equity index (Wilshire5000, MSCI Europe Small Cap) 1 Quarter Lag + X%
- Leveraged buyout Equity indexes (S%P500 / Wilshire5000 / S&P/ASX / MSCI Europe + X%)
Absolute return X%; Cambridge PE; Equity index 1 Quarter Lag + X%
- Diversified Equity indexes (Russel2000 / Wilshire5000 / S&P/TSX / MSCI World + X%)
S&P500 / Wilshire 5000 moving 3 year average
Cambridge PE; Thomson Venture Economic Index
Absolute return X%; LIBOR + X%
Hedge funds & TAA
- Hedge funds HFRI/HFRX Indexes (all indexes and sub strategies); Credit Suisse Indexes
CPI + X%; Libor + X%; T-Bill + X%; Bank of Canada Overnight Rate + X%
Equity indexes (S&P500, TSE300, FTSE); Custom (S&P500 + X%)
Absolute return X%; 50% Absolute return X% + 50% S&P500
- TAA Custom (XX% equity index + XX% fixed income benchmark)
MSCI World (hedged or unhedged)
CPI + X%; Libor + X%; Euribor + X%; T-Bill + X%
Hedge fund indices (HFRI, HFRX and Credit Suisse Indexes)
Absolute return X%
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Table B.2: Gross benchmark-adjusted return differences
This table presents the gross benchmark-adjusted returns in alternative assets, which I estimate by sub-
tracting the benchmark returns from the gross returns. Columns Int, Ext and FoF show the mean gross
benchmark-adjusted returns separately for every intermediation level. The second row presents the
standard errors in brackets and the third row counts the observations. Columns Int vs Ext, Int vs FoF
and Ext vs FoF present the t-tests of differences in gross benchmark-adjusted returns. Each set of the
three rows in the t-test columns consists of row of mean differences, a row of standard deviations in
brackets, and a third row with t-statistics. The t-statistics are for the test with null hypothesis that the
difference between the returns of different levels of intermediation equals zero. *, **, and *** indicate
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Gross benchmark-adjusted returns
Int Ext FoF Int vs Ext Int vs FoF Ext vs FoF
Real assets 1.571 0.060 -2.994 1.511*** 4.565*** 3.054***
[0.363] [0.168] [1.178] [0.381] [1.012] [0.858]
841 3,360 139 t=3.967 t=4.511 t=3.560
Private equity 4.312 2.502 1.671 1.810 2.641 0.831
[2.133] [0.597] [0.913] [1.674] [1.980] [1.124]
389 2,172 813 t=1.081 t=1.334 t=0.739
Hedge funds & TAA 2.294 0.954 -1.110 1.340 3.403* 2.063***
[4.529] [0.370] [0.449] [1.887] [2.011] [0.592]
59 1,039 618 t=0.710 t=1.692 t=3.486
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Table B.3: Panel regressions: Private equity net benchmark-adjusted return (related to Table 4.8)
I estimate a panel model and the dependent variable is the private equity net benchmark-adjusted return
in percentage points. As compared to Table 4.8, the private equity net benchmark-adjusted returns are
not winsorized. %External, the percentage allocated to external managers, and %FoF, the percentage
allocated to fund-of-funds, capture the effect of these intermediation levels on performance relative
to internal asset management. As independent variables, I also include: LogAssets, the logarithm of
investor holdings in every alternative asset class, and Specialzie, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
the institution invests only in one alternative asset class and 0, if it invests in more than one alternative
asset class. Canada, Europe and Aus/Nzd are regional dummy variables (the base result refers to U.S.
investors). I include year dummies and independently double cluster the robust standard errors by
investor and by year. I report standard errors in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Private equity Private equity Private equity
%External -9.209* -7.660
[4.828] [4.829]
%FoF -12.737*** -9.819**
[4.838] [4.717]
LogAssets 1.401*** 1.190***
[0.399] [0.382]
Specialize -0.355 0.054
[1.130] [1.055]
Canada -5.551 -0.935 -3.267
[3.528] [2.895] [3.323]
Europe 3.247 4.442 3.846
[3.652] [4.100] [3.776]
Aus/Nzd -3.252 -1.215 -2.601
[2.262] [2.159] [2.133]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Funds 522 522 522
Observations 2,759 2,759 2,759
R2 0.187 0.188 0.192
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Chapter 5
Value Added From Investment
Managers in Private Markets? Evidence
from Pension Fund Investments in Real
Estate*
5.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, institutional investors have significantly increased their exposure to alter-
native assets. For instance, pension funds increased their exposure to real estate, private equity,
hedge funds, infrastructure and commodities from 9 percent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2010 (An-
donov, Bauer, and Cremers, 2012), while university endowment funds increased the allocation
to alternative assets from 7 percent in 1989 to 19 percent in 2005 (Brown, Garlappi, and Tiu,
2010). The markets for these private assets are generally less transparent than public markets,
and institutional investors face significant fixed costs related to understanding, monitoring and
learning about the investments.
To achieve superior returns in private markets, gathering information about specific assets
and capitalizing on the acquired informational advantage requires a high level of specializa-
tion. This induces the majority of institutional investors to pick multiple external asset man-
agers who are specialized in a single asset class and to delegate portfolio decisions to these
specialists. However, according to Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2008) delegated investment
management can cause several misalignments of objectives between the institutional investors
and their external managers, such as loss of diversification, unobservable managerial appetite
for risk, and different investment horizons. Institutional investors can significantly offset these
agency conflicts by employing good specialized asset managers to work in their internal in-
vestment divisions, but they face high search costs. In this paper, we investigate whether pen-
sion funds have rationally moved toward delegated portfolio management in private markets,
given the greater coordination problem and higher fees that delegation brings. Alternatively, it
*This chapter is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University) and Nils Kok (Maastricht University).
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is possible that the increased prevalence of delegated asset management is simply due to pen-
sion funds shifting responsibility for potentially poor performance to external managers and
fund-of-funds (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992).
Within the delegated asset management, investors can directly select external managers
or invest through fund-of-funds. We empirically test the implications of Stoughton, Wu, and
Zechner (2011) financial intermediation model, which predicts that the variety of intermedi-
ation channels by which an asset is sold is related to its performance. We compare the per-
formance of investments managed by fund-of-fund with investments through internal and ex-
ternal managers, testing whether underperforming assets can only be sold indirectly, through
multiple intermediaries, like fund-of-funds. Overall, we extend the delegated portfolio man-
agement literature by providing implications for the approach of institutional investors to-
wards investing in private assets.
This paper examines the allocation and performance of pension funds in real estate invest-
ments, which is the most significant alternative asset class for institutional investors.2 The pa-
per adds to the recent literature on the performance of private equity mandates, another asset
class characterized by illiquidity and a seemingly inefficient market, but accounting for a lower
share of pension fund wealth. For example, Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) analyze
whether there are systematic differences in private equity returns and investment strategies
across several different classes of institutional investors (limited partners), e.g. banks, corpo-
rate and public pension funds, endowments, advisors, and insurance companies. Hochberg
and Rauh (2013) extend the analysis of heterogeneity in the performance of private equity in-
vestments by institutional investors, documenting that especially public pension funds exhibit
substantial home-state bias and underperform with their local investments.3
We contribute to the literature on financial intermediation and investment performance in
illiquid alternative assets by providing new insights into the investment behavior, fee struc-
ture and performance of pension funds in their allocations to real estate. Real estate offers
unique possibilities to explore the role of intermediated investment management. First, real
estate is the alternative asset class with most heterogeneity in the implemented investment ap-
proach. On the one hand, internal management, i.e. direct selection of properties of REITs
(without intermediaries), accounts for a significant part of pension fund assets. On the other
hand, in addition to delegating investments to external managers, pension funds increasingly
use fund-of-funds, which yields an additional layer of intermediation. Internal management
is also possible in private equity, but this approach is significantly less common,4 whereas
for investments in hedge funds, internal management is almost impossible and the choice of
2For example, all properties in the most widely used U.S. private real estate index, the NCREIF Property Index
(representing more than $315 billion in 2012), have been acquired, at least in part, on behalf of tax-exempt institu-
tional investors – the great majority of which are pension funds. Outside of the U.S., pension funds constitute more
than 60 percent of the investors in the IPD U.K. property database (Bond and Mitchell, 2010), the main U.K. private
real estate index.
3See also Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) for analysis of private equity fund
performance.
4According to the CEM database, on average, only 11 percent of the private equity investments are managed
internally, while in real estate internal investment approach accounts for 19 percent of the assets (http://www.
cembenchmarking.com/Default.aspx).
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investment approach is limited to external managers or fund-of-funds. Second, only in real es-
tate investors have the option to substitute an illiquid product (direct real estate) with a liquid
product (REITs) that generally has comparable long term performance.5
We use the CEM dataset, the broadest global database on pension fund investments. This
unique database contains data for almost 900 defined benefit pension funds across the world
over the 1990-2009 period. The assets under management of these funds exceeded $4.7 trillion
in 2009.6 The CEM database provides extensive coverage of both direct real estate investments
and REIT holdings. For instance, the aggregate pension fund holdings of private commer-
cial real estate in the database add up to more than $240 billion in 2009, which represents 30
percent of the aggregate market value of the IPD Global Property Index (and equals the total
market value of the U.S. NCREIF Property Index). REIT holdings of pension funds covered by
CEM in 2009 equal some $74 billion, which corresponds to more than 11 percent of the FTSE
EPRA/NAREIT Global Index in 2009.
Our results show that about 75 percent of the pension funds in the CEM database invest
in real estate, allocating on average 5.36 percent of pension fund assets (average allocations to
private equity and hedge funds are 4.00 and 3.23 percent, respectively). Once pension funds
decide to invest in real estate, they have to make two choices. First, pension funds have to
decide on the real estate investment approach. Funds typically employ three investment ap-
proaches: internal management, external management and investing through fund-of-funds.
We document that just 19 percent of real estate investments are managed internally by pen-
sion funds. Larger pension funds are more likely to invest internally, whereas smaller funds
are more likely to rely on intermediaries, investing externally or through fund-of-funds. How-
ever, even among the largest quintile of pension funds, with on average $33 billion in assets
under management, only 42 percent of the funds manage direct real estate or REIT portfolios
internally. Importantly, pension funds with greater allocation to other alternative asset classes,
like private equity and hedge funds, are more likely to invest in real estate through financial
intermediaries, suggesting that internal management can be viewed as a more specializing ap-
proach.
Second, funds select the investment subcategory: direct real estate investments or invest-
ments in REITs. Although listed REITs provide liquid and scalable property exposure, which
should make these vehicles attractive to smaller investors, we document that larger funds are
in fact more likely to invest in REITs. Allocations to REITs are mostly implemented as comple-
mentary investments to the direct real estate holdings of larger pension funds.
The choice of investment subcategory and approach has significant effects on the costs and
performance of pension fund investments in real estate. On average, pension funds pay fees
of 76 basis points for investments in real estate, which are higher for direct real estate (83 basis
points) and lower for REITs (41 basis points). Even though our cost figures do not include
5Pagliari, Scherer, and Monopoli (2005) document that the return characteristics of direct real estate and listed
real estate investment trusts (REITs) are not different after controlling for leverage, property mix and appraisal
smoothing.
6CEM collects data from pension funds investing in multiple asset classes and the data have been used pre-
viously by French (2008) to study the cost of active investing, and by Andonov et al. (2012) to examine the asset
allocation, market timing and security selection skills of pension funds.
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the performance fees (which are subtracted directly from returns in the CEM database), real
estate investment fees are substantially lower than fees for investments in private equity and
hedge funds. Phalippou (2009) and Metrick and Yasuda (2010) estimate that the average private
equity buyout fund charges fees of more than 7 percent per year (the annual management fee
alone is 2 percent of capital commitments). For hedge funds, French (2008) documents that the
average annual fee is 4.26 percent of assets (the management fee alone is 1.16 percent) over the
1996-2007 period, and for funds-of-hedge-funds, the average fees are even higher.
We find strong economies of scale in the costs of real estate investments: doubling the size
of a real estate mandate reduces the annual costs by 32 basis points. Importantly, we document
that larger pension funds are not only able to organize internal mandates more efficiently, but
also negotiate lower fees with external investment managers. Financial intermediation, like ex-
ternal management and fund-of-funds, considerably increases the overall investment costs. A
fund that invests internally has 21 basis points lower investment costs than a fund that invests
through external managers. Investing through fund-of-funds increases the costs by 122 basis
points.
On a net benchmark-adjusted basis, we find that pension funds generally meet the thresh-
olds of their benchmarks. There is substantial heterogeneity in the investment returns of pen-
sion fund allocations to real estate. We document that larger funds obtain higher net benchmark-
adjusted returns: doubling the size of real estate holdings increases returns by 32 to 43 basis
points. We observe these economies of scale both among REIT investments and direct real es-
tate investments. In addition, larger funds have a better performance in their internal as well
as external mandates. These results suggest that larger pension funds not only invest more
efficiently internally, but can also select and retain better external managers.
The investment approach has an even stronger effect on performance. When controlling
for size and costs, pension funds investing through internal asset management divisions ob-
tain 102 basis points higher net benchmark-adjusted returns than funds that delegate the asset
management to external managers. Moreover, investing through fund-of-funds results in a 202
basis points lower return. Overall, financial intermediation through externally delegated asset
management in real estate investments results in significant underperformance.
Our results on the effect of investment approach on performance in alternative assets are
in line with the theoretical model of financial intermediation by Stoughton et al. (2011), where
only high net-worth institutions invest directly and achieve superior returns, while underper-
forming assets are only sold indirectly, through external managers and fund-of-funds. The
findings in this paper also complement the empirical evidence on the agency conflicts and in-
ferior investment performance resulting from intermediation among equity mutual funds (see,
for example, Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano, 2009; Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik, 2013).
The economies of scale in pension fund performance in real estate are contrasting the dis-
economies of scale that have been documented for equity mutual funds (Chen, Hong, Huang,
and Kubik, 2004), but are in line with the evidence on private equity funds and hedge funds.
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) document a concave relation between fund size and performance
of private equity funds, whereas Agarwal, Nanda, and Ray (2013) find that larger institutions
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invest more directly instead of using funds of hedge funds, and outperform the smaller insti-
tutions.
Our findings have some general implications for the investment management industry. In
line with Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Goyal and Wahal (2008) we conclude that pension funds
should avoid extended intermediation chains, like fund-of-funds, and could benefit from con-
sidering the full range of investment approaches. Especially larger investors should evaluate
the possibility of investing internally. The findings also show that portfolio size provides ne-
gotiating power with respect to cost and access to better investment opportunities. Smaller
pension funds should therefore reconsider their approach to real estate investments, substi-
tuting direct holdings with REITs and specializing in one alternative asset class, instead of
simultaneously investing in multiple alternative assets.
5.2 How institutional investors invest in real estate
Thus far, academic research has focused predominantly on the risk-return characteristics of real
estate in a mixed-asset portfolio. Compared to typical portfolio models, predicting about 10-20
percent allocations to real estate,7 institutional investors generally have more modest alloca-
tions to private and public real estate investments. In this section, we explain the institutional
marketplace and the investment process for institutional investors considering an allocation of
assets to real estate. Figure 5.1 provides a stylized chart of the decision process and financial
intermediation layers that investors face when investing in real estate.
The first decision is whether an institutional investor includes real estate in the strategic
asset allocation. Institutional investors seeking exposure to real estate can invest in debt-type
assets and equity-type assets. Debt-type assets include private commercial real estate debt
(whole loans or mortgages) and commercial mortgage-backed securities. The debt real estate
assets are usually part of a broader fixed income portfolio and are not the focus of this paper.
Our analysis covers real estate equity investments, which are generally organized as separate
mandates in the pension fund portfolio. There are two subcategories of real estate equity assets:
(1) direct (private) commercial real estate and (2) listed (public) real estate equity, in many
countries structured as real estate investment trusts (REITs), or an equivalent legal structure.
After deciding to invest in real estate directly, through REITs, or using a combination, a
pension fund selects an investment approach. Investing in direct (private) real estate can be
executed internally or can be outsourced to third-party fund managers. If a fund decides to
invest in direct real estate internally, it typically establishes a separate or “at-arms-length” divi-
sion.8 When outsourcing the investment decision, institutional investors can directly select the
7See for example: Friedman (1971) and Kallberg, Liu, and Greig (1996).
8Internal investing means that the buy-sell decisions for the individual properties are made within the organiza-
tion (including wholly-owned subsidiaries).
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external managers (funds) or invest via fund-of-funds.9 In case of the latter, the fund-of-fund
manager selects the external managers (funds), who then acquire the assets.
Investing in public real estate securities requires selection of REITs, which can be outsourced
to external investment managers, or can be executed internally by the pension fund. REIT
investments can also be classified as passive if they replicate a broad capital market benchmark
(e.g., the FTSE NAREIT Index) or are dedicated to matching a specific set of liabilities (i.e.,
if REIT investments are part of a strategic asset allocation designed to match fund-specific
liabilities).
Overall, an institutional investor directly acquires or disposes of properties only if that insti-
tutions internally invests in direct real estate. External investing in direct real estate and REITs
creates additional intermediation layers between the pension fund and the assets. Figure 5.1 il-
lustrates these additional layers. The involvement of third-party intermediaries potentially cre-
ates principal-agent conflicts and increases the investment costs, as each intermediation layer
leads to additional fees. However, not all approaches delegating investments create similar
agency problems. REITs, for example, are listed on the stock market, which not only increases
transparency and liquidity, but also lowers investment costs. In addition, the institutional de-
sign of REITs may reduce agency conflicts, for example by mandatory dividend distributions
(Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok, 2010). External investing in direct real estate demands strong mon-
itoring capacities from the investor, especially in the absence of a stock market to mitigate
potential agency conflicts. In addition, the costs for external investments in private real es-
tate are typically higher, because they incorporate management fees as well as performance
fees. Investing through fund-of-funds adds another layer of both management and perfor-
mance fees. Hence, when delegating investments in private real estate assets, pension funds
need more skills as compared to investments in public equities and fixed income, in order to
select and monitor the external parties. See Lakonishok et al. (1992), Goyal and Wahal (2008)
and Stoughton et al. (2011) for an elaborate discussion of agency problems in the investment
management industry.
5.3 Data
We use of the defined benefit pension fund data collected by CEM Benchmarking Inc. Pension
funds included in the CEM database had more than $4.66 trillion of assets under management
in 2009 and covered around 35 percent of global defined benefit pension fund assets (which
is also more than 20 percent of total global pension fund assets).10 Over the 1990-2009 period,
the U.S. pension funds included in the dataset controlled more than 40 percent of the total
assets under management by the U.S. defined benefit pension fund sector. Canadian pension
9External investing also incorporates real estate limited partnerships. The limited partnerships are investments
in real estate funds which focus on active management of properties, ranging from moderate reposition or releasing
of properties to development or extensive redevelopment. These funds typically have a fixed life span during which
properties are acquired, actively managed and then sold. This category includes value added and opportunistic
partnerships.
10The comparison is based on the Towers Watson Global Pension Assets Study 2010 (http://www.towerswatson.
com/en-IE/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2010/02/Global-Pension-Asset-Study-2010).
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funds included in the CEM database held approximately 80-90 percent of the total assets under
management by Canadian pension funds. The CEM database also covers a smaller percentage
of, mostly larger, European, Australian and New Zealand pension funds. Table 5.1 presents
the number of pension funds in the CEM database, the number of funds investing in real estate
and the average size of these funds. To our knowledge, this is the broadest global database on
pension fund asset allocation and performance available for academic research.
The CEM database contains detailed information on each fund’s annual asset allocation
decisions, self-declared benchmarks for each asset class, and precise cost structure and perfor-
mance data for all separate asset classes and their benchmarks. While CEM collects data from
pension funds investing in multiple asset classes, we solely focus on the real estate allocations
in this paper. In the data, real estate includes assets invested in direct real estate holdings, seg-
regated real estate holdings, real estate limited partnerships and real estate investment trusts
(REITs).11
The CEM database provides a broad and complete perspective on the choices and outcomes
of pension fund real estate allocations. Using data at the pension fund level rather than real-
estate-only datasets (like those offered by NCREIF, IPD, or NAREIT) provides some unique
insights into the allocation decisions, costs and returns of real estate investments. First, pension
fund returns reflect the costs of real-life constraints involved in real estate investments, such as
commitment periods and delays on the withdrawal of capital that external parties impose.
Second, pension fund returns reflect the costs of managing a portfolio of underlying real estate
investments in private, public or both real estate subcategories, as the returns are reported net
of an additional layer of fees. Third, the CEM data incorporates returns in both public and
private real estate investments, taking into account the time trend in weights assigned to both
subcategories. Focusing on either NCREIF or NAREIT data does not reflect the overall real
estate portfolio of an institutional investor, and does not provide insight into the allocation
choices that institutional investors face within their real estate allocation.
As reporting to CEM is voluntary, the data is potentially vulnerable to self-reporting bias.
Andonov et al. (2012) address the self-reporting issue by constructing a Cox proportional haz-
ard model. The authors test whether the decision of a particular fund to exit the database is
related to its returns (from all asset classes), costs or size. The results show that the database
does not suffer from self-reporting bias with respect to costs and returns, though larger funds
are more likely to survive in the CEM database.12
Table 5.1 shows that, on average, 75.6 percent of the pension funds in the CEM database
invest in real estate. In Europe and Australia/New Zealand this percentage is higher, which
may be due to the database covering fewer, mostly large funds. In Canada, the percentage of
11REIT investments are reported separately in the CEM database – CEM explicitly asks pension funds to split
REIT investments from the small cap equity mandate. Some pension funds may not be able to filter out REITs from
passive index investments, and our results may thus slightly understate actual allocations to REITs.
12Bauer, Cremers, and Frehen (2010) also address the self-reporting bias by matching the CEM data with the
Compustat SFAS data. They test whether the decision to stop reporting is related to the overall fund performance,
but the results indicate that there is no evidence of a self-reporting bias related to performance in the exiting and
entering years.
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Figure 5.2: Real estate as a percentage of total pension fund assets
funds investing in real estate decreases over time, from 75.5 percent in 1990 to 59.8 percent in
2009.
During the 1990-2009 period, pension fund real estate holdings increased substantially and
their total value amounted to more than $320 billion in 2009. In line with Pagliari et al. (2005)
we find that pension funds favor private real estate investments over REITs. In 2009, pension
fund holdings in direct real estate were more than $240 billion and the holdings in REITs were
around $74 billion.13
When we include all pension funds in the database, real estate represents on average 3.9
percent of pension fund assets. This compares to 1.9 percent allocation to private equity and
0.7 percent allocation to hedge funds. When we focus just on pension funds investing in real
estate, these funds allocate, on average, 5.4 percent of their assets to real estate. Figure 5.2
shows that real estate assets as a percentage of total pension fund total assets were higher at
the beginning of the sample period and picked up again after 2000. Real estate investments
represented 6.9 percent of the total assets by 2009.
Panel A of Table 5.2 shows that there is substantial variation in the allocation to real estate
assets across regions. Fund size and geography are important determinants of this heterogene-
ity. European and Australian/New Zealand funds are substantially larger and their real estate
holdings, in dollar terms, are substantially larger than the holdings of U.S. and Canadian funds.
In Panel C of Table 5.2, we observe the size of the real estate investments by subcategory. The
size of REIT mandates is comparable to the size of direct real estate mandates, but the num-
ber of pension funds that invest in direct real estate is substantially higher than the number of
13A minor part of pension fund real estate holdings is classified as “other real assets”, which captures investments
that could not be classified as direct real estate or REITs. For instance, a building owned by the pension fund and
used as office space by the fund, but also partially leased to other tenants for a rent, will be classified as such. Other
real assets also capture investments in raw land.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics: real estate holdings
This table provides descriptive statistics of pension fund investments in real estate. We present the time
series averages of cross-sectional statistics for the 1990-2009 time period, showing the following statis-
tics: median, mean and standard deviation (StDev). Columns # Funds and # Obs present the number of
funds investing in real estate or in one of the subcategories and the number of observations. Panels A,
B and C display the summary statistics of real estate holdings in million US$. In Panel A, the real estate
assets descriptive statistics are presented separately for U.S., Canadian, European and Australian/New
Zealand funds. In Panel B, we split the real estate investments into two subcategories: real estate invest-
ment trusts (REITs) and direct real estate. Panel C presents the real estate holdings summary statistics
by investment approach. For internal and external statistics we use the entire period 1990-2009. Fund-
of-funds exist in the data since 1995 and we present the time series averages of cross-sectional statistics
for the 1995-2009 period.
Median Mean StDev # Funds # Obs
Panel A: Real estate holdings (in million US$)
All funds 116 650 1,578 668 3,928
U.S. 147 647 1,417 409 2,408
Canada 47 399 1,072 163 1,178
Europe 1,049 2,311 3,589 79 281
Aus/Nzd 451 668 626 17 61
Panel B: Real estate holdings by subcategory (in million US$)
REITs 104 407 1,290 220 966
Direct real estate 107 549 1,235 635 3,616
Panel C: Real estate holdings by investment approach (in million US$)
Internal 230 899 1,690 160 914
External 92 517 1,242 611 3,324
Fund-of-funds 83 96 50 32 94
funds that invest in REITs. Figure 5.3 Panel A shows that REITs gained popularity after 1997
and make up about 20 percent of the overall real estate holdings, on average.
Pension funds implement three main investment approaches within their real estate alloca-
tion: internal management, external management and investing via fund-of-funds. In Figure
5.3 Panel B we observe that pension funds have some 80 percent of their assets managed ex-
ternally, with little variation over time. Interestingly, the allocation to internal mandates has
decreased from 22.4 percent in 1990 to 15.6 percent in 2009, due to an increased allocation to
fund-of-funds. The percentage allocation to fund-of-funds has increased from zero in 1990 to
5.3 percent in 2009, mainly at the expense of internal, not external mandates. Even though the
vast majority of funds use external management, Panel D of Table 5.2 shows that the dollar
value of internal mandates is substantially larger than the value of external mandates.
Table 5.3 shows more descriptives on pension fund investment approaches to real estate
investment. In Panel A, we document that the percentage of internal management is lowest
among U.S. funds (7.6 percent). Canadian funds, even though they are significantly smaller
than U.S. funds, allocate 35.6 percent of their real estate investments through internal man-
dates. European and Australian/New Zealand funds have higher allocations through internal
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Figure 5.3: Allocations to real estate subcategories and investment approaches
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5.4 Pension fund characteristics and real estate investments
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics: investment approach
This table shows pension fund investment approaches in real estate. For every variable we present
the time series averages of cross-sectional means. Columns %Ext and %Int present the percentage
of assets managed externally and internally in the period 1990-2009. %FoF shows the percentage of
assets invested in fund-of-funds during the 20 years period. Panel A shows the investment approach
separately for U.S., Canadian, European and Australian/New Zealand funds. Panel B presents the
percentage allocations to different real estate investment approaches for REITs and direct real estate.
For REITs our data allows for two distinct decompositions. In addition to %Ext and %Int, we also
decompose REIT investments into percentage of assets managed actively (%Act) and passively (%Pas).
For direct real estate assets we observe one decomposition in four different investment approaches. In
addition to %Ext, %Int, %FoF we also add the percentage of assets invested in limited partnerships
(%LP). (In Panel A %LP is combined with %Ext.)
Panel A: Real estate investment approach (in percent)
%Ext %Int %FoF
All funds 79.63 18.94 1.43
U.S. 90.40 7.62 1.97
Canada 64.25 35.62 0.13
Europe 47.11 51.48 1.41
Aus/Nzd 84.41 14.85 0.74
Panel B: Real estate investment approach by subcategory (in percent)
%Ext %Int %FoF %LP %Act %Pas
REITs 54.66 45.34 - - 94.05 5.95
Direct real estate 78.41 16.81 1.74 3.04 - -
mandates as well. Investments in fund-of-funds are mainly implemented by U.S. and European
pension funds.
Panel B of Table 5.3 shows that pension funds are more likely to invest internally in REITs
rather than in direct real estate: the average allocation to internal mandates is 45.3 percent
among REITs as compared to 16.8 percent among direct real estate investments.
Passive management in real estate is not really possible, except investments that held through
REITs. Investments are classified as passive in the CEM data if they replicate a broad capital
market benchmark (like the FTSE NAREIT Index) or match a specific set of liabilities, i.e., if
they are part of a strategic asset allocation based on the pension fund liabilities. On the basis
of that definition, the vast majority of the REIT investments are managed actively (94 percent)
and there are very few pension funds that passively invest in REITs.
5.4 Pension fund characteristics and real estate investments
In this section, we study the two main investment decisions presented in Figure 5.1 for the
institutional investors with an existing real estate allocation. First, we investigate which pen-
sion fund characteristics influence the choice of real estate subcategories. Second, we examine
which investment approach pension funds implement in their allocation to real estate. We
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estimate the following logit model:
Pr(yi,t = 1|X) = F(β1FundSizei,t + β2Alteri,t + β3PTi + β4Regioni + β5YDt + υi,t) (5.1)
where F is a logit function taking on values strictly between zero and one, and yi,t is a binary
dependent variable. For example, the dependent binary variable yi,t is 1 if pension fund i in-
vests internally in real estate in year t and 0 otherwise. We model the probabilities as a function
of pension fund characteristics (X), focusing on total fund size (FundSize) and the allocation to
other alternative asset classes (Alter) of fund i in year t. FundSize is the natural logarithm of the
dollar value of the pension fund assets under management. The Alter variable captures the as-
set allocation to private equity, hedge funds, infrastructure, tactical asset allocation mandates,
commodities and natural resources. We control for plan type (PT), i.e., whether the pension
plan is public, corporate or other. We also control for regional effects, include year dummies
(YD) and we cluster the standard errors by pension funds, allowing for intragroup correlation.
Table 5.4 shows the results of model (1). In Panel A, we analyze which characteristics deter-
mine whether a pension fund invests only in direct real estate, only in REITs, or simultaneously
in both direct real estate and REITs. The dependent binary variable is 1 if a fund has direct real
estate holdings only and 0 otherwise. We find that smaller pension funds are more likely to in-
vest in direct real estate only but not in REITs, although REITs provide easy and low-scale prop-
erty exposure, which should make them especially attractive to smaller investors. A one unit
increase in the logarithm of assets under management (i.e., doubling the fund size) decreases
the probability that a pension fund invests in direct real estate only by 4.0 to 5.8 percent. More-
over, pension funds with higher allocations to other alternative assets have a higher probability
to invest in real estate only directly. For example, the probability to invest in direct real estate
only for pension funds that have no allocation to other alternative assets is 79.8 percent. This
probability increases to 83.3 percent for funds that have at least 10 percent of assets allocated
to other alternative asset classes. Based on the regional dummies, European pension funds are
less likely to invest in direct real estate than their U.S. counterparts, whereas Canadian funds
are more likely to invest in direct real estate only.
The probability to invest in direct real estate, given that a pension fund decides to invest
in real estate, is close to 100 percent and the percentage of funds investing only in REITs but
not in direct real estate is very low. This implies that REITs are typically incorporated in a
portfolio of larger pension funds as complementary to existing exposure to direct real estate
investments. Indeed, a one unit increase in the logarithm of assets under management increases
the probability that a pension fund invests simultaneously in both REITs and direct real estate
by 4.1 to 5.3 percent.14
Summarizing, smaller funds are less likely to invest in REITs, but not in direct real estate.
This finding is surprising, since we document later in this paper that investing in private real
estate is more expensive. Moreover, direct real estate investments are less liquid and require
14Our results are in line with Ciochetti, Craft, and Shilling (2002), who document that the largest pension plans
invest more in REITs.
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Figure 5.4: Pension fund investment approach in real estate by size quintiles
more monitoring skills, because of the increased potential for agency conflicts following from
asymmetric information problems. In addition, institutional investors with larger allocations
to other alternative assets are more likely to invest in direct real estate, which means that they
simultaneously allocate capital to multiple alternative asset classes.
Table 5.4 Panel B presents the analysis of the characteristics which determine whether a
pension fund invests internally, externally or through fund-of-funds. The dependent binary
variable is 0 if a fund does not invest in real estate internally and 1 otherwise. In the other
specifications, the dependent variable reflects external management and fund-of-funds invest-
ments, respectively.
In line with expectations, larger pension funds are more likely to invest internally. A one
unit increase in the logarithm of assets (i.e., doubling the fund size) increases the probability
that a pension fund invests internally by 10 percent. Smaller funds are more likely to dele-
gate investment management by investing externally and through fund-of-funds. A one unit
increase in the log size decreases the probability that a pension fund invests externally by 2.6
percent. Furthermore, the allocation to other alternative assets is significantly and positively
related to the probability to externally invest in real estate. The marginal effect of allocations
to alternatives estimated at means indicates that a 10 percent increase in the allocation to alter-
natives increases the probability of external investing in real estate by 5.1 percent. Importantly,
even after controlling for size, investments in other alternative asset classes and allocation to
REITs, Canadian and European pension funds are significantly more likely to invest internally
than U.S. pension funds.
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Since pension funds can simultaneously invest via one or more investment approaches, Fig-
ure 5.4 analyzes further the relation between pension fund size and investment approach. We
split the funds into quintiles based on their size and calculate the percentage of funds select-
ing a particular combination of investment approaches. The majority of funds across all size
quintiles invest only externally in real estate. Among the smaller quintiles, this holds for more
than 80 percent of the funds. Additionally, only pension funds in the smaller quintiles invest
exclusively through fund-of-funds. As we move from the smallest to the largest quintile, the
percentage of pension funds investing internally (only internally or simultaneously internally
and externally) is increasing. However, even among the largest quintile, some 57 percent of the
funds do not manage properties or REITs internally.
Our results indicate that larger funds are more likely to invest internally, but a minority
of the smallest funds also take that approach. In the smallest quintile, about 13.2 percent of
funds decide to invest internally. Internal management requires devoting sufficient resources
to establish an internal real estate department or an “at-arms-length” operating division. Es-
tablishing such an internal department for direct selection of properties or REITs is costly and
can be regarded as a more long-term commitment. In line with this statement, we observe that
funds with a larger allocation to other alternative asset classes are more likely to invest exter-
nally. This positive relation suggests that especially external real estate mandates are part of
a broader portfolio of alternatives. When a pension fund decides to invest in real estate inter-
nally, it is likely to devote significant organizational resources and to specialize in real estate
for a longer period, rather than to invest in a broader portfolio of alternatives.
5.5 The costs of pension fund real estate investments
In this section, we analyze the level of overall real estate investment costs, the differences in
costs between REITs and direct real estate, and the role of investment approach and size as
determinants of cost differences. The CEM database contains detailed information on the in-
vestment costs of pension funds. Internal investment costs include compensation and benefits
of employees managing internal portfolios and support staff, related research expenses and
allocated overhead costs. In the CEM database, external investment costs capture the manage-
ment fees paid to investment consultants and external money managers. The performance fees,
carried interest and rebates15 are directly subtracted from the returns and are not incorporated
in the cost figures. External investments costs also include costs for internal staff whose sole
responsibility is overseeing the external investments in real estate assets. Similarly, for fund-of-
funds, cost figures capture the base management fee paid to both the fund-of-funds manager
and the underlying managers, but they do not include performance fees and carried interest
on either layer.
15Carried interest is a fee that is a portion of returns exceeding a hurdle rate. Rebates are the limited partners’
share of certain fee income realized by the general partner in connection with the fund, such as fees for break-up,
monitoring and funding.
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Figure 5.5: Real estate investment costs by region and subcategory
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Table 5.5 provides the summary statistics of real estate investment costs per region. Pension
funds pay fees of about 76 basis points for real estate investments. We find that U.S. pension
funds have higher real estate investment costs than funds from other regions: the average
costs of U.S. pension funds amount to 91 basis points, which is about twice the percentage
that their foreign peers are paying. Canadian funds pay 56 basis points, European funds pay
38 basis points and Australian/New Zealand funds pay 45 basis points for their real estate
investments. Figure 5.5 shows that these cost differences are consistent during the 1990-2009
period. Moreover, U.S. pension funds have higher costs for investing in both REITs (Panel
B) and direct real estate (Panel C). The three panels of Figure 5.5 suggest that there are no
particular time patterns in REIT investment costs, but direct real estate investment costs have
increased since 2002. The increasing costs in direct real estate are mostly due to the increasing
allocations to fund-of-funds, which is the most expensive approach to invest in real estate.
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics: real estate investment costs
This table provides the descriptive statistics on investment costs of pension funds investing in real estate
(in basis points). The values presented are time series averages of cross-sectional statistics for the 1990-
2009 time period (for fund-of-funds 1995-2009). The statistics presented are median, mean and standard
deviation (StDev). In Panel A, the cost statistics are presented for all funds, as well as separately for U.S.,
Canadian, European and Australian/New Zealand funds. In Panel B, we split the real estate investment
costs into REITs and direct real estate. We split REIT investment costs into two investment approaches:
internal and external. For direct real estate we distinguish four approaches: internal, external, limited
partnerships and fund-of-funds. Costs for all internal mandates are a weighted average of internal in-
vestment costs across all subcategories. Costs for all external mandates are calculated as a weighted
average of costs for external mandates in REITs, external mandates in direct real estate, limited partner-
ships in direct real estate and external mandates in other real assets. Investments in direct real estate via
fund-of-funds are the only category from Panel B not incorporated in Panel C, because we analyze the
fund-of-funds as a separate investment approach.
Median Mean StDev # Funds # Obs
Panel A: Costs in basis points by region
All funds 67.24 76.19 84.61 662 3,815
U.S. 83.48 91.12 90.61 407 2,353
Canada 44.97 55.54 51.55 161 1,144
Europe 30.31 37.62 33.74 77 259
Aus/Nzd 42.90 44.82 18.79 17 59
Panel B: Costs in basis points by subcategory and investment approach
REITs: 32.75 41.45 57.18 213 917
- Internal 8.35 12.06 14.04 50 286
- External 52.61 62.75 68.37 181 698
Direct real estate: 72.47 82.89 100.30 635 3,595
- Internal 22.81 31.40 31.63 129 675
- External 78.52 88.09 85.73 567 2,941
- Limited partnership 122.58 143.15 131.74 53 154
- Fund-of-funds 170.70 182.56 43.94 32 94
Panel C: Costs in basis points by investment approach
Internal 18.51 26.24 27.88 148 834
External 76.35 86.08 88.63 607 3,245
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Cost summary statistics for subcategories are presented in Panel B of Table 5.5. The av-
erage costs for investing in direct real estate are 83 basis points and are about double the
costs for investing in REITs (41 basis points). Internal investing in REITs and internal direct
selection of properties are associated with substantially lower costs than the external invest-
ment approaches. Furthermore, within direct real estate investments, limited partnerships and
fund-of-funds yield substantially higher costs than other ways of gaining real estate exposure:
143 and 183 basis points, respectively. Panel C of Table 5.5 shows that costs for all external
mandates are 86 basis points, on average, as compared to just 26 basis points for all internal
mandates, on average.16
Overall, the descriptives indicate that the selected subcategories and investment approach
strongly influence the overall level of real estate investment costs. But of course, these non-
parametric comparisons are not conclusive: for example, U.S. pension funds have a low allo-
cation to internal mandates (just 7.6 percent) as compared to funds from other regions, which
may explain their higher costs. For more precise inferences, and to disentangle the effects of
real estate portfolio size, allocation to subcategories and investment approach, we estimate the
following model, using pooled panel regressions with year and regional, or fund fixed effects:
Ci,t = γ0 + γ1Mandatei,t + γ2 InvApproachi,t + γ3YDt + γ4FEi + ui,t t = 1, 2, ..., 20 (5.2)
where Ci,t refers to the investment costs, FEi captures regional or fund fixed effects, YDt refers
to year dummies and ui,t are idiosyncratic errors. Mandate is the log of the dollar value of the
real estate investment portfolio, and InvApproach refers to the percentage allocation to external
managers, fund of funds, etcetera.
Table 5.6 presents the results of the analysis. Regressions for the pooled sample of all funds
indicate that pension funds allocating more assets to real estate realize strong scale advantages
in their investment costs. For the full sample, a one unit increase in the log of the real estate
mandate (i.e., doubling the mandate size) reduces the costs by 32 basis points, even when
controlling for investment approach, year and fund fixed effects. Our results also indicate
that allocations to external investment managers and fund-of-funds significantly increase the
overall investment costs. A pension fund that delegates the asset management to external
managers has 21 basis points higher investment costs than a fund that invests internally in
real estate. Investing through fund-of-funds would increase the costs by 122 basis points as
compared to internal management.
When we split the sample into regions, we still document strong economies of scale among
U.S. and Canadian funds. For Europe and Australia/New Zealand, the log of real estate assets
under management is insignificant, which may be due to the smaller sample size and the fact
that funds are generally very large. (The size of the minimum allocation to real estate in Europe
and Australia/New Zealand is equal to the median real estate investment mandate of U.S. and
16Costs for all external mandates are calculated as a weighted average of costs for external mandates in REITs,
external mandates in direct real estate, limited partnerships in direct real estate and external mandates in other real
assets. Costs for all internal mandates are also a weighted average of internal investment costs across all subcate-
gories. Investments in direct real estate via fund-of-funds are the only category from Panel B not incorporated in
Panel C, because we analyze the fund-of-funds as a separate investment approach.
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Canadian funds.) The observed scale advantages are strongest among U.S. funds, where a one
unit increase in the log of real estate holdings reduces the investment cost by 42 basis points.
Greater allocation to external mandates and fund-of-funds remain positively related to costs in
the regional regression results.
In Panel B of Table 5.6 we investigate the importance of size and investment approach in ex-
plaining the costs of investments in REITs and direct real estate. In the regressions with region
and year fixed effects, the size coefficient is significantly negatively related to investment costs
for both subcategories.17 Controlling for investment approach also explains part of the hetero-
geneity in investment costs. The percentage of assets managed externally is positively related
to the costs associated with REIT investments. Similarly, the percentage of assets invested in
external mandates, fund-of-funds and limited partnerships result in substantially higher costs
for direct real estate investments.
Table 5.6 Panel C shows that larger pension funds have lower costs in all three invest-
ment approaches: internal, external and fund-of-funds investments. The magnitude of the
economies of scale is much stronger for external mandates, where a one unit increase in the
log of assets managed externally reduces the costs by 35 basis points. For internal costs, a
one unit increase in the log of internally managed assets reduces the internal costs by 7 basis
points.18 These findings suggest that larger funds not only organize internal mandates more
efficiently, but also negotiate lower fees for their external investments in real estate. This points
at bargaining power with external asset managers.
Even after controlling for size and investment approach, we find that U.S. pension funds
have costs that are 28 to 41 basis points higher compared to pension funds from other regions.
Results in Panel C indicate that the higher costs of U.S. pension funds can be attributed chiefly
to their external mandates, whereas their costs for internal investing are similar to those of
pension funds from other regions. In addition, the results in Panel B suggest that U.S. funds
overpay mainly for their mandates in direct real estate. The higher costs of U.S. funds for
external investments in direct real estate could be due to a worse relative negotiating position
of U.S. pension funds, as the vast majority of funds do not seem to consider the option to
invest internally and rather use exclusively external managers. One would expect that greater
attention to internal management increases the competitive pressure on the external real estate
investment managers.
Summarizing, we document that pension funds allocating more assets to real estate realize
strong scale advantages in their internal and external investment costs. Investment approach
is also a major determinant of real estate investment costs, since greater external management
17Adding fund fixed effects removes considerable variation as the amount of fund investments in real estate
subcategories does not vary strongly over time, especially relative to the large cross-sectional variation in size. Thus,
the coefficient for log Mandate becomes insignificant for REITs and less significant for direct real estate investment
costs.
18Larger fund pay lower fees also for investing in fund-of-funds, but the Mandate variable is not significant once
we control for fund fixed effects, because the number of funds investing in fund-of-funds is low and the fund fixed
effects capture most of the relation.
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Table 5.6: Regression results: real estate investment costs
Panel A of this table reports the results of pooled panel regressions of the real estate investment costs
for all funds and per region. Panel B reports the results of pooled panel regressions of the investment
costs for different real estate subcategories. In Panel C, we use the costs by investment approach as
dependent variable. As independent variables, we include the log of real estate assets in millions of
dollars (Mandate), and the percentage allocations to externally managed (%Ext) mandates and fund-of-
funds (%FoF). When analyzing the REITs costs, we include the following independent variables: log
of REIT investments (Mandate) and the percentage allocations to externally (%Ext) and actively (%Act)
managed REIT assets. When analyzing Direct RE costs, we include: log of direct real estate investments
(Mandate) and the percentage allocations to externally managed (%Ext) mandates, limited partnerships
(%LP) and fund-of-funds (%FoF). In Panel C, Mandate refers to the log of assets managed internally,
externally or through fund-of-funds, respectively. We use two types of pooled panel regressions: (1)
with year and regional dummies; and (2) with year and fund fixed effects (FE). All regressions use
robust standard errors clustered by fund. We report standard errors in brackets and significance levels
with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The R2 column presents the
adjusted R-square.
Cons. Mandate %Ext %Act %FoF %LP Canada Europe Aus/Nzd FE R2
Panel A: Costs regressions for all funds and by region
All funds 89.67*** -9.80*** 33.12*** 100.49*** -36.29*** -27.61*** -40.64*** No 0.10
[12.23] [0.91] [4.96] [13.94] [4.12] [6.88] [13.23]
All funds 185.96*** -32.25** 21.36** 122.03*** Yes 0.25
[65.96] [14.24] [9.31] [41.95]
U.S. 222.76** -41.51** 30.87 151.48*** Yes 0.20
[97.62] [20.91] [21.15] [52.75]
Canada 71.57*** -10.71*** 23.43** -28.31 Yes 0.43
[16.73] [3.93] [11.09] [26.81]
Europe 154.03 -20.04 15.85** 72.79** Yes 0.76
[133.85] [22.10] [6.76] [35.82]
Aus/Nzd -10.65 1.79 23.75 131.28*** Yes 0.83
[27.83] [4.59] [16.53] [35.60]
Panel B: Costs regressions by real estate subcategory
REITs 6.41 -9.89*** 30.82*** 35.29*** -10.81 -15.50** -22.41 No 0.12
[78.27] [1.67] [6.96] [10.67] [9.17] [7.00] [14.09]
REITs 185.22 -32.99 33.27** 10.88 Yes 0.47
[151.45] [27.44] [16.07] [17.58]
Direct 110.94*** -12.72*** 26.50*** 85.71*** 139.67*** -43.29*** -33.54*** -33.46* No 0.09
[19.77] [1.28] [7.10] [17.98] [14.67] [5.81] [9.71] [18.40]
Direct 164.89*** -25.82* 17.76** 135.81*** 111.42* Yes 0.61
[62.37] [13.33] [8.82] [44.68] [62.76]
Panel C: Costs regressions by investment approach
Internal 33.19*** -3.57*** 6.19*** 0.07 1.90 No 0.08
[7.46] [0.51] [2.25] [3.04] [8.27]
Internal 58.34*** -6.84** Yes 0.65
[16.43] [3.06]
External 126.79*** -11.06*** -41.44*** -25.44*** -40.90*** No 0.05
[15.51] [1.10] [4.88] [8.49] [14.89]
External 218.12*** -34.92** Yes 0.21
[63.15] [15.68]
FoF 240.61*** -16.41* -74.86 22.72 80.21** No 0.09
[75.34] [9.76] [53.22] [26.66] [39.21]
FoF 346.84* -54.04 Yes 0.64
[177.03] [58.39]
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and allocation to fund-of-funds considerably increase the overall costs. Moreover, U.S. pen-
sion funds have considerably higher costs for investing in real estate, even after controlling for
mandate size and investment approach.
5.6 Pension fund performance in real estate investments
In the previous sections, we documented that pension funds opt for investing in direct real
estate over REITs, and prefer delegated investment management over internal management,
despite the higher costs associated with these approaches. It may be possible that the invest-
ment preferences are driven by performance differences in investment approaches. In this
section, we examine whether pension fund real estate returns justify their preference for more
expensive investment approaches. We first address the performance of allocations to REITs
and direct real estate, after deducting returns on self-reported benchmarks and the investment
costs. We then relate the net benchmark-adjusted returns to fund characteristics, such as the
size of the real estate mandate and the implemented investment approach. We also investigate
the persistence in pension fund real estate investment performance.
5.6.1 Benchmark-adjusted returns
Table 5.7 reports the returns of pension fund real estate investments by subcategory and invest-
ment approach. Panel A shows that the average gross return of pension funds in real estate is
about 7 percent during the 1990-2009 period. REITs delivered a higher gross return (10.92 per-
cent) than direct real estate investments (6.70 percent). The gross returns on internally managed
assets (7.77 percent) are higher than the returns on external mandates (6.82 percent).
To put these returns into perspective, we compare them with the returns on self-reported
benchmarks. In the CEM database, pension funds declare their benchmarks, which are usu-
ally market indexes (for example, the NCREIF Index or the FTSE/NAREIT Index for U.S. real
estate investments), against which performance is measured. Benchmark returns can also be a
combination of multiple indices, weighted by the asset allocation. The realized returns and the
benchmark returns are provided in the local currency.19 The advantage of using self-declared
benchmarks is that these benchmarks more precisely reflect the allocation and risk exposure
of the real estate allocations. For example, if a fund is exposed to office buildings in the U.S.,
benchmarking its returns against the NCREIF Office Index is more appropriate than using the
broader NCREIF Property Index. Similarly, if a pension fund invests internationally and en-
gages in any currency management, the benchmark returns are a weighted average of indices
in multiple countries and account for the implemented hedging policy. The disadvantage of us-
ing self-declared benchmarks is that pension funds can strategically select benchmarks which
are easier to outperform, which implies that one should be careful when drawing conclusions
if outperformance relative to these benchmarks would be documented.
19If currency risk hedging is done at the asset class level, pension funds provide hedged returns and benchmarks.
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Table 5.7: Pension fund returns in real estate investments
This table presents the pension fund returns in real estate investments. Panel A shows the time series av-
erages of cross-sectional mean gross returns for the 1990-2009 time period (for fund-of-funds 1995-2009).
Standard deviations of the gross returns are in brackets. In Panel B, we deduct self-declared benchmark
returns from pension fund returns, resulting in gross benchmark-adjusted returns. In Panel C, we also
deduct the investment costs, resulting in net benchmark-adjusted returns. In Panels B and C, we run
a random coefficient model with a constant only, for every fund that has at least three observations.
The All RE Assets column presents the constants for the performance in all real estate assets together
for all funds and per region. The consecutive two columns present the constants for performance in
subcategories: REITs and direct real estate. The last three columns report the performance of different
investment approaches: internal, external and fund-of-funds (FoF). In Panels B and C, we report the
constant and standard error in brackets, and denote significance levels with *, ** and ***, which corre-
spond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. In Panel D, we report the number of funds and observations
(in parentheses) included in these regressions.
All RE Assets Subcategory Approach
REITs Direct RE Internal External FoF
Panel A: Gross returns (percent)
All funds 7.00 10.92 6.70 7.77 6.82 6.72
[9.41] [10.21] [8.40] [11.20] [9.17] [7.85]
Panel B: Gross benchmark-adjusted returns (percent)
All funds -0.10 1.13** -0.18 1.08** -0.20 -1.71
[0.26] [0.52] [0.30] [0.49] [0.31] [3.21]
U.S. -0.38 1.06 -0.47 0.47 -0.38 -2.08**
[0.34] [0.67] [0.40] [0.90] [0.38] [0.91]
Canada 0.40 1.92 0.31 1.20* 0.28
[0.50] [1.48] [0.50] [0.72] [0.61]
Europe 0.42 1.56 0.40 1.75** -0.25
[0.75] [1.23] [1.10] [0.89] [1.43]
Aus/Nzd 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.14
[1.45] [0.35] [1.58] [1.64]
Panel C: Net benchmark-adjusted returns (percent)
All funds -0.86*** 0.70 -0.98*** 0.81* -1.05*** -3.90
[0.27] [0.52] [0.30] [0.49] [0.32] [3.39]
U.S. -1.27*** 0.56 -1.43*** 0.21 -1.29*** -3.76***
[0.35] [0.66] [0.41] [0.90] [0.39] [0.92]
Canada -0.17 1.59 -0.28 0.89 -0.45
[0.51] [1.52] [0.51] [0.72] [0.62]
Europe 0.00 1.33 -0.10 1.55* -0.98
[0.78] [1.23] [1.12] [0.90] [1.45]
Aus/Nzd -0.41 -0.31 -0.59 -0.30
[1.47] [0.33] [1.61] [1.66]
Panel D: Number of funds and observations included in the regressions
All funds 392 107 373 83 346 8
(3,136) (703) (3,004) (686) (2,624) (55)
U.S. 248 76 232 25 234 5
(1,967) (491) (1,872) (198) (1,833) (46)
Canada 109 10 106 43 83
(955) (75) (918) (386) (626)
Europe 26 16 26 14 21
(173) (114) (171) (99) (127)
Aus/Nzd 9 5 9 8
(41) (23) (43) (38)
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The results in Table 5.7 Panel B show that pension funds mostly match, but do not out-
perform, their self-declared benchmarks on a gross return basis. In this panel, we run a ran-
dom coefficient regression, with a constant only, for returns on all real estate assets, returns by
subcategory and returns by investment approach. An important advantage of the random co-
efficient model is that it allows for heteroscedasticity-adjusted and fund-specific alphas, while
being more robust to outliers than the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach. Following
Swamy (1970), the random coefficient model is similar to a generalized least squares approach
that puts less weight on the return series of funds that are more volatile. In the regressions, we
include every pension fund that has at least three return observations.20
The overall gross benchmark-adjusted returns of all pension funds are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero.21 However, we observe outperformance in two cases. First, pension funds
obtain positive abnormal annual returns of 108 basis points from internally managed real estate
investments. Across all regions, the benchmark-adjusted returns on internal investments are
positive, and they are statistically significant for Canadian and European pension funds. Sec-
ond, we observe positive and significant outperformance of 113 basis points per year for REIT
investments. Of course, we cannot conclude that pension funds obtain alpha on a risk-adjusted
basis, because our annual data does not allow to control for multiple benchmarks, which may
explain a significant portion of REIT returns.22
U.S. pension funds that delegate investment management through investing in fund-of-
funds underperform their self-declared benchmarks by 208 basis points per year, even before
deducting investment costs. Part of this significant underperformance may be due to higher
performance fees of fund-of-fund managers, because the CEM database captures just the man-
agement fees paid to both the fund-of-funds manager and the underlying managers. (Our cost
data do not include the performance fees and carried interest paid on either layer, as these costs
are deducted directly from the gross returns.)
In Panel C of Table 5.7 we deduct the investment costs and focus on the net benchmark-
adjusted performance of pension fund investments in real estate. Overall, we document an
annual underperformance of 86 basis points. This seems to be driven mostly by the underper-
formance of U.S. pension funds, which significantly underperform their self-declared bench-
marks, by 127 basis points per year. The returns on pension fund real estate investments in
other regions are not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, U.S. pension funds do not
underperform in their internal real estate mandates, but rather in their selection of external
asset managers (-129 basis points) and fund-of-funds (-376 basis points). This large and sig-
20Our results do not change if we use all funds in the sample, regardless of the number of observations, or if we
use pension funds with at least five observations only.
21In a related paper, using data on publicly traded REIT portfolios as well as portfolios of private entities,
Hochberg and Mu¨hlhofer (2011) find that both public and private real estate portfolio managers do not exhibit
market timing or security selection skills.
22Hartzell, Mu¨hlhofer, and Titman (2010) investigate REIT mutual fund performance using three sets of REIT-
based benchmarks, plus an index of returns derived from non-REIT real estate firms, including homebuilders and
real estate operating companies. The REIT-based factors consist of a set of characteristic factors, a set of property-
type factors and a set of statistical factors. Using annual return data, we cannot control for this extensive list of
factors.
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Figure 5.6: Performance of U.S. pension funds in direct real estate
nificant underperformance cannot be explained solely by investment costs, because these are
much lower than the size of the estimated alphas.
We investigate in more detail why U.S. pension funds underperform their benchmarks dur-
ing the sample period. Figure 5.6 displays the gross returns of U.S. pension funds in direct real
estate, the returns on the CEM self-declared benchmarks, the returns on the NCREIF Property
Index, and the net benchmark-adjusted returns. Until 2004, the performance of U.S. funds in
direct real estate was close to their benchmarks. Between 2005 and 2007, U.S. pension funds
achieved positive net benchmark-adjusted returns. However, in the last two years of the sam-
ple period (2008-2009) U.S. pension funds experienced substantial underperformance in direct
real estate. As Figure 5.6 shows, the net benchmark-adjusted return in 2008 was -6.28 percent,
on average. In 2009, the average return of U.S. pension funds in direct real estate was -29.24
percent and they underperformed their self-declared benchmarks by 12.43 percent. The graph
provides some evidence that the average underperformance of U.S. funds is to a large extent
due to the dismal performance during the recent economic downturn. We cannot further ex-
plain the performance of U.S. pension funds using the CEM database, but the poor performance
may be due to increased usage of leverage in direct real estate holdings and the choice of more
risky allocations during the 2005-2009 period. We observe similar patterns among pension
funds from the other three regions, but not as extreme as among U.S. pension funds.
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5.6.2 Performance and characteristics
In this section, we relate the net benchmark-adjusted returns to a selection of pension fund
characteristics, employing Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. In the first stage, we regress
the fund-specific net benchmark-adjusted returns on a set of pension fund characteristics for
each sample year:
Ri,t = αt + δ1,t Mandatei,t + δ2,tCostsi,t + δ3,t InvApproachi,t + ε i,t for each t. (5.3)
where Ri,t refers to the net benchmark-adjusted returns of fund i in year t. Mandate is the log
of the dollar value of the real estate asset portfolio, Costs refers to the real estate investment
costs in percentage points, and InvApproach refers to the percentage allocation to external
managers, fund of funds, etcetera. The error term ε i,t is normally distributed with zero-mean.
In the second stage we estimate the coefficients as the average of the cross-sectional regression
estimates:
αˆ =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
αˆt δˆ1 =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δˆ1,t δˆ2 =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δˆ2,t δˆ3 =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
δˆ3,t (5.4)
We correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using Newey-West standard errors.
Results in Panel A of Table 5.8 show that real estate mandate size is positively related to
performance. A one unit increase in the log of real estate holdings (Mandate) increases the
net benchmark-adjusted returns by 32 to 43 basis points. The documented economies of scale
remain even after controlling for costs and investment approach. Furthermore, we observe that
higher costs reduce performance. An increase in costs by 100 basis points results in 103 basis
points lower returns. The results also indicate that external management and fund-of-funds
diminish performance. A pension fund that delegates the asset management responsibilities
to external managers experiences a decrease in net benchmark-adjusted returns of 102 to 189
basis points as compared to a pension fund that invests internally in real estate. Adding more
intermediaries in the asset management process, by investing through fund-of-funds, reduces
returns by at least 202 basis points.
In Panel B of Table 5.8 we examine the relation between performance in real estate sub-
categories and pension fund characteristics. In this panel, mandate size, costs and investment
approach variables refer to REITs and direct real estate investments, respectively. For REITs,
we use a shorter time period (1998-2009), as the number of observations during the first years
is low (see Figure 5.3 Panel A) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions assign equal weight
to every year in the second stage. Our results for REITs indicate that the size of REIT holdings
is positively related to performance, controlling for investment approach and costs. There is no
significant relation between investment costs or approach and net benchmark-adjusted returns
in REITs.
We find significantly positive economies of scale for direct real estate investments as well. A
one unit increase in the log of direct real estate assets improves the performance by 31 to 37 ba-
sis points. Higher investment costs in direct real estate are disproportionally negatively related
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Table 5.8: Regression results: performance and characteristics
We estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on the net benchmark-adjusted returns and correct
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using Newey-West with three lags. The net benchmark-
adjusted returns are constructed after deducting the costs and self-declared benchmark returns from
pension fund real estate returns. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the net benchmark-adjusted
return on all real estate assets of all pension funds. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the net
benchmark-adjusted return on REITs or direct real estate. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the
net benchmark-adjusted return on all assets managed internally, externally or via fund-of-funds. We
include the following characteristics: Mandate - log of total holdings in real estate (Panel A), log of
holdings in one subcategory (Panel B) or log of holdings in one investment approach (Panel C), Costs
- total costs for investing in real estate, subcategory of real estate or investment approach, %Ext - per-
centage of investments in external mandates, %Act - percentage in active mandates, %FoF - percentage
in fund-of-funds, and %LP - percentage in limited partnerships. We report standard errors in brackets
and significance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Cons. Mandate Costs %Ext %Act %FoF %LP # Funds # Obs.
Panel A: Performance and characteristics for all real estate assets
All assets -2.51*** 0.43*** 634 3,463
[0.37] [0.12]
All assets 1.06 -1.89*** -3.33*** 634 3,463
[0.75] [0.58] [0.98]
All assets -0.85 0.37*** -1.56** -3.05*** 634 3,463
[0.79] [0.13] [0.64] [0.87]
All assets -0.28 0.32** -1.03*** -1.02** -2.02*** 634 3,463
[0.97] [0.15] [0.36] [0.48] [0.69]
Panel B: Performance and characteristics by real estate subcategory
REITs -5.77*** 0.61*** 2.54 1.46 199 802
[2.24] [0.24] [1.74] [1.27]
REITs -6.38* 0.70** 0.13 2.42 1.61 199 802
[3.21] [0.32] [1.22] [1.47] [1.57]
Direct RE -0.85 0.37*** -1.66*** -3.59*** 0.25 608 3,324
[0.83] [0.10] [0.68] [1.05] [1.87]
Direct RE -0.02 0.31*** -1.11*** -1.22** -2.63*** 1.00 608 3,324
[1.05] [0.12] [0.34] [0.56] [0.78] [1.50]
Panel C: Performance and characteristics by investment approach
Internal -1.18 0.43* 141 761
[1.37] [0.26]
Internal -0.71 0.43 -2.56 141 761
[2.09] [0.28] [2.96]
External -2.29*** 0.35*** 580 2,937
[0.41] [0.13]
External -1.07 0.30** -1.13*** 580 2,937
[0.70] [0.14] [0.41]
FoF 1.48 -1.96 29 53
[4.94] [2.02]
FoF 4.92 -2.16 -1.05 29 53
[15.84] [2.50] [4.58]
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to net benchmark-adjusted returns. Higher allocations to external managers and fund-of-funds
also result in lower returns from direct real estate. Investing in direct real estate via external
managers instead of internal selection of properties results in a 122 to 166 basis point annual
decrease in the net benchmark-adjusted returns. Investing through fund-of-funds reduces the
net benchmark-adjusted returns by 263 to 359 basis points.
In Table 5.8 Panel C we analyze the relation between performance and characteristics per
investment approach.23 The results show that larger pension funds have better returns within
both internal and external real estate mandates. For externally managed portfolios, a one unit
increase in the log of assets improves the annual net benchmark-adjusted returns by 30 to 35 ba-
sis points. The scale effect is even stronger for internal management, where a one unit increase
in the log of assets increases the returns by 43 basis points. Investment costs are negatively
related to external management returns. A 100 basis point increase in the costs reduces returns
by 113 basis points per year.
The previous section showed that the last two years of the sample period had a strong in-
fluence on investment performance. As a robustness check, we examine whether the exclusion
of the 2008-2009 period influences the relation between real estate investment performance and
pension fund characteristics. The findings in Appendix Table C.1 confirm that size is positively
related to performance, while external management and investing in fund-of-funds have a dis-
proportionally negative effect on returns. Moreover, the economies of scale effect becomes even
stronger.
Summarizing, we document that pension funds investing internally in real estate outper-
form those funds opting for delegated investment management. Moreover, investing in real
estate through fund-of-funds results in substantial underperformance (more than 200 basis
points per year) as compared to other investment approaches, which may be due to multi-
ple layers of fees, lack of skill, and possibly greater agency conflicts. Larger funds seem to have
better skills, which enable them to select better properties when investing internally, and to
select better investment managers when investing externally. When investing externally, larger
funds are likely to get preferential treatment, have greater monitoring capacity and may have
access to better investment opportunities at lower cost. The positive relation between fund size
and performance is in line with evidence on private equity funds, for which a concave relation
between fund size and performance has been documented (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). In con-
trast, increased fund flows generally lead to underperformance for mutual funds (Chen et al.,
2004).
5.6.3 Persistence
We document that pension funds generally meet, but do not exceed the performance of their
benchmarks, and that performance is positively related to the size of real estate holdings, and
to the implementation of internal management. We examine whether there is persistence in the
performance of pension fund real estate investments, splitting pension funds into five quintiles
23For fund-of-funds we focus on a shorter time period (2007-2009) because the number of observations in the
earlier years is very low (see Figure 5.3 Panel B).
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based on their net benchmark-adjusted returns. Table 5.9 presents the transition matrixes, i.e.,
the probabilities that a fund ranked in one of the five quintiles in year t ends up in any of the
quintiles in year (t + 1). We also investigate the difference in returns in year (t + 1) between
funds ranked in the lowest and highest quintile in year t. Under the null hypothesis of no
persistence, the value of the difference in returns in year (t + 1) should be centered on zero,
which would mean that past performance is no prediction of future performance. Carpenter
and Lynch (1999) show that the t-test for the difference between top and bottom portfolios
ranked by past performance is best specified under the null hypothesis of no persistence, as it
is the most powerful against the alternatives considered.24
In Panel A of Table 5.9, we document strong persistence in the performance of pension
fund real estate investments. Funds are more likely to end up in a high-ranked quintile next
year if they perform well in this year, and funds are more likely to rank low next year if they
performed relatively poorly this year. Funds have, on average, a 30 percent chance to remain
in the same quintile, and if they do not, they are most likely to move to an adjacent quintile.
The results in Panel B show that there is no persistence in REIT performance. Pension funds
ranked in the highest quintile are in fact most likely to end up in the bottom quintile next year.
The difference in REIT returns between the top and bottom ranked funds in the following year
is small and insignificant. The overall persistence in real estate performance is entirely due to
the persistence in direct real estate performance, as shown in Panel C. The last columns of the
table provide the year (t+ 1) average net benchmark-adjusted return for the pension funds that
are in the lowest and highest ranked quintiles in year t, and the t-statistic for the performance
difference between the two groups. The net benchmark-adjusted return for the bottom quintile
is -3.26 percent, while the return is 1.56 percent for the top quintile. The difference is statistically
significant, with a t-statistic of 6.23.
The persistence in performance can potentially be explained by the fact that direct real es-
tate returns are susceptible to appraisal smoothing of property valuations.25 However, Geltner
and Goetzmann (2000) argue that the NCREIF Property Index, which captures direct real estate
investments, is more like an annual index, partially updated each quarter. Hence, the use of
annual returns in this paper should help minimize the problems associated with “stale” ap-
praisals of direct real estate returns. Nevertheless, we also address the persistence in pension
fund performance in direct real estate by using a two-year horizon, when the appraisal smooth-
ing effect should have lapsed. Table 5.9 Panel D shows that 29.82 percent of the funds in the
best performing quintile in year t will end up in the same quintile two years later. Funds are
also more likely to end up in the worst performing quintile in year (t + 2), if they were ranked
in that quintile in year t. The difference in returns in years (t + 2) between the best and worst
performing pension funds ranked in year t is 1.98 percentage points (t-statistic of 2.46).
24Similar methodology has been used by Tonks (2005) to examine the persistence in pension fund returns and
Carhart (1997) to examine the performance persistence among mutual funds.
25For instance, the NCREIF database has various statistical problems, including smoothing and lagging due to
the partial adjustment in the index caused by the stale valuations, and artificial seasonality in the index returns due
to the clustering of the reappraisals in the fourth calendar quarter.
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Table 5.9: Persistence in the performance of pension fund real estate investments
Pension funds are placed into quintiles based on their total net benchmark-adjusted returns (Panel A),
direct real estate returns (Panels B and C) and REIT returns (Panel D). High row or column represents
the quintile with the highest return. In the transition matrices, percentages represent the probability
that a fund which was ranked in one of the five quintiles in year t ends up in any of the quintiles in
year (t + 1). Return in (t + 1) columns present the total, direct real estate and REIT net benchmark-
adjusted returns in year (t + 1) of the top and bottom quintiles, which are formed in year t. The Test
Di f f column is a t-statistic of the difference in net benchmark-adjusted returns between the low and
high quintile. In Panel C, we investigate the persistence in the performance of pension fund direct real
estate investments over a two-year horizon to control for possible short-term smoothing of the returns.
In Panel D, the analysis of persistence in performance of pension fund REIT investments is based on the
1998-2009 period, whereas in the other panels we employ the entire sample period.
Panel A: All real estate
Year (t+1) ranking Return in (t+1) Test
Low 2 3 4 High Low High Diff
Low 34.10% 22.04% 16.01% 12.89% 14.97% -2.95 1.31 5.89***
2 22.11% 27.01% 23.09% 14.48% 13.31%
Year t ranking 3 15.54% 20.12% 29.08% 21.31% 13.94%
4 12.14% 15.61% 16.38% 31.98% 23.89%
High 16.57% 12.48% 11.70% 20.66% 38.60%
Panel B: REITs (1998-2009 period)
Year (t+1) ranking Return in (t+1) Test
Low 2 3 4 High Low High Diff
Low 30.36% 13.39% 15.18% 21.43% 19.64% -0.56 -0.35 0.13
2 16.04% 31.13% 29.25% 14.15% 9.43%
Year t ranking 3 13.16% 28.07% 18.42% 24.56% 15.79%
4 15.97% 10.92% 25.21% 30.25% 17.65%
High 31.19% 12.84% 16.51% 14.68% 24.77%
Panel C: Direct real estate (one-year persistence)
Year (t+1) ranking Return in (t+1) Test
Low 2 3 4 High Low High Diff
Low 34.30% 22.11% 16.94% 13.84% 12.81% -3.26 1.56 6.23***
2 19.80% 27.96% 23.06% 15.10% 14.08%
Year t ranking 3 15.43% 20.04% 26.65% 22.44% 15.43%
4 13.43% 15.70% 17.98% 29.75% 23.14%
High 15.34% 12.55% 12.75% 20.32% 39.04%
Panel D: Direct real estate (two-years persistence)
Year (t+2) ranking Return in (t+2) Test
Low 2 3 4 High Low High Diff
Low 26.24% 20.44% 17.13% 16.85% 19.34% -1.43 0.55 2.46***
2 20.16% 26.26% 20.69% 18.04% 14.85%
Year t ranking 3 13.40% 19.60% 27.79% 23.33% 15.88%
4 16.71% 17.72% 18.73% 24.81% 22.03%
High 18.30% 16.54% 15.54% 19.80% 29.82%
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In Appendix Table C.2 we examine whether the persistence results are robust to controlling
to the effect of size and investment approach on performance. We run an ordered logit model,
where the dependent variable is the quintile ranking based on the performance in year t+ 1 and
the main independent variable is the quintile ranking in year t, while controlling for real estate
mandate size and investment approach. The results indicate that pension fund performance
ranking in year t has a significant positive effect on the performance ranking in year t + 1. For
example, looking at all real estate assets (Panel A), an increase in the quintile ranking from 3 to
4 increases the probability of ranking among the best performers in year t + 1 by 4.5%. Again,
we document persistence only for pension fund performance in direct real estate.
These results suggest that certain pension funds are persistently more likely to outperform
(or underperform) their direct real estate benchmarks, while that is not the case for REIT in-
vestors. This finding may be explained by the fact that direct real estate markets are illiquid
and not very transparent, which may give insiders an edge. On the other hand, the stock list-
ing of REITs makes the REIT market more transparent and efficient, and outperformance more
difficult. Additionally, higher transaction costs and market illiquidity limit the possibility to
exploit persistence in direct real estate returns.26
Similar to our findings on persistence in direct real estate performance, persistence has been
documented among private equity funds and hedge funds as well. Kaplan and Schoar (2005)
find substantial persistence in leverage buyout (LBO) and venture capital (VC) fund perfor-
mance. General partners (GPs) whose private equity funds outperform the industry in one
fund are likely to outperform the industry in the next and vice versa. Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and
Ramadorai (2008) document that better performing hedge funds, generating positive alpha, are
less likely to be liquidated, and have a higher propensity to persistently deliver alpha.
5.7 Conclusion
Comparable to investments in private equity and hedge funds, pension funds face a palette of
choices to deploy capital in the illiquid property market, the most significant alternative asset
class. The allocations to real estate can be managed internally, externally and through fund-of-
funds, and can be invested both in REITs and directly in fixed assets. This offers the opportu-
nity to investigate the impact of delegated investment management on costs and performance
of investments in private markets. Binsbergen et al. (2008) argue that investing through mul-
tiple external asset managers is costly, as it causes agency conflicts between the institutional
investor and external managers. We evaluate whether sufficiently large investors can reduce
these agency conflicts in diversification, risk-taking and investment horizon objectives, by es-
tablishing an internal asset management division, instead of delegating the asset management
decisions. According to Stoughton et al. (2011) financial intermediation model, if it is costly
26Prior research on performance persistence in real estate has arrived at similar conclusions. Among mutual funds
that invest only in the REIT sector, Kallberg, Liu, and Trzcinka (2000) document little evidence of persistence. On
the other hand, among fund managers investing in the direct real estate market, Bond and Mitchell (2010) document
performance persistence over a short-term horizon, but there is little evidence of persistence in fund returns over a
medium and long-term horizon.
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to identify higher quality fund managers, the choice between direct and intermediated asset
management will depend upon investor size, since search costs are more easily offset by better
performance on a larger investment.
Exploiting the access to a unique sample of pension funds, we document that the costs
and performance of pension fund real estate investments are mainly determined by two main
variables: mandate size and the choice to invest internally or externally. We find strong scale
advantages in pension fund real estate investments: large pension funds not only have lower
investment costs, but also achieve higher net benchmark-adjusted returns. This is partly due
to the fact that larger funds are more likely to opt for internal management, rather than select-
ing financial intermediaries. Internal management is associated with substantially lower costs
and better gross performance as compared to external managers. Moreover, even when large
pension funds select an external investment approach, they seem to have better skills than the
smaller pension funds in our sample. When investing through financial intermediaries in real
estate, larger funds can presumably assert more negotiating power, which then leads to access
to more favorable investment opportunities at lower costs.
Surprisingly, larger funds are also more likely to invest in REITs, whereas smaller funds
allocate more capital to fund-of-funds in direct real estate. Investing through fund-of-funds re-
sults in substantial underperformance as compared to other investment approaches. This is at
least partly due to multiple layers of fees, but fund-of-fund managers also seem to lack unique
skills in selecting investment managers, since both their gross and net benchmark-adjusted re-
turns are significantly negative. Especially smaller pension funds do not seem to recognize that
REITs represent an investment approach in real estate that is comparable to selecting external
managers investing in direct real estate (and much better than fund-of-funds managers), but
with substantially lower investment costs.
Overall, the behavior of small and large pension funds suggests that there may be differ-
ences between the two groups, with relatively less sophisticated agents among smaller funds,
and more sophisticated agents, with an ability to detect profitable real estate investments,
among larger funds. Lerner et al. (2007) document that agency conflicts and information gaps
associated with assessing private equity fund portfolios lead to dramatic disparities in the per-
formance of venture capital investments across different classes of institutional investors. We
document that such information gaps and agency problems can also lead to performance dif-
ferences within one class of institutional investors – pension funds. These results are consistent
with the predictions from the Stoughton et al. (2011) model of financial intermediation, where
underperforming assets (funds) can only be sold via financial intermediaries to unsophisticated
investors. Our results on the effect of delegated investment management on performance are
also in line with Agarwal et al. (2013) finding that the performance of institutions investing in
funds of hedge funds is worse than the performance of those institutions investing directly in
hedge funds.
Fund-of-funds in direct real estate perform worse than REIT mutual funds and funds in-
vesting in hedge funds. The literature on the performance of REIT mutual funds shows that
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this industry generates an average alpha that is either zero or significantly positive.27 Funds
investing in hedge funds deliver small alphas, albeit sporadically (Fung et al., 2008), but there
is no significant underperformance among hedge funds-of-funds either. Compared to these
benchmarks, fund-of-funds in direct real estate perform poorly, so it seems surprising that
small pension funds increasingly use their services. However, this behavior is consistent with
the Lakonishok et al. (1992) model of pension fund portfolio management: despite higher costs
and lower returns, pension funds will maintain a preference for external management and
fund-of-funds, as a way to shift responsibility for potentially poor performance to the exter-
nal manager, and even to shift the responsibility for poor selection of managers to the fund-
of-funds manager. Goyal and Wahal (2008) show that pension funds continuously engage in
hiring and firing external money managers, even though these decisions have, on average, no
effect on their performance, while creating substantial transition costs.
This paper has some general implications for institutional investors investing in real estate.
Pension funds should consider the full range of possible approaches to real estate investments
and avoid extended chains of financial intermediaries. Particularly smaller funds should re-
evaluate their extensive use of fund-of-funds to gain exposure to direct real estate and consider
substituting part of this allocation with REITs. Smaller pension funds can also implement more
passive strategies in REIT investments in order to remain cost-competitive with larger funds.
27For instance, Cici, Corgel, and Gibson (2011) find that REIT mutual funds obtained significant abnormal net
returns, while Hartzell et al. (2010) document that REIT mutual funds deliver alpha close to zero and fail to outper-
form any alternative benchmark net of fees.
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Table C.1: Regression results: performance and characteristics 1990-2007
We estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions on the net benchmark-adjusted returns and correct
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using Newey-West with three lags. The net benchmark-
adjusted returns are constructed after deducting the costs and self-declared benchmark returns from
pension fund real estate returns. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the net benchmark-adjusted
return on all real estate assets of all pension funds. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the net
benchmark-adjusted return on REITs or direct real estate. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the
net benchmark-adjusted return on all assets managed internally, externally or via fund-of-funds. We
include the following characteristics: Mandate - log of total holdings in real estate (Panel A), log of
holdings in one subcategory (Panel B) or log of holdings in one investment approach (Panel C), Costs
- total costs for investing in real estate, subcategory of real estate or investment approach, %Ext - per-
centage of investments in external mandates, %Act - percentage in active mandates, %FoF - percentage
in fund-of-funds, and %LP - percentage in limited partnerships. We report standard errors in brackets
and significance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Cons. Mandate Costs %Ext %Act %FoF %LP #Funds # Obs.
Panel A: Performance and characteristics for all real estate assets
All assets -2.35*** 0.52*** 570 2,985
[0.42] [0.10]
All assets 1.45 -1.63*** -3.38*** 570 2,985
[0.89] [0.49] [1.08]
All assets -1.14 0.48*** -1.17*** -2.87*** 570 2,985
[0.70] [0.09] [0.42] [0.89]
All assets -0.78 0.45*** -0.75** -0.79** -2.21*** 570 2,985
[0.77] [0.09] [0.30] [0.37] [0.80]
Panel B: Performance and characteristics by real estate subcategory
REITs -6.51** 0.81*** 2.27 1.74 166 601
[2.76] [0.32] [2.04] [1.50]
REITs -7.08* 0.87** -0.40 2.26 2.10 166 601
[3.30] [0.36] [1.27] [1.53] [1.33]
Direct RE -0.90 0.44*** -1.23*** -3.39*** 1.48 543 2,869
[0.89] [0.08] [0.43] [1.06] [1.58]
Direct RE -0.35 0.41*** -0.89*** -0.90** -2.67*** 1.67 543 2,869
[1.00] [0.08] [0.32] [0.37] [0.85] [1.48]
Panel C: Performance and characteristics by investment approach
Internal -1.79 0.60*** 130 665
[1.25] [0.22]
Internal -1.30 0.58** -2.13 130 665
[2.18] [0.27] [3.18]
External -2.14*** 0.46*** 519 2,520
[0.44] [0.10]
External -1.32* 0.43*** -0.86** 519 2,520
[0.73] [0.10] [0.37]
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Table C.2: Regression results: performance persistence
The net benchmark-adjusted returns are constructed after deducting the costs and self-declared bench-
mark returns from pension fund real estate returns. Pension funds are placed into quintiles based on
their total net benchmark-adjusted returns (Panel A), direct real estate returns (Panels B and C) and
REIT returns (Panel D). In Panel C, we investigate the persistence in the performance of pension fund
direct real estate investments over a two-year horizon to control for possible short-term smoothing of
the returns. In Panel D, the analysis of persistence in performance of pension fund REIT investments is
based on the 1998-2009 period, whereas in the other panels we employ the entire sample period. The
coefficients in the table present the marginal effects after an ordered logit model. The dependent vari-
able is the quintile ranking based on returns in year t. We show the marginal effects for the probability
to be ranked in the quintile with lowest and in the quintile with the highest returns. The Rank(t−1)
variable is the quintile ranking in the previous year. The Rank(t−2) variable is the quintile ranking two
years ago. We also include the following variables: Mandate - log of total holdings in real estate (Panel
A), log of REIT holdings (Panel B) or log of direct real estate holdings (Panels C and D), Costs - total
costs for investing in real estate, REITs or direct real estate, %Ext - percentage of investments in external
mandates, %Act - percentage in active mandates, %FoF - percentage in fund-of-funds, and %LP - per-
centage in limited partnerships. The marginal effects are estimated at the median values. In the ordered
logit model we also add year dummy variables and cluster the standard errors by funds. We report
standard errors in brackets and significance levels with *, ** and ***, which correspond to 0.10, 0.05 and
0.01, respectively.
Rank(t−1) Rank(t−2) Mandate Costs %Ext %Act %FoF %LP YD
Panel A: All real estate assets
Low ranking -0.054*** -0.016*** 0.059*** 0.033* 0.002 Yes
[0.007] [0.004] [0.019] [0.020] [0.062]
High ranking 0.045*** 0.013*** -0.048*** -0.027* -0.002 Yes
[0.006] [0.003] [0.017] [0.016] [0.051]
Panel B: Direct real estate (one-year persistence)
Low ranking -0.053*** -0.013*** 0.045*** 0.042** 0.022 0.039 Yes
[0.006] [0.004] [0.017] [0.018] [0.046] [0.045]
High ranking 0.048*** 0.012*** -0.041** -0.038*** -0.020 -0.035 Yes
[0.006] [0.003] [0.017] [0.015] [0.042] [0.041]
Panel C: Direct real estate (two-year persistence)
Low ranking -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.074*** 0.058** 0.087* 0.039 Yes
[0.005] [0.005] [0.021] [0.025] [0.050] [0.062]
High ranking 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.073* -0.033 Yes
[0.005] [0.004] [0.020] [0.019] [0.041] [0.052]
Panel D: REITs (1998-2009)
Low ranking -0.010 -0.021* -0.037 -0.025 -0.086** Yes
[0.011] [0.012] [0.068] [0.041] [0.036]
High ranking 0.009 0.018* 0.031 0.022 0.074* Yes
[0.009] [0.010] [0.054] [0.037] [0.039]
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Conclusion
6.1 Agency conflicts among defined benefit pension funds
In investment management, pension funds and other institutions serve as agents that enable
the principle, plan members, to save for retirement or reach other financial goals. People rely on
DB pension funds to manage their wealth because these funds provide insurance to members
against the risk of outliving their assets by allowing for intergenerational and intragenerational
risk sharing (Ball and Mankiw, 2007; Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005). However, DB pen-
sion funds also serve as agent for multiple principles: different generations of plan members
as well as for the taxpayers, if the pension benefits are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed. In
this dissertation, I show that this agency relations in DB retirement systems could create two
agency conflicts.
First, different generations of plan members have opposing interests when the pension fund
is underfunded. Current stakeholders have an incentive to postpone restructuring the pension
benefit promises and to transfer the underfunding risk to future generations. Chapter 2 shows
that pension fund asset allocation decisions implemented by the current generation can be
influenced by the regulatory incentives to mask funding problems and shift the risk to future
generations as well as to taxpayers.
Second, when people delegate the management of their retirement saving to pension funds,
plan members trade off higher anticipated returns from these intermediaries against the in-
creased difficulty in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty about their true
incentives and skills. The management of retirement assets involves multiple levels of inter-
mediaries, such as pension fund executives, asset managers, placement agents, consultants
and actuaries. Chapters 4 and 5 show that multiple layers of intermediation result in higher
investment costs and lower performance, especially in alternative assets.
Both of these agency conflicts can be reduced substantially by greater transparency in the
pension fund reporting of financial situation as well as in the relations between pension funds
and asset management intermediaries.
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6.1.1 Implications for pension fund regulation
My research on U.S. public pension funds documents that their regulation permits the current
generation to shift concealed funding deficits to future generations by using liability discount
rates based on the expected rate of return, not the riskiness of promised pension benefits. This
regulation can lead to substantial intergenerational redistribution of wealth and I argue that
the policy pertaining to U.S. public pension funds needs a reform.
Pension fund accounting standards should promote transparency, which includes making
fair disclosure of the funding situation. The current regulation of U.S. public pension funds
permits smoothing of the asset value and discounting the liabilities with the expected rate of re-
turn. These valuation rules obscure pension plans true funding status and impact pension fund
planning, budgeting and restructuring. In 2010, the average self-declared funding ratio of U.S.
public pension funds, estimated using these rules, was equal to 75 percent. In order to over-
come this significant underfunding, the vast majority of U.S. public pension funds would have
to modify the pension deal. However, restructuring of the contribution rates and promised
pension benefits cannot be successful and fair across generations, if it is based on self-reported
funding ratios which do not reflect the financial situation. Hence, increasing the transparency
in U.S. public pension fund reporting is a necessary precondition before discussing the poten-
tial reforms.
In my policy implications, I do not want to make any assertion about the optimal fund-
ing level of pension plans. Ricardo (1820) postulates that it is irrelevant for the public welfare
whether the current spending is financed with debt or taxes. However, the Ricardian equiv-
alence is applicable to the intergenerational consequences of public pension debt only if the
current and future generations are informed about the level of pension plan underfunding
and state indebtedness. The current regulation of U.S. public pension funds camouflages their
funding situation and indirectly the state indebtedness, making it difficult for people to esti-
mate the magnitude of intergenerational transfers. I believe that it is important to provide the
plan members and taxpayers with accurate estimates of pension fund financial situation and
their projected cash-flows in order to enable them to make sound financial decisions.
6.1.2 Implications for pension fund investment management
The investment management of retirement assets involves many intermediaries, such as pen-
sion fund boards and executives, asset managers, placement agents and consultants. These
intermediaries provide expertise in information gathering and scale advantages in investment
costs. However, the multiple layers of intermediation can also create agency conflicts and mis-
alignment of objectives, which will reduce the retirement wealth of plan participants.
DB pension funds are among the largest institutional investors. The large size enables them
to obtain scale advantages in information gathering as well as in the investment costs, but
also makes DB funds prone to liquidity-related diseconomies of scale. According to Chapter
3, large pension funds experience diseconomies of scale when they invest actively in multiple
asset classes, such as equities and bonds. In these assets, some larger pension funds could
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have performed better, if they had invested in passive mandates without frequent rebalancing
decisions. Instead of focusing on traditional active management, DB pension funds can benefit
more from designing dynamic asset allocation and market timing policies.
In alternative assets, institutional investors delegate more than 85 percent of the asset man-
agement to financial intermediaries, even though multiple layers of intermediation result in
higher investment costs and lower performance. These results suggest that part of the delega-
tion decisions of pension funds may be made sub-optimally and driven by considerations other
than where the best investment opportunities. For instance, institutional investors may retain
underperforming intermediaries because delegation reduces their anxiety about taking risk as
compared to internal investing. Pension funds delegating the asset management to interme-
diaries in order to shift responsibility perceive the returns delivered by these intermediaries
as less risky than those delivered by an internal investment division (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 2013; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992). If institutional investors delegate the
asset management to intermediaries in order to shift responsibility and reduce perceived risk,
than they violate their fiduciary duty and do not act in the best interest of their beneficiaries.
Based on Chapters 4 and 5, larger pension funds should evaluate the possibility to re-
duce the intermediation by investing internally in alternative asset classes. Smaller pension
funds should consider substituting fund-of-funds with other less intermediated investment
approaches, and specializing in one alternative asset class, instead of simultaneously investing
in multiple alternative assets. If smaller investors do not have sufficient capacity to manage
alternative investments, they should invest passively in public equity.
6.2 Future research
6.2.1 The effect of regulation and governance on asset allocation policy
In Chapter 2, I examine the risk-taking and liabilities valuation of pension funds. Using data
on U.S., Canadian and European defined benefit pension funds, I study how pension funds
modify their asset allocation policy over time in response to maturing member population and
declining interest rates, and whether the changes in strategic asset allocation policy depend
on the differences in regulation of liability discount rates. U.S. public funds face distinct reg-
ulations that link the liability discount rate to their expected return on assets rather than to
the riskiness of their promised pension benefits. Accordingly, they behave differently from all
other pension funds. In the past two decades, U.S. public pension funds uniquely increased
allocations to riskier investments to maintain high discount rates (especially as more mem-
bers retired), thereby camouflaging the degree of underfunding. This increased risk-taking is
associated with an annual underperformance of more than 60 basis points.
However, even among U.S. public pension funds, there is substantial heterogeneity in strate-
gic asset allocation, fund maturity and liability valuation. I plan to extend this research by
examining the governance of pension funds. The governance of pension funds is important
because the increased risk-taking and underfunding can lead to redistribution across genera-
tions and may create significant conflicts of interest between current and future stakeholders. I
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plan to analyze whether the cross-sectional differences in contribution rates, allocation to risky
asset and liability discount rates can be explained by the composition of pension fund Board of
Truestees and by the characteristics of pension fund executives.
For example, board members who represent the general public are always appointed and
do not participate in the pension plan themselves, which suggests that they have different in-
centives from employee and retiree representatives, who are pension fund participants. Whereas
board members representing actual pension participants (either employees or retirees) would
likely give a higher priority to the economic welfare of the pension plan participants, board
members representing the general public may give a relatively higher priority to the provision
of public services more generally rather than funding pension plans in particular.
Overall, I would like to extend my empirical work on pension fund asset allocation and
regulation by studying how the board composition and the background of their executives
affect pension fund asset allocation, benefit payments and funding level.
6.2.2 Institutional investor asset management decisions
Institutional investors continuously engage in asset management through changing the strate-
gic asset allocation weights over time, deviating from those in short-term market timing, and
by selecting particular securities within asset classes.
Changes in asset allocation policy result in positive abnormal returns, which are due to
pension funds changing their asset allocation policy across broader asset classes over time, not
to changes within equity or fixed income. Market timing also delivers a positive alpha that is
larger among smaller pension funds. Market timing alpha is due to passive market movements,
and pension funds have the ability to exploit ‘time series’ momentum by investing in multiple
asset classes at the same time. However, pension funds do not have active rebalancing skills.
These results suggest that funds that try to stay as close as possible to their strategic asset
allocation policy may miss market timing opportunities. If fund managers can obtain positive
returns from the passive market movements due to time series momentum, letting the actual
weights deviate from the strategic weights and not rebalancing back immediately can in fact
improve performance. Security selection delivers an insignificant negative return after risk-
adjusting and controlling for the momentum factor.
Larger pension funds do not manage to transfer their lower investment costs into higher
net returns. Rather, I document diseconomies of scale in pension fund performance. The dis-
economies of scale are primarily apparent for funds investing in less liquid assets, as proxied
by fund total return loadings on the traded systematic liquidity factor. As a result, the perfor-
mance of large pension funds seems to be subject to size-induced liquidity limitations. These
liquidity limitations related to size are significant in all three asset management components.
Smaller pension funds obtain higher total returns and especially higher market timing returns.
I would like to extend this research by examining pension fund holdings on a security level,
which will provide more precise of the pension fund exposure to illiquid assets. These holdings
data will enable me to test whether the long-term liability structure enables pension funds to
exploit the illiquidity premium in public as well as private markets. Pension fund holdings data
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can also provide an opportunity to test the Berk and Green (2004) model of decreasing returns
of scale. Pension funds invest through both internal and external managers, and combine both
active and passive strategies. According to Berk and Green (2004) model, the amount of assets
that pension funds could manage successfully by active internal mandates is limited, but large
pension funds may potentially avoid the scale disadvantages by invetsing in passive mandates
or by selecting multiple external managers.
6.2.3 Investing in alternative assets
Over the last decades, institutional investors have increased especially the amount of invest-
ments in alternative asset classes, attracted by the promise of superior absolute returns and
low correlation with traditional assets such as equities and bonds. In Chapters 4 and 5, I ex-
amine the allocations of institutional investors to private equity, real estate and hedge funds,
focusing on how levels of intermediation and specialization relate to costs and performance of
institutional investors in alternative assets.
When delegating the asset management to financial intermediaries, institutional investors
trade-off higher anticipated returns from these intermediaries against the increased difficulty
in coordinating their risk-taking and the greater uncertainty about their true incentives and
skills. In private equity, real estate and hedge fund investments, I can distinguish three levels
of intermediaries serving as interface between investors and assets. Institutional investors can
manage the alternative investments internally (in-house), delegate the asset management to
external managers or delegate even the selection of external managers to fund-of-funds.
I document that institutional investors that invest through internal managers tend to per-
form better than their counterparts, which rely on financial intermediaries, in all three alter-
native asset classes: real assets, private equity and hedge funds. Fund-of-funds significantly
underperform as compared to external and internal managers, while external managers under-
perform internal managers. The outperformance of internal managers compared to financial
intermediaries stems from two sources. First, for sufficiently large institutional investors, estab-
lishing internal management divisions costs significantly less than investing through external
managers and fund-of-funds. Second, internal managers can successfully compete with finan-
cial intermediaries in the private markets and manage to obtain similar or higher gross returns
in all three alternative asset classes.
I would like to extend this research by merging the CEM institutional investor data with
more detailed datasets on an asset class level for private equity, real estate or hedge fund invest-
ments. This would enable me to study the exact deals in alternative assets, while controlling for
investor characteristics. Using data on an asset class level will enable me to measure precisely
the risk and location of different alternative investments. Riskier and more distant alternative
investment may require higher levels of expertise, which financial intermediaries may possess.
There can be significant differences between the institutional investments managed internally
and those delegated to financial intermediaries. Furthermore, it is relevant to study the num-
ber of deals that institutions manage in alternative assets. Managing less deals simultaneously
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reduces the monitoring costs and potential agency conflicts, but exposes investors to diversi-
fication problems. Overall, I would like to study whether the riskiness, location and number
of alternative investments are related to the intermediation level and specialization, while con-
trolling for institutional investor size and strategic asset allocation policy.
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